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EDMISTEN, et al. (North Carolina officials)

v.

Ttfcu:..t..- JuOG L 0 U "t 1\.lC-.'T court."1 UU\App. from EDNC (Phillips [CJ], Britt
[CDJ] , Dupree [DJ] )

ov

GINGLEA, et al.(class of
voters)
SUMMARY:

Timely

Appellants challenge the EDNC's conclusion that seven

of North Carolina's legislative
~~

Federal/Civil

Act of 1965.

districts ~iolate

§2 of the Voting

Resolution of the appeal requires a ruling on

r~-u. ~ ~ lntU~ a. ~ ~ ~ tiu· (M~ [1/YVC&.d-; twf ~ wutU i ul 0
~ pyV 'Z ~ (!.~ hOJA). ~/df;. k_.

-
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Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Responding to the 1980 census, the

NC General Assembly adopted in October 1981 a redistricting plan for
the state's House of Representatives and Senate.

Because 40 of NC's

100 counties were covered by §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42

u.s.c.

§1973c, the new plan was submitted to the Attorney General for

preclearance.

The plan did not divide any counties: thus in large
~-

=~-c>

~

population areas, voters in one district would elect several legislators.

The AG found this objectionable because it "necessarily sub-

iv/~

merges cognizable minority population concentrations into larger white
electorates."

Twice again the General Assembly revised the plan, ~ di\'

viding more counties each time, before the AG finally precleared the
~~
redistricting plan on April 30, 1982.
~~
While the General Assembly and the AG were busy devising a plan
acceptable under §5, this class action, brought by black voters in the
state, proceeded through pretrial stages.

--

The final amended complaint

included a claim that seven legislative districts violated §2 of the

------------------

Voting Rights Act, as amended on June 29, 1982.

Six of these dis-

tricts were multi-member configurations, which allegedly diluted the
votes of blacks.

One single-member district was challenged:

~f ~

that district's registered voters were black, but appellees claimed
that

in the boundaries so that blacks could con-

stitute 61% of the voters (i.e., a safe district in which to elect a
~

black state senator).
precleared by the AG.
~

Two of the contested districts were in the area
c---

- 3 -

~he

case was tried before a

~ree-judge

court (Phillips, Britt,

Dupree) from July 25, 1983 till August 3, 1983.

The court unanimously

--------

ruled in appellees' favor on January 24, 1984.

---------~-------------------------The EDNC's Opinion and Ruling --Congress amended §2 in 1982 1 to

remove the requirement that plaintiffs prove discriminatory intent.
Congress was concerned with more than racist motives; it also wanted
to

~--------------------------------------------~

liminate electoral mechanisms that, "in the totality of the cir-

cumstances," have "dilutive effects."

I

Thus amended §2 codifies voting

rights cases prior to Mobile v. Bolden, 446

u.s.

55 (1980), when the

Court first injected an intent requirement into the 15th Amend and §2.
~

The Court's opinion in White v. Register, 412

plies the current statutory definition of

u.s.

illeg~ l

755 (1973), supdil ution: racial

bloc voting interacts with certain electoral mechanism to deprive minority groups of the representation (i.e., voting success) that their

1 current §2 reads:
"
(a)
No voting qualification or prereqisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in
the denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set ~ tion 4(f) (2), as
provided in subsection (b) •
(b)
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on
the totali
of the circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes lead1n
o nomrnation or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of
a protected class have been elected to office in the State or
itical subdvision is one circumstance which may be considered:
rov ded, That nothing in this section establishes a right to lA
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to ~\
their proportion in the population."

- 4 -

numbers would otherwise warrant.

Vote dilution may occur when blacks

are submerged in a multi-member district with a majority of white voters, or when a safe concentration of black voters (about 60% of the
electorate) is fractured into two "unsafe" districts.

Congress recog-

nized that amended §2 could result in the creation of single-member
districts defined by color (so-called racial ghettos): but it was
willing to pay that price in the hope that all voters would have equal
O?POrtunites to elect representatives of their choice.
In NC there is a long history of discrimination against black
citizens in voting matters.

Indeed, not until around 1970 did the

State Bd of Elections officially direct cessation of all literacy
tests.

7

As a result, to this day black voter registration remains de-

pressed.

~he

inequality of access to the political process has con-

tributed to the fact that, in general, blacks in NC are poorer and

??
..

~--Ys ~l
t'1ca 1 campa1gns
.
. 1 appea
Rac1a
1n po 1~
are
. -"'\
a persistent state tradition. Black citizens are being elected to

.
1 ess e d uca t e d th an wh 1tes.

positions with increasing frequency, but blacks still do not have anything

approachinq 1 ~roportional representatio~~ (~~~
Racial bloc voting exists in the challenged seven districts. ~)

the average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the primary elections.

And racial polarization operates to

minimize the strength of black voters • . Holding all other factors constant, therefore, it is a great adavantage for a legislative candidate
in the seven districts to be white.
In sum, considering all of the circumstances--the effects of official discrimination, the relatively worse socio-economic conditions
of blacks, the existence of racial appeals in campaigns, and the fact

- 5 -

of racial bloc voting--there is a real danger that blacks will not
have an eaual OP?Ortunity to participate in the election process and
to elect representatives of their choice.

That danger is realized in

the contested seven districts because the multi-member districts make
blacks a distinct minority, and the single-member district fractures a
black population into two districts in which they are voting minorities.

Accordingly, the NC redistricting plan, as it applies to these

districts, violates §2 of the Voting Rights Act and the defendants are
enjoined from conducting elections pursuant to the present arrangement.
CONTENTIONS:
Appellants

1.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act guarantees

equal access to the political process, not electoral success.

The

EDNC, however, has held that wh~never there is something like racial
bloc voting, legislators must be elected from single-member districts
that reflect the racial composition of the state.

In other words, the

EDNC is determined to see that the percentage of blacks in the legislature equals the perecentage of blacks in the population.

This is

flatly inconsistent with amended §2(b), which states that "nothing in
this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."

This

Court should note probable jurisdiction to interpret the meaning and
scope of this new legislation.
2.

The two challenged districts that were precleared pursuant to !

§5 of the Voting Rights Act are immunized from private attacks under
§2.

The test of a valid legislative district under §2 is the same

standard that the AG applies in his preclearance ivestigation.

Thus,

-

6 -

collateral estoppel applies and the General Assembly need not restructure districts that satisfied the AG.
3.

The EDNC's finding of racial polarization (so-called racial

bloc voting)
4.

is clearly erroneous.

The lower court disregarded the testimony of many black lead-

ers who testified that blacks have equal electoral access, and that
"safe" black districts would further separate the voters along racial
lines.
Appellees

The EDNC examined the relevant factors in reaching

the conclusion that blacks in the seven districts do not have an equal
chance to elect candidates of their choice.

The court's factual find-

ings (such as racial polarization) are not clearly erroneous.

And

private individuals may challenge even precleared voting rules and
practices: the standards under §2 and §5 of the Act are different.
Moreover, because the AG's preclearance proceedings are nonadversarial, they deserve no preclusive (collateral estoppel) effect
in this action.
DISCUSSION:

This Court has GVR'd several cases in light of Con-

gress' 1982 amendments to §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

See

Escambia County v. McMillan, No. 82-1295 (Mar. 27, 1984): Cross v.
Baxter, 82-1360 (April 4, 1983).

Two other appeals involving applica-

tions of amended §2 are currently on summer lists.

See Miss. Repub.

Exec. Comm v. Brooks, No-1722 (S.L. 5, page 1): Strake v. Seamon, No.
83-1823 (S.L. 11, page 1).

The opinions in these cases are represent-

-

ative of lower court opinions in the area; they are long, highly factual, and
~

1984).

----

~ess.

,-------.

See, e.g., Jones v. Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (CAS

Everyone knows -that the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982
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did something extraordinary, but defining that something has proved
difficult.

I believe that the time has arrived to CVSG.

Se~n

___

2, which is enforceable by private individuals, has
...._
na-

tional application and is not limited to situations where a state or
city chan

--------

"standard, practice, or procedure," 42
suspect.

u.s.c.

1973(a), is potentially

What makes a suspicious "standard, practice, or procedure"

illegal, however, is far from clear.
In United States v. Marengo County Comm., 731 F.2d 1546 (CAll
1984) , the court wrote that "Congress wished to eliminate any intent
requirement from section 2, and therefore changed the terms of §2(a)
to forbid any practice that 'results in' discrimination."
1563.

Id., at

There ' is language in the statute supporting such a view.

Sec-

tion 2(b) states that it is a violation of the section if the political processes provide members of a protected class with "less opportunity than other members of the electorate • • • to elect representatives of their choice."

This langauge suggests that a court must

examine election results and declare a process illegal if blacks (or
other members of a protected minority) are unable to pool their votes
to elect black candidates.
Sess. 30 (1981)

Accord, H.R. Rep. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st

(election system illegal if it "accomplishes a dis-

criminatory [unequal?] result").
On the other hand, amended §2 states "that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected
in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."
ate Report recites that the purpose of the

And, the_p enen-

sure that minorities have "an equal chance to participate in the elec-

- 8 -

toral process."

s.

Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 {1982).

This legislative purpose animated the E.D.Tex {Johnson, Parker, Steger
[diss]) when it upheld, against a §2 attack, the reapportionmnent of
congressional districts in Texas.

See Juris. Stat. in Strake v.

Seamon {No. 83-1823), at A-1-11 to A-1-13.
One thing is reasonably clear.
to this Court's decision
o~ly

in~obile

Amended §2 is Congress' response
v. Bolden, supra, which held that

intentional discrimination violates the 15th Amend.

There is

evidence, however, that Congress misread Bolden as requiring direct
proof of racism.

If so, Congress' wish to return to pre-Belden deci-

sions may mean that amended §2 still requires some finding of racial
animus, but very circumstantial proof will suffice.

Or the 97th Con-

gress may have correctly understood the import of Bolden and passed an
extraordinary law--one that, in the words of DJ Steger, renders illegal those voting practices that do not maximize "the political interests of minority groups."

See Strake v. Seamon, supra, at A-2-3.

In

any event, the question is substantial enough to make this appeal a
candidate for oral argument.
I therefore recommend CVSG.

The SG's views on questions I

and II in the juris statm would be most helpful.
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm.
August 25, 1984

Martin

Opn in juris statm
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To:

Justice Powell

From: Annmarie
Re:

No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles
Response rec'd -- for 4/26/85 Conference

The SG argues that the Court should grant probable
jurisdiction to review the DC's decision that 7 N.C. legislative districts violates §2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Res-

olution of the appeal requires the Court to interpret the
1982 Amendments to the Act, amendments that were adopted to
overrule the Court's decision in Mobile v. Bolden.
Discussion

legal standard to claims that various legislative districts
,_---------~

were drawn to dilute minority voting strength.

The SG be-

lieves that the DC's decision necessarily equates the standard of §2 with guaranteed electoral success in proportion to
the percentage of blacks in the population.

The SG also

argues that the DC erred in adopting a definition of racial
block voting that it deemed "severe" whenever "the results
of the individual election would have been different depend-

2.
ing upon whether it had been held among only the white voters or only the black voters in the election."

Under the

DC's interpretation, even a minor degree of racial block
voting would be "severe."

The SG contends that the Court

should address the question whether the "linchpin" finding
of racially polarized voting can be sustained in the face of
substantial and decisive, white support for black candidates, merely because a white candidate would have won if
the election had been held only among white voters.
In addition, the SG argues that the DC erred in in-

-

sisting on safe, single-member districts when the facts un...

equivocally demonstrate that black voters have an equal opportunity to participate and to elect representatives of
their choice in multimember districts.
Recommendation
On the basis of the SG's brief, it is hard to say that
this case does not raise substantial questions.
I recommend noting probable jurisdiction.

-
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New Voting Cases 1;1:1-1/t~
HE RIGHT to vote, to participate in the political process, is the fundamental privilege of a
free citizen because it enables him to exercise
and protect all the others. The Constitution and various laws gtiarantee that this primary right shall not
be infringed because of race, and though in practice
various jurisdictions have failed to meet that standard,
great progress has been made in the 20 years since
the passage of the Voting Rights Act. Cases now
oorping before the courts no longer involve clearly
discriminatory poll taxes, literacy tests or physical
and economic intimidation. Today's much more difficult cases are concerned with practices that allegedly
dilute minority voting strength to the extent that
they are, in fact, discriminatory.
This term, the Supreme Court will hear such a
case challenging North Carolina's redistricting plan
for the state Sel)ate and House of Representatives.
Civil rights lawyers have·challenged the state's use
of multi-member districts in some areas of the state
where there is a sufficient concentration of black
voters to form majority black single-member districts. Litigants on both..sjdes of the case agr<:_tlhat
th~ law~ ~arantee~oportional ~k£ti,on resul.!§.J~r'!c1at &!Qu_p.
ere is also agreement
that if a rewstilcfii1gpran h~d been formulated expressly to exclude blacks or if it had resulted in ·
clearly excluding them from the political process-as
evidenced by a variety of factors-the plan would be
in Violation of the law. Th~m in North Carolina, as in most of the recent cases, is in eyah:!ating. the
effects of a given votin Jan and de
· · from

T

that evidence whether the plan is discriminatory.
~Q[ ~all~~tricts, blacks have
been erecfe<T to office-m some cases, in greater-pro:
po~presence in the electorate. This
alone does not conclusively prove that the system is
not biased. But it is also true that an increasing_ number of whites-though not yet a ma;,rity-~
fo~ There are no barriers to minority registratfon;paity affiliation or candidacy, no slating of candidates dominated by whites and no allegation that black
voters have been ignored by white candidates. Nevertheless, a district court invalidated the plan after taking
into consideration 1) the lingering effects of voter discrimination before the 1970s, 2) continuing bloc voting along racial lines, 3) the majority-vote requirement
in primaries, 4) ap~s to racial prejudice in campaigns and ~ the failure of the state to offer a policy
justification for the form of the challenged districts.
Legal briefs in this case do not even consider the
ultimate question of whether black citizens fare better when they constitute 30 percent of the voters in
each of three districts or 90 percent in one and zero ,
in two others. That is a political and not a legal question and must be settled by the voters themselves.
But the court's responsibility in interpreting the Voting Rights Act has profound political consequences,
too. It has often been necessary for judges to intervene in that process in order to protect the rights of
minorities. But as conditions improve and the most /
obvious forms of discrimination disappear, it becomes
more difficult to distinguish constitutional requirements from mere political goals. ·
·

lfp/ss 11/26/85

GINGLES SALLY-POW
83-1968 Thornburg v. Gingles

(Appeal, three-judge court, North Carolina)
(Argued December 4, 1985)
MEMO TO ANNE:
This
different
this

is

one

Court

a

from

is

redistricting
Bandemer.

reviewing

the

case,

Here,

for

the

application

Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982.
a three-judge

but

of

quite

first
§2

of

the

time
the

The case comes from

in the Eastern District of North Carolina,

with all members of the Court citizens of that state.
involves

a

1982

redistricting

plan

(the

fourth

lt
plan

adopted by the North Carolina legislature since the census
of 1980).

At issue ar

ulti-member districts

and ~

single-member district from which persons are elected to
the

state

legislature.

This

is

a class

action suit by

black citizens claiming that the plan in these districts
discriminates against blacks in violation of §2 as amended
by Congress in 1982 after extensive debate, and involving
an elaborate legislative history.
The

DC,

in

a

55-page opinion -

a

thorough

and

well written opinion - held that the plan with respect to
the districts in question violated §2.

The DC entered an

order

enjoining

the

state

2.

defendants

from

conducting

elections pursuant to the plan before the court, but "in
deference" to the duty of the legislature to reapportion,
deferred further action to allow the General Assembly of
North

Carolina

an

opportunity

to

comply

with

§2.

The

court retained jurisdiction to make sure that appropriate
action would be taken.
I will not attempt in this memo to do more than
state

briefly

the

positions

of

the

parties

before

us.

Both appellants and appellees purport to apply new §2 of
the Act, and focus particularly on the following language:
"A violation .
• is established if, based on
the totality of the circumstances, the political
processes
are not equally open to
participation by a class ot ci f"rz"ens protected
by subsection (a) in that its members have had
l~ss Oj>POf"~ty t~otber members of the
e~a~- participate
in the political
process . • . "

-

In addition, the SG and the state rely particularly on the
.......
~
proviso that was the "compromise" proposed by Senator Dole
7

and

approved

by

the

President

that

enabled

the

1982

amendment to be adopted by the Congress and approved by
the President.

Il

-~'"

The proviso states:

3.

"Nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in
numbers
equal
to
their
proportion
in
the
population."
It was clear
the

language of

compromise,
and

also

§2,

from

the

legislative

that

and particularly as modified by the

adopted

the

generally

the

rationale
relevance

identified in the CAS Zimmer case.
as Zimmer factors,

history

of White
of

the

v.

Regester,

seven

factors

These are referred to

and the DC purported to apply them to

ilie "facts and circumstances" of this case.
In the multi-member districts on the average only
about

20

to

25%

rarely had a
member

\L r

~ l:.~

v1f

V
,

~

population

issue

was

black,

and

only

In the single-

there also was a comparatively

small percentage of black citizens.

The three-judge court

found that in all of the multi-member districts there were

~ stricts

f._e _

the

black person been elected.

district at

1Jif"'~ sufficient

~

of

The

DC

blacks
to

elect

if

they

representatives

made

factors - includin

resided
to

in
the

app(t) ng
past discrimination,

~,~videnced in campaign~mited
~ ~ blacks, etc. Moreover, it was

single-member
legislature.

the

Zimmer

racial hostility

1

economic opportunities for
pointed out that a smaller

percentage of black citizens registered to vote than white

4.

citizens.
to vote

It can be argued, however, that since the right
is assured,

the

state cannot be

blamed for

the

neglect of black citizens to exercise their franchise.
The

SG

makes

Attorney General of
the

wrong

a

strong

argument,

North Carolina,

standard.

In effect,

~

as

does

the

that the DC applied

the

result of

the

DC' s

opinion is to require "proportional representation in all
such districts", contrary to the proviso of §2 and to the
clear
that

All that §2 authorizes is

intention of Congress.
all

citizens

participate
guarantee

in

shall

the

have

electoral

that minorities must

guarantee

that

could

be

"an

equal

opportunity
It

process".
be

fairly

does

to
not

represented,

effectuated

by

only

a

a

redistricting plan that afforded the black population of
the

state

a

substantially

representation
in

proportion

in
to

the

the

legislative

percentage

body

of

black

appellees

hotly

citizens in the state.
The
contest

this

opinion.
when
degree

two

briefs

behalf

interpretation

Appellees'

discrimination
in

on

of

of

the

District

Court's

briefs do look backward to the days
was

North Carolina.

certainly

practiced

to

They also emphasize

a

large

the fact

that blacks generally have not enjoyed economic advantages

5.

or

success

to

the

same

extent

as

whites

or

presumably

other ethnic groups, although this fact in itself does not
suggest discrimination in the late 20th Century.
no doubt

that

the

DC

was

correct

in

finding

I have

that

some

political debate in North Carolina emphasizes the race of
candidates.

This

is to be contrasted,

for example, with

the recent elections in Virginia.

In

sum,

particularly

Anne,
us

for

to

this
review

findings of the District Court.
would have to find,

to

representation.
opinion in Mobile,

a

difficult

in view of

not

It

may

"factual"

that it applied an

in the belief that the
if

the

case

To reverse that court, we

as the SG argues,

incorrect standard
pointed

is

Zimmer

proportional

contemplated
have

been

factors

Justice

Stewart's

or perhaps an opinion in one of these

cases by Justice Stevens, that emphasized that neither the
Constitution

nor

representation

federal

in

statutes

political

require

bodies.

proportional

Indeed,

in

many

states this would result in a chaotic situation in view of
the heterogeneous nature of our population - a population
composed of many different racial and ethnic groups.

As

the

to

Chief

Judge

of

the

Ninth

Circuit

recently

said

6.

several

of

us,

the

white

California will soon be

population

in

in the minority.

the

state

There was

of
the

recent article in the Washington Post to the effect that
for

the first time the student body of the University of

California

at

has

Berkeley

a

white

composition

only

of

47%.

* * *
1

therefore
genuine

do not
the

think we can review the evidence,

extent

findings

of

that
fact,

the
we

"findings"
must

accept

problem in this,

and similar §2 cases,

easily apply

Zimmer

the

factors

for

you

to

focus

the
them.

The

is that a DC can

primarily

on

1 therefore would

whether

the

correct that the DC applied an erroneous standard.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

DC are

in a way that in effect

results in proportional representation.
like

of

and

SG

is
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minorities,
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a
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in
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the Voting Rights Act entitle protected

jurisdiction
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elections,
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in

to
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process
I(

safe

and

minorities
in
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Does

racial
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No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles
(appeal from D.C. E.D. N.C.)

(argument December 4, 1985)

Questions Presented
(1)

Does

§2 of

minorities,

in

a

participate

in

the

candidates

the Voting

jurisdiction
political

elections,

win

to

Rights Act entitle protected

in

which

process
1(

safe

and

minorities
in

electoral

which

actively
minority
~

districts

simply

because a minority concentration exists sufficient to create such
a district?
(2)

Does

racial

bloc

voting

exist

as

~~ -~----........

whenever

less than 50 percent of the w i te vo

for the black candidate?

-

a

matter

of

law

Background
In

this

case,

black

voters,

who

are

appees

here,

----

challenged the redistricting plan enacted by the North Carolina
General Assembly for
claimed

that

the

districts

and

of

viola ted

their

amended,

42

the election of state legislators.

plan
one

made

of

a

single-member

rights

u.s.c.

use

under

§§

§2

1981

district

of

and

number

of
in

the

Voting

1983,

and

Appees

multi-member

a

manner

Rights
the

Act,

that

submerging

the

black

plan

diluted

minority

voting

population concentrations

in

as

Thirteenth,

Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
argued

that

Appees

strength

the

by

multi-member

districts and by fracturing such concentration between more than
one single member district.
Court for

A three-judge panel of the District

the Eastern District of North Carolina evaluated

the

plan under §2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Briefly
purpose"
necessary

of

stated,

the

v;Cconcluded

amendment

element of

the statute."

the

to

racial

§2

was

that

"to

the

remove

"fundamental
intent

as

a

vote dilution claims brought under

The DC believed that,

under §2, a vote dilution

claim requires proof that an electoral mechanism "results
under
___,
, " ....---the

"totality of

the

circumstances,"

strength of

The

DC

in minimizing

listed

a

the

voting

number of factors

relevant to this inquiry, drawing these factors from the Senate
Report accompanying amended §2, which in turn derived the factors
from

White

v.

Regester,

412

u.s.

755

(1973),

and

Zimmer

v.

McKeithen,

485 F.2d 1297 (CAS 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 424

u.s.

(1976)

636

(per

curiam).

The

DC

also

noted

that

the

~

"linchpin" of vote dilution is f acial
of

When

~emb~rs / ~

th_e____m_a_J_·o_r__
i _t _Y___c_o_n's _i~s_t_e~n_t_l_Y~__r_e~f_u_s_e____t_o___v_ o
__t _e___f_o_r_____
mlnorlty

candidates,

observed

being submerged.

DC,

the

minority

votes

are

in

danger

of

But the DC emphasized that the mere fact that

blacks constitute a minority in a multi-member district does not
-------~

alone

establish

plan.

that

dilution has

resulted

from

the challenged

The DC also emphasized that the fact that blacks have not

been elected in numbers proportional to their percentage in the
population does
proof

that

in

not

a

dlallenged

DC

establish

challenged

elected to office."
'lhe

alone

district

vote

blacks

does

recently

been

See Zimmer, ·supra, 485 F.2d at 1307.
concerning
and

the

existence

The memo will discuss these findings
The DC found

have

then

districts

"Nor

dilution.

of

the

Zimmer

the

factors.

in the discussion section.

that the plan violated §2 and enjoined appts from

holding elections under

the plan.

The DC did not reach appees'

other statutory and constitutional arguments.
Discussion
At the outset, I note that appts do not challenge the DC's
decision

that

plaintiffs

of

intended

Congress
the

burden

of

to

proving

relieve

voting

discriminatory

rights
intent.

Rather, appts agree that the test is whether, under the "totality
of

the

Moreover,

circumstances,"
appts

agree

a
that

plan

"results"

evaluation

of

requires application of the Zimmer factors.
actually fairly narrow,
will

be

important.

I

in
a

vote

dilution.

districting

plan

Appts' challenge is

though the implications of this decision
believe

that

the

DC

did

apply

the

~
~ ~

4.

-

ppropr ia te legal standard in evaluating appees

......._t::\X

the

Court

should

A

carefully

------

bloc

definition of

examine
voting"

and
used

claim, but that

1

I•
• v
ref1ne

probably
by

the

DC.

the

This memo

will attempt to answer the concerns expressed in your memo to

~v

file.
I
worded
tends

want
in

to

th~

to

the

point out

manner

that

selected

mischaracter ize

the

by

the

"questions presented"

appts

nature

of

and
the

that
DC 1 s

such

~

are

wording

.-1 .

In

deClSlOn.

particular, the first question does not reflect any aspect of the

1!7c..
~
~~--------------------------------------------"safe electoral districts" simply because such districts could be
~~-

OC 1 s ruling.

The DC never suggested that blacks were entitled to

--------------------~
created.
On the other hand, a finding that black concentrations

exist is necessary, but not sufficient, to a decision that black
another

plan

~

~~

cou1 ~

4 uJ
~

more

important one be ause

often be crucial
believe

that

the Court 1 s

opinion

in

this case must caution the

~~------~--------------------------------

lower courts carefully

to evaluate evidence of bloc voting and

perhaps should adopt a more stringent definition of bloc voting
than

that

used

by

the

DC.

But

examination

of

what

the

DC

"""z:.

actually found with respect to bloc voting in this case suggests
that

its findings

should be upheld even under a more stringent

definition.
Appts and the SG essentially make two points.

5 & '5
electi~

First, they

argue that the DC erroneously failed to consider recent

successes of black candidates in the challenged districts.

Since

4.

-

sta~dard

in evaluating appees' claim, bu
I•
,
carefully examine and probably refin4

ppropriate legal

"--M

the

Court

should

A

definition of

" acial

____.,.

bloc

voting"

used

by

the

Thi~

DC.

will attempt to answer the concerns expressed in your memo t
file.
I
worded
tends

want
in

to

to

the

point

manner

out

that

selected

mischaracter ize

the

by

the

"questions

appts

nature

of

and
the

presented"

that
DC's

such

are

wording

.-1.

dec1s1on.

In

particular, the first question does not reflect any aspect of the
OC's ruling.

The DC never suggested that blacks were entitled to

~~-----------------------------------------'--

"safe electoral districts" simply because such districts could be

-----------------------On the other hand,

created.

a finding that black concentrations

exist is necessary, but not sufficient, to a decision that black
votes

have

been diluted

remedy that dilution.
more

~
~~~

~~

by

The

important one be ause

believe

that

the Court's opinion

~

lower courts carefully

~

J.:7C.

in

this case must caution the

~--------------------------------

to evaluate evidence of bloc voting and

perhaps should adopt a more stringent definition of bloc voting
than

that

used

by

the

DC.

But

examination

of

what

the

DC

'-Z::.

actually found with respect to bloc voting in this case suggests
that

its

findings

should be upheld even under a more stringent

definition.
Appts and the SG essentially make two points.

First, they

argue that the DC erroneously failed to consider recent

5" 6- '5

electi~

successes of black candidates in the challenged districts.

Since

it is clear that the DC did evaluate those successes, the SG must
be making

evidence

a broader point.
electoral

of

r

forecloses,

-

success

weighs

-~

a

finding

"[t] he extent
elected

I assume that the argument is that
,.......

.......

of vote dilution.

to which members of

to office

Section 2

a

or

even

states

that

against,

heavily

~---.

-

protected class have been

in the State or political subdivision is one

circumstance which may be considered . .,

Thus,

it is clear

that

electoral success is only one circumstance among the ntotali ty of
circumstances., to be considered under §2.
a

~~.§

showing of

is a

negate a claim of vote dilution.

In short, I agree that

factor

that would tend to

But the wording of the statute

requires rejection of the argument that such showing, no matter
what

other

circumstances

are

presented,

forecloses

a

claim of

vote dilution.
The

SG's

position

concerning

electoral

success

is

particularly ill-founded in this litigation in light of the DC's
conclusion

about

Specifically,

the

the

DC

successes
found

reflected

that,

while

in
the

this

record.
elections

1982

suggested that a .,more substantial breakthrough of success could
be

the

imminent,"

------

aberrational

aspects

speculation."

recent

elections
to

make

had
that

"enough
a

obviously

matter

of

sheer

As a general matter, reliance on a single election

year would rarely be sufficient either to prove or disprove vote
dilution

since

idiosyncracies.
success

any
More

particular

election

specifically,

here,

in 1982 could partly be attributed

can

be

subject

the

DC

noted

to

to
that

the pendency of

this litigation, which led white leaders to organize support for

[TL

black

Significantly,

candidates.

the

after this lawsuit was commenced.
!307

(noting

that

electoral

!982

elections

occurred

See Zimmer, supra, 485 F.2d at

success

may

be

attributable

to

factors other than voting strength, namely, political efforts to
thwart

challenge
by

finding

to

districting

DC,

the

I

simply

plan) •

do

not

In

see

the

how

face

Court

the

this

of

could

reverse for failure to consider recent electoral success.
Second,

,...._____._...

appts and

the SG make a more troubling point by

arguing that the DC in effect granted relief because appees had
been denied proportional representation.
will

have

the

opportunity

proviso to §2.
«fact

that

to

explain

In this case, the Court
the

significance

of

the

The DC believed that the proviso means that the

blacks

have

not

been

elected

under

a

challenged

districting plan in numbers proportional to their percentage of
the population« does not alone establish a vote dilution claim.
I tend

to think that the DC's interpretation of the proviso is

correct.
as one

The sentence immediately preceding the proviso, as well
of

the

Zimmer

factors,

makes clear

that

the court can

consider the «extent« to which members of the minority group have
been

____

elected

to

showing
....__ that

pub! ic

the

number

_,-

Thus,

off ice.
of

black

it

seems

election

plain

that

victories

a
is

disproportionate to black population is a relevant consideration.
The

proviso

rather,

must

the

mean

court

that
must

such

showing

consider

is

not

it

along

the

DC's

sufficient;
with

other

circumstances.
Appts

and

the

SG

believe

that

definition

of

racial bloc voting had the effect of leading the court to grant

J

because

relief

blacks

representation.
significant

The

"when

had

DC

the

been

stated

results

that

of

bloc

the

proportional

denied
voting

is

legally

individual election would

~

?

have been different depending upon whether it had been held among ~..,
only the white voters or only the black voters in the election."
vi

Significantly,

"'

bloc

voting

the
is

SG

the

agrees

"linchpin"

~

claim.

See

with

Rogers v.

Lodge ,

the

of

DC

that

proof of

successful

a

racial

dilution

vote

------------------6 2 3 (19 8 2 ) ("Voting

4 58 U. S • 613 ,

along racial lines allows those elected to ignore black interests
without fear of political consequences,

and without bloc voting

the minority candidates would not lose elections solely because
of

their

race.");

1043 (CA5 1984)
voting

McMillan v.

Escambia County,

748

F.2d

1037,

(no factor is dispositive, but racially polarized

ordinarily

"keystone"

is

§2

of

But

claim).

the
..,..----,

•

disagrees with the definition of bloc voting used by the DC.
SG claims that,
of

racial

bloc

violation,

under

voting

regardless

electoral defeats."
happen
where

the DC's definition,
would

of

be

whether

actually

The SG then gives an

under
there

"in
is

a

small

white

"even a minor degree

sufficient
it

voting

to

make

results

out
in

the

vote

receives
community

the
is

in

the

black

reverse,
severely

(emphasis in original).

the

community,

a

two-person

majority,

district

racially

and

court

a

black

xample of what could

if

t.

candidate receives 51% of the vote in the white community
of

The

the

black

would

polarized."

SG

hold

ca
tt

Brief

~ 1/

1
define

agree

with

the

SG

that

"racial bloc voting," and

it

is

necessary

carefully

to

also tend to agree that the

I

Court should not adopt a definition under which a plaintiff could
succeed merely

by

showing

that

less

than

votes were cast for black candidates.
give

a

word

of

caution

50

percent

of

white

Moreover, the Court should

respecting

reliance

on

statistical

analyses of the type relied on by appees in this case.

See Lee

County Branch of NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1481-82
(CAS 1984)

(Wisdom, J.)

evaluated

because

pattern

in

correspondence

of

(noting that statistics must be carefully
"'risk

fact

is

of

race

that

only
to

a

seemingly

the

loss

polarized

presence

inevitable

of
in

voting

mathematical

such

defeats of

minority candidates'"; noting further that it may be necessary to
examine factors other than race that may correlate with election
outcomes)
(CAS 1984)

(quoting Jones v.

I

stringent as

do

not

I

think

that

the

definition

that apparently recommended by appts

really provide

access,

730 F. 2d 233,

234

(Higginbotham, J., specially concurring) •

But

not

City of Lubbock,

do not

a

definition).

think

should

be

as

(the SG does

Since §2 guarantees

"equal"

should be required

to show

that appees

racial bloc voting so severe that it effectively shuts them out
of

the

electoral

process.

The

fact

that,

despite

polarized

voting, blacks have attained some electoral success does not mean
that their votes have not been diluted.
may

have

been

achieved

only

through

For example, the success
single-shot

voting,_which
,

means that black voters have been forced to sacrifice their right

"·'.

9.

to vote

for

a

full

slate of candidates

in order

to elect one

black representative.
On

balance,

I

think

that

the

Court

should

adopt

a

definition of racial bloc voting that is not simply tied to the
statistical

showing

offered

Higginbotham
put it,
_______.,

"The

by

inquiry

the

parties.

is whether

As

Judge

race or ethnici ty

was such a determinant of voting preference in the rejection of
black

. candidates by a white majority that the

plan]

denied

Jones

v.

minority

City

of

voters

effective

Lubbock,

730

F.2d

233,

(Higginbotham, J.,

specially concurring).

permit

courts

the

lower

to

take

a

voting

[challenged

opportunity."

234

(CAS

1984)

Such definition would

common

__.,

sense

approach

to

evaluation of proffered statistics as well as to eradicate
the

SG's

fears

that

reliance

on

statistics

will

render

the

proviso meaningless.
Though I agree that the Court should refine the definition
of

"racial bloc voting,"

concerning

the

DC's

the argument made by the SG and appts

"definition"

of

this

factor

essentially

overlooks the careful findings made by the DC in this connection.
I believe that the findings should be upheld.
on the findings assumes that the 1982

election successes will be

taken into account in evaluating bloc voting.
the

DC • s

conclusion

that

the

the

1982

that the DC
districts.

(and

If you agree with

results

value, the SG's argument here loses force.
results are considered

attack ~

The SG's

are

of

dubious

And, even if the 1982

the DC did consider

them),

I

think

found racial bloc voting in the challenged
The

following

excerpt

is

a

portion

of

the

DC's

9.

to vote

for

a

full

slate of candidates

in order

to elect one

black representative.
On

balance,

1

think

that

the

Court

should

adopt

a

definition of racial bloc voting that is not simply tied to the
statistical

showing

Higginbotham put

offered

it,

"The

by

inquiry

the

-

parties.

is whether

As

race or ethn

was such a determinant of voting preference in the rejectic
black

•

• candidates by a white majority that the

plan]

denied

Jones

v.

minority

City

of

voters

effective

Lubbock,

730

.F.2d

233,

(Higginbotham, J.,

specially concurring).

permit

courts

the

lower

to

take

a

voting

[chall(

opportuni

234

(CAS

1~

_ _,

Such definition would

common

_...

approach

sense

to

evaluation of proffered statistics as well as to eradicate
the

SG's

fears

that

reliance

on

statistics

will

render

the

proviso meaningless.
Though I agree that the Court should refine the definition
of

"racial bloc voting,"

concerning

the

DC's

the argument made by the SG and appts

"definition"

of

this

factor

essentially

overlooks the careful findings made by the DC in this connection.
I believe that the findings should be upheld.
The SG's attack ~
---------~--------~~------~--~on the findings assumes that the 1982 election successes will be
taken into account in evaluating bloc voting.
the

DC's

conclusion

that

the

the

1982

results

value, the SG's argument here loses force.
results are considered
that the DC
districts.

(and

If you agree with
are

of

dubious

And, even if the 1982

the DC did consider

them),

I

think

found racial bloc voting in the challenged
The

following

excerpt

is

a

portion

of

the

DC's

10.

discussion of racial bloc voting in the challenged multi-member
districts considered as a whole:
In none of the ele ions, primary or general, d ,.l9._a
blac candidate receive a majority of white votes cast.
Cl1 t h e ave rag e, ~f"t e VOterS d i<J not v; te for
any black candidate in the primary elections.
In the
general elections, white voters almost always ranked
black candidates either last or next to last in the
multi-candidate . fiel~ except in heavily Democratic
areas;
in these latter, white voters consistently
ranked black candidates last among Democrats if not
last or next to last among all candidates.
In fact,
approximately two-thirds of white voters did not vote
for b c
n 1dates 1n genera
1ons even after
the~ won the Democratic primary and the
only choice was to vote for a Republican or no one.
Black
incumbency alleviated
the general level of
polarization revealed, but it did not eliminate it.
Some black incumbents were reelected, but none received
a majority of white votes even when the election was
essentially uncontested.
Republican voters were more
disposed to vote for white Democrats than to vote for
black Democrats . • • • One revealed consequence of this
disadvantage is that to have a chance of success in
electing candidates of their choice in these districts,
black voters must rely extensively on single-shot
voting, thereby forfeiting by practical necessity their
right to vote for a full slate of candidates.
In addition
e

ial b

figures

loc

to

vo~

supplied

by

this general discussion,
in

district.

each

appees'

expert

The

witness

the DC examined
DC

and

discussed
explained

the
why,

even in elections that presented a fairly substantial percentage
of

white

votes

established

cast

bloc

for

voting.

the
For

black

candidate,

example,

those

figures

in one primary election

for the state House, a black candidate received 50 percent of the
white

vote.

In

addition

to

the

fact

that

this

election

took

place in 1982 and thus was of dubious value as an indicator of
black

success,

the

DC

noted

that

there

were

only

7

white

candidates for 8 positions in the primary and one black candidate
had to be elected.

Moreover, the black candidate, "the incumbent

11.

chairman
voters

of

the

but

Board

seventh

of

Education,

ranked

whites."

With

among

challenged district,

first

among

respect

black

to

every

the DC made that type of careful evaluation

to show the existence of substantially polarized voting.
Since your memo to the file suggested that I focus on the
standard applied by the DC,

I have not spent sufficient time to

comment

DC's

extensively

appropriate

to

on

remand

the
in

the

findings

event

of

that

It

fact.

the

Court

may be

thinks

it

necessary to refine the definition of "racial bloc voting."
I believe that the Court could choose simply to affirm.
to

think

district

that

violated

exception
enjoyed

§2

electoral

the

DC's

probably

is

of ~i3/

th~rs;

in

determination
________.

the

success

(In

correct,

the DC's findings show,

district

is

rae iall

polarized

each

with

roughly

blacks

it may

be proper

---------------------

DC made

factors

careful

that

findings

I

can

findings

believe
be

with

should

underscored

redistricting will

not

succeed

respect

to

have
to

that the voting

uphold the DC's decision to invalidate the district.)
the

possible

proportional

however,
so

I tend

challenged

the

district,

that
1973

since

that

But

Similarly,

the other

be

upheld.

The

to

suggest

that

to

nature of

Zimmer
those

challenges

to

simply because a minority group

believes that it has been denied proportional representation.
Conclusion
'!he

DC

applied

the

appropriate

legal

standard

by

evaluating the challenged plan to decide if, under the totality
of the circumstances,

it resulted in vote dilution.

The DC made

specific findings to explain why recent electoral successes were

11.

chairman
voters

of

the

but

Board

seventh

of

Education,

ranked

whites."

With

among

challenged district,

first

among

respect

to

the DC made that type of careful evalu

to show the existence of substantially polarized voting.
Since your memo to the file suggested that I focus

01

standard applied by the DC,

I have not spent sufficient ti11

comment

DC's

extensively

appropriate

to

on

remand

the
in

the

findings

event

of

that

It may be

fact.

the

Court

thinks

it

necessary to refine the definition of "racial bloc voting."
I believe that the Court could choose simply to affirm.
to

think

that

the

But

I tend

DC's

determination that each challenged
------probably is correct, with the possible
~

district

violated

exception
enjoyed

~~

of

electoral

th~rs;

in

§2

the

success

(In

since

that
1973

the DC's findings show,

district

is

rae iall

polarized

district,
roughly

factors

that

findings

I

can

findings

believe
be

with

should

underscored

redistricting will

not

succeed

respect

it may be proper

to

to

that the voting

uphold the DC's decision to invalidate the district.)
the DC made careful

have

proportional

however,
so

blacks

Similarly,

the other

be

upheld.

The

to

suggest

that

to

Zimmer

nature of those
challenges

to

simply because a minority group

believes that it has been denied proportional representation.
Conclusion
'!he

DC

applied

the

appropriate

legal

standard

by

evaluating the challenged plan to decide if, under the totality
of the circumstances, it resulted in vote dilution.

The DC made

specific findings to explain why recent electoral successes were

12.

of

dubious

value

in

deciding

if

access to the political process.
that

racially

Court

should

polarized
adopt

a

voting

the

plan denied

blacks

equal

While the DC properly decided
is

definition

a

crucial

of \ racial

--------------~

circumstance,
bloc

the

votinp _that

approves of the manner

in which the DC evaluated the s .a tistics

in t -Q_is case_.~ that,

to some extent, rejects lan~ sed by

the DC to describe the relevance of the statistics.

------------·
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December 6, 1985
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles
(appeal from D.c. E.D. N.C.)
The following

peal.

I have

voting districts are

in

issue on this ap-

included a brief summary of some of the relevant

statistics, but have not attempted to include the DC's findings
on racial bloc voting.

~·~J·~
I

(1)

House District 21 (Wake County):

This is a 6-member

.bi~ 1-/8"4 · tl 3'1..

district.

21.8 % of

the population of

the district

15.1 % of the registered voters are black.

is black;

A black citizen was

elected to serve in the House in 1980 and 1982.

3

~
(2)
House District
J 13.L.~~~~~ 1<1'73

member district.

23

(Durham County) :

36.3 % of the population is black;

the registered voters are black.
has

been

elected

This

each

two-year

is

a

3-

-

28.6 % of

Since 1973, a black citizen
term

to

the

House

delegation.

(This is the district that I believe may not violate §2.

I must

P.P1(

r
j

point out, however,

that the DC's findings indicate racial bloc

""'--------

voting in this district.)
----~-------

ff ~
~

I -

(3)

House District 36

~k..,.. ~ ~~

8-member district.

26.5

(Mecklenburg County) :

% of

the population of

This is an

the county is

black; 18 % of the registered voters are black.
In this century,
~
~ one black citizen has been elected to the House from this county.
That black was elected in 1982, after this lawsuit was commenced.
Seven other blacks had previously run unsuccessfully for a House
seat.

f>'

~

(4)

House District 39 (part of Forsyth County) :

a 5-member district.

25.1 % of the population is black; 20.8 %

of the registered voters are black.

In 1974 and in 1976, a black

citizen was elected to the House delegation.
blacks

ran

This is

unsuccessfully

litigation was commenced,

for

the

House.

In 1978 and 1980,

In 1982,

after

this

two blacks were elected to the House.

(No blacks have been elected to the Senate from Forsyth County) •

(5)

Senate District
-=:::::2.

This is a 4-member district.

22

(Mecklenburg/Cabarrus Counties):

24.3 % of the population is black;

16.8% of the registered voters are black.

One black citizen has

been

served

1980.

elected

to

the

Senate;

that

citizen

from

1975

to

Since then two blacks have unsuccessfully run for a Senate

seat, and no black now serves on the Senate delegation.

Appellants do not challenge the DC's conclusion that two
other districts, House District 8 and Senate District 2, violated
§2.

In House District 8, no black had ever been elected to the

-----------

House,

and

in Senate
District 2, no black had ever been elected
1...------·-

to the Senate.
~

1 think that the Court should affirm.
proviso to §2

is

The meaning of the

that a DC may not order relief on the ground

that a protected minority has failed to achieve proportional representation.

But, once the DC properly concludes that the total-

ity of the circumstances shows that a group has been denied equal
-----·---------~-

access to the electoral process
votes) ,

(here, through dilution of their

the DC may order relief.

______.,

The fact that the relief or-

dered may give the group an opportunity to achieve proportional
representation should not run afoul of the proviso.

I

believe

that the Court should refine the definition of "racial bloc voting."

The Court also should point out that racial bloc voting is

only one of the Zimmer factors approved by Congress and that the
DC should carefully evaluate statistics offered to establish that
factor since, as this case demonstrates, racial bloc voting will
be important in making out a violation of §2.

December 14, 1995
83-1968 Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Chief:
Your assignment sheet for the December cases has
just come to mv desk (at 1:00 p.m. today).
I called you immediately but you had left the
Court. I no not think I should write 83-1968 Thornburg v.
Gingles, the North Caroli.na reapportionment case. I was one
of possi.bly only three Justices who did not agree to affirm
the District Court in all respects. My view was that the DC
erred in its decision with respect to the Durham district
(No. 23). In addition, I am not in accord with the extent
to which the DC viewed the Zimmerman factors as the standard
to apply, or with the DC's heavy reliance on statistical
testimony with respect to "block voting".
In view of my differences, I doubt that an opinion
would write would attract a Court. It seems to me, therefore, that the case should be reassigned. I would, of
course, aopreciate being given another case to write, as I
am well up to date.
I

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

CHAMI!IE:RS 01'"

.JUSTICE

w.. . .J.

February 5, 1986

eRENNAN, .JR.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

No. 83-1968 -- Thornburg v. Gingles

As you will recall, the vote in this case was basically 9-0,
with several -- particularly, I believe, Byron, Lewis, Bill and
Sandra -- voicing some uncertainty over the proper disposition of
House District 23.

While working on the opinion, I became aware

of the following "gap" in the findings made by the District Court
in support of its conclusion that the multi-member structure of
District 23 has the effect of diluting black citizens' votes.
In

House

District

23

(Durham

about one-third of the population.

County),

blacks

constitute

A black has been elected to

the district's three-member delegation every two-year term since
the 1972 election.
proportional
No

decade.
-----..

black,

Reconstruction)

the

however,

in

the State House for

has

been

elected

(at

at least a
least

to the Senate District corresponding

since

to Durham

The District Court was given and analyzed data from only

1978,

Court

blacks in that district have enjoyed

representation

--L

County.

Thus,

1980,

determined

and
that

1982 elections.
both

the

1978

Initially
and

1980

the

District

elections

were

racially polarized in the sense that the outcome of the elections

would

have

been

different

if

held

in

racially

segregated

electorates. The court also took account of the great disparity
between

black

and

white

support

candidate, Kenneth Spaulding.
effect,
was

that the

somewhat

that,

the

offset

experiences

black

Additionally, the court found, in

in

these

elections

by

success

the

facts

that

he

in each election and that he was an

Based on these considerations,

Spaulding's

successful

"handicap" of Representative Spaulding's race

essentially ran unopposed
incumbent.

for

the court concluded

notwithstanding,

racially polarized

voting

House

to such a

District

23

severe extent

that it impairs blacks' ability to participate in the political
process.
I think that the court's conclusion with regard to the 1978
- 1982 elections is permissible under Section 2.
the

court was

not furnished data concerning

Unfortunately,

the three earlier

elections in which a black was elected -- 1972, 1974, and 1976.
In the absence of information about these elections, it is hard
to know just what to make of this decade-long pattern of black
success.
My opinion for

the Court,

as

it now stands,

affirms

the

District Court's finding of vote dilution in all of the contested
districts.
polarized
other

I

voting

factors

court's

think that the trial court's finding of racially
in

recent elections,

found by the court,

in combination with

the

is adequate to support the

ultimate conclusion that the multi-member structure of

the District results in dilution of

bl~· ; ~s: ~owev~lily

vie;;;--On~ are suff~~:rltl~~v~~~J i f

there were

a

-3-

Court

for

opinion to

it,

I

would

isolate

District Court

for

be willing

to revise Part IV,

this evidentiary gap and
further

proceedings

only.
Sincerely,

I~

to remand

concerning

B of my
to the

District 23

arne 02/07/86

February 7, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles

1 have

read

Justice

Brennan's

opinion

for

the Court

in

this case, and my initial thinking is that you can join most of
it.

My review of the file

~ irst

is

indicates two areas of concern.

H~ (Durham

County).

The

In that District, a

jJ

black has been elected to the three-member delegation every term

~

since 1973, which means that blacks there have achieved propor-

'to

-"'~onal representation.

~ was

At Conference,

1 believe that your view

that the record probably did not support the DC's finding of

~ ~~n

~p)/"f:rms

in

your view;

analysis,

that

District.

Justice Brennan's

letter con-

he identifies an "evidentiary gap" in the DC 's

resulting

from

the

lack

of

any

evidence

concerning

-~~

elections in 1972, 1974,

and 1976.

------~ ··_.......___----

Justice Brennan states that

~-

he is satisfied that the record supports the DC's finding of vote
dilution in District 23, but that he may be willing to revise his
------.___

1/~~'i~
er proceedings on District

opinion and remand to the DC for
23.

My feeling

is that a

elusion concerning
proportional

the DC' s con-

District

23 is dubious in the light of the
~-----blacks have enjoyed there for many

representation

years and in the absence of data concerning the early elections.
A remand would caution the lower courts carefully to examine data
offered in these cases.
~

~(

c . b The second area of concern, the appropri ~ of

------

t\

racial bloc voting, is more troubling.

..-----------..

properly rejects
my view,
DC's

Justice Brennan's opinion

the arguments made by the State and the SG;

the State and the SG mischaracterized the nature of the

inquiry

into

racial bloc

voting.

,g

The problem that I have

-

1f1' A) fJ,--

with

in

the

opinion

is

that

it sefems

-;7

to take unnecessary care

-

avoid articulating any kind of a legal definition at all.

to

I sus-

p ect that what the opinion is driving at is that the inquiry into
racial bloc voting

is a factual

of precise legal definition.

inquiry that is not susceptible

That may be so, but the DC
;:::::=:2

itself]

used language to define racial bloc voting that did not seem appropriate.

Justice

,.....------,

nature of
take

a

Brennan's

opinion

carefully

look

at

the

statistics.

Implicit
....

therefore,

describes

the statistical inquiry the DC engaged in;

hard

the

the DC did

in the opinion,

£k$

is the notion that DCs should not take statistics at

face value but should conduct a searching inquiry to be sure that
race, and not some other factor,
be racial bloc voting.
such a proposition.

is the cause of what appears to

But the opinion does not clearly state

-..,

LTC

......_.

n

~

r-J-

-·

1n short, while 1 largely agree with what the opinion does
and with the standard it implies should be used, 1 think it might
be useful to describe the inquiry in more general language.
- ~-------- -~

---

The

7

carry-over sentence on page 19 to page 20 to some extent satisfies my concern.

That sentence contains language similar to that

which you thought was appropriate,
cide

if

racial

bloc

voting

is

namely,

"so

that the DC must de-

severe

that

it

impairs

the

ability of protected class members 'to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.'"
file

reflects that you would approve a similar test.

v. City of Lubbock,
J.,

concurring)

such
black
planJ

a

730 F.2d 233,

("The

determination

inquiry
of

234

(CAS 1984)

is whether

in

ethnicity was

the

. candidates by a white majority that the
denied

minority

voters

effective

voting

See Jones

(Higginbotham,

race or

voting preference

The

rejection of
[challenged

opportunity.")

The carry-over sentence may fully satisfy any concerns that you
have.

The concern that 1 have with that sentence is that,

like

this entire section, it describes what the DC did without clearly
stating what the Court thinks that DCs should do.

~

i'npr.tuu Qf&ruri .n tlrt ~b .jtatta
'lllaaltinghtu. ~. <!f. 211p'l~
CHAM!!ERS Of"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 6, 1986

Re:

No. 83-1968-Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~..

T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

,ju.prtntt Qtourt of tqt ~ittb ,jtalt~

Jla.G'lfhtgton, ~.Of.

21lgt'l~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 10, 1986

No. 83-1968

Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Bi 11,
I agree with your rejection, in Part II of your opinion,
of the suggestion that a racial minority's proportional electoral
success in a single election does not preclude finding a §2
violation as a matter of law. It may be that even a decade-long
pattern of proportional elector a 1 success does not always
preclude finding a §2 violation, but in my view great weight must
be attached to such persistent success unless the plaintiffs can
come forward with actual evidence that it results from a series
of aberrations rather than from established and effective
minority voting strength. As applied to House District 23, these
views would at a minimum require remanding, particularly in light
of the evidentiary gap identified in your helpful memorandum,
although it may be possible to reverse the findings as to this
district as clearly erroneous.
In any event, I plan to write separately to discuss not
only the District 23 findings but also the issue of racial bloc
voting.
I have grave reservations about the District Court's
method of assessing the extent of racial bloc voting and the
manner in which the Court assigned weight to this factor in the
various challenged districts. The District Court's ultimate
findings of legally significant racial bloc voting may survive
review under the clearly erroneous standard, which I agree is
applicable. But I am not persuaded that Congress intended that
districts in which a very large minority of white voters
frequently vote for black candidates should be treated as
exhibiting racial bloc voting as your opinion seems to imply, nor
do I think the District Court's extensive reliance on aggregate
rather than district-by-district statistics was proper.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

February 11, 1986

83-1968 Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Bill:
In response to your. memorandum of February 5, I
will await SanCira's writing 5.n this case.
I mew "~>lell he able to jo:l.n much of your o~nn1on,
although I have the reservations I mentioned at Conference
with respect to the extent of the DC's reliance on statistics ~nd infPrences drawn therefrom with resoect to "polarized" or "racial bloc" 7otlng. RxpertencB in Virginia (not
on!y the recent election) pet:suades me that racia bloc voting has ~iminish~d and is not easy to idPntify.
As to House District ~3 (Durham ~ounty), it still
seems to me that there is little or no basis for the District Court's finding of~ violctlon of~? of the Votinq
Rights Act. I note your suggestion that we could remand on
that issue. At present, however, I am inclinec to think
that the District Court's findings with respect to that District were clearly erroneous.
Sincerely,

Justtce Brennan
lfP/SS
cc:

The Conference

iluprtmt Qiomt of tit~ ~lt~ iltat~•
,.-ultinllhtn, ~. QI. 2Dc?'l'
CHA .. I!IERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 11, 1986

Re:

83-1968 - Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
I am still persuaded that the
District Court made the proper disposition of House
District 23, but I don't rule out the possibility
that I could be persuaded otherwise.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

CHAMBER S 0 F"

..JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

February 19, 1986

83-1968 - Thornburgh v. Gingles

Dear Bill,
In all likelihood, I am closer to Lewis than to
you with respect to House District 23.
And I would
like to see what Sandra circulates before otherwise
coming to rest.
I should say that it would improve opinions in
this area if the facts and relevant factors were
analyzed more directly in terms of the requirements
of
~
subsection 2(b)
rather than in the l1ght of the
amOrphous standa rd of "vote dilution."
Doing so makes
this a harder case than I had thought.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

..,

.

'

February 21, 1986

CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN, JR .

.~

." -~No. 83-196Si Thornburg v. Gingles
·,

'
Dear Byron:
I am a bit confuse~ by the comment in your letter to me of
February 19, 1986, that "it would improve opinions in this area
if the facts and relevant factors were analyzed more directly in
terms of the requirements of subsection 2(b) [of the amended
Voting Rights Act] rather than in light of the amorphous standard
of 'vote dilution.'"
As I understand it, minority voters may suffer "less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representative of their
choice," §2(b), as a result of any one of at least three major
types of electoral discrimination. The terms of art often used
to describe these types of discrimination are disfranchisement,
candidate diminution, and vote dilution. See, Davidson, Minority
Vote Dilution, An Overview, in Minority Vote Dilution
(C.Davidson, ed. 1984) 3.
·
"Disfranchisement" describes techniques used to prevent or
discourage people from voting. Disfranchisement techniques that
have been used to suppress the minority vote in our country range
from force and violence, to poll taxes and literacy tests, to
more subtle methods, such as purging the registration rolls (the
efficacy of which has just been proven in the Philippines) and
decreasing the number of voting machines in minority areas.
"Candidate diminution" occurs when candidates representing
the interest of a group of voters are prevented or discouraged
from voting. In addition to force and threats of reprisal,
familiar techniques of candidate diminution include changing
governmental posts from elective to appointive ones when a
minority candidate has a chance of winning an election, setting
high filing and bonding fees; and increasing the number of
signatures required on qualifying petitions.
"Vote dilution" is a less precise term, but is generally
agreed to refer to a process whereby election laws or practices,
either singly or in concert, combine with systematic racial bloc

voting among an identifiable group to diminish the voting
strength of at least one other group. 'Because dilution often
operates to diminish a group's potential voting strength that
derives from the group's geographic concentration, "vote
dilution" is commonly used to describe the loss in potency of
minorities' votes that occurs when a discreet concentration of
minfiit.r i ty voters that is s_uf'""f icient to constitute a "safe" single
memb~distri~t is either "submerged" into predominately white
mul~~.me"int:?~r ·districts or "fractured" between two or more
predGmiqa.te.ly white single member districts.
A{l ~; -~i_ations, whe.,.ther they stem from disfranchisement,
candidate dimfnu~ion, or vote dilution, must be evaluated
according to the standard~set forth in the statute. That is
what the District Court d~d in this case and what I did in my
op1n1on. I intended t -h at "vote dilution" serve simply as a
shorthand term referring to a particular form of electoral
discrimination.
~
I share what I perceive to be your frustration with the
semantic carelessness and confusion, stemming from statistical
terminology that is unfamiliar to most judges and lawyers, of
op1n1ons in this area. If you think that my opinion would be
improved by a clarification of the relevant language, I would be
happy to do so. I think that in this first case interpreting
amended §2, it is important that members of the Court be in as
much agreement as possible regarding its meaning and the
pertinent legal standards. As always, I welcome your
suggestions.
Sincerely,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

..inprtmt Qf01trl of tftt 'Jnittb ..itatt.e'
~~·~·<lf· 20~~~

v

CHAMBER S O f'

JUSTICE B Y RON R . WHIT E

March 1, 1986

83-1968 - Thornburg v. Gingles
Dear Bill,
In tardy response to your letter of
February 21, I am surprised that I managed to
confuse you, which you seldom, if ever, are.
In any event, I
intended nothing earthshaking--only the mundane observation that
courts should pay close attention to the
language of the statute they are construing,
especially when they have not dealt with the
statute before.
Subsection 2(b) specifies
the factors to be considered in determining a
subsection 2(a) violation.
It does not mention "vote dilution", much less "disenfranchisement" or "candidate diminution."
But,
unless persuaded otherwise by additional
writing, I expect to JOln in affirmance
except with respect to District 23.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~tm.t <IJ~ of tlf~ ~b jJtatte

Jl'Mlfin.gbm. ~. <IJ. 2D.;t_,._, ,
CHAMBE:RS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

March~986

No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Bill:
I still would affirm across the board and therefore
join your opinion.
Sincerely,

-

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

~·

C~AMI!IE:RS

..JUSTICE

w.. . J .

OF"

BRENNAN, JR .

/
March 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

N~
Thornburg v. Gingles

In
changes

due

course

in our

I

will

circulation

be

--

in response

to Sandra's circulation of today.

W.J.B., Jr.

making

.iuprtntt <lf!tUrt d tlft ~tb .ibdts

..u!fing~ ~. <q. 2ll~'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 14, 1986
Re:

No. 83-1968

Dear Sandra,

Thornburgh v. Gingles

at!

-. r.

Please join me in your opinion concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part.
Sincerely,

~

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

...

arne 03/20/86

March 20, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles

I have re-read Justice 0 'Connor • s opinion, concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part, and your draft letter to her.

I have the following thoughts.

In the last sentence

on page 10, Justice O'Connor states that it is likely that Congress intended that "statistical proof of polarized racial voting
patterns could establish a prima facie case of racial bloc voting
for §2 purposes."

I believe that the sentence probably should be

retained, but I would suggest that the word "severely" be insert-

(! /

ed (sentence would read: "statistical proof of ~everely polarized
racial voting patterns could establish a prima facie case of racial bloc voting

for

§2 purposes").

I

think that the sentence

should be retained largely because statistical proof of severely
polarized voting would, in my view, give rise to an inference of
Here,

racial bloc voting.
this point is clear
facie

case of

I want to emphasize, and I hope that

•
•
•
•
(Va pr1ma
.
1n
Just1ce
0 I Connor I s op1n1on,
t h a~

racial

bloc voting

is not equivalent to a prima

facie violation of §2.

That is, a voting plan violates §2 when

it denies blacks an "equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice."

One

element of the totality of the circumstances test that district
To make

courts must apply is the extent of racial bloc voting.
out a prima facie case of that one factor,

I

think that plain-

tiffs can offer statistical proof.
I fully agree with you that it would be useful for Justice
O'Connor

to note

that

the Court has explained how prima facie

proof rules work in the context of Title VII.
of

cases

began

Douglas Corp.

with

your

v. Green,

decision

u.s.

411

for

792

Department of Community Affairs v.

the

The pertinent line
Court

in McDonnell

(1973), followed by, Texas

Burdine,

450

u.s.

248

and United States Postal Service Board of Governors v.
460

u.s.

711

(1983)

0

(1981)
~ikens,

The point would be especially helpful in

light of the paragraph on page 11 immediately preceding the sen~

'\.,.

tence discussed above concerning prima facie proof of racial bloc
voting.

Use

of

the

term

"prima

facie"

suggests

that

Justice

O'Connor is referring to the rules set out in those cases.

Under

those rules, of course, the defendant always is entitled (indeed,
the defendant must if he does not want to risk losing the lawsuit)

come

forward

with

paragraph on page 11,

rebuttal

evidence.

Justice O'Connor

Yet,

states

in

that

the

first

there

is a

question as to whether defendants in §2 cases may be entitled to
rebut statistical proof of racially polarized voting.
of language may be stylistic.

Her choice

But it seems to me that defendants

always must be entitled to rebut prima facie proof offered by a

plaintiff.

The

provides

good

a

With minor

line of cases beg inning with McDonnell Douglas
example

changes

in

of

the

how prima
first

facie

proof

rules

paragraph on page 11,

work.

Justice

O'Connor could incorporate a reference to those decisions to emphasize

that

defendants

are

entitled

to rebut.

Then,

I

agree

with you that it would be useful to refer again to the factors
noted at

the bottom of page 9 that must be examined to decide

whether it is race, and not something else, that is causing the
polarized voting.

March 21, 1986
83-1968 Thornburg v. Gin9les
Oear Bandras
Your opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, is persuasive and extremely well written.

1 do have the following suggeatJona.

1.

one.

The last sentence on page 10 is an important

As there usually will be statistical evidence intro-

duced in a S2 case, it would be helpful to frame the sentence in way that would require more than a showing of such
proof in a single election.

For example:

~congress probably intended that statistical
proof of polarized racial voting patterns
over a reasonable period of time could establish a prima facie case of racial bloc voting
for §2 purpoBes, without particular regard
for the causes of such patterns.•

2.

With this sentence in your oplnion, 1 suggest

that you explain how prima

f~cie

proof. rules operate in the

analogous context of 'I'ltle Vll cases.
las Corp. v. Green, 411
Affairs v. Burdine, 450

u.s.
u.s.

E.g., McDonnell Doug-

792; Texas Oept. of Community
248J and

Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460

u.s.

u.s.
711.

Postal Ser.vice
These cases

establish that where the plaintiff has carried the initial
burden of establishing a prima facia case, the burden of
going forward then shifts to the defendant to present evidence sufficient to rebut the prima facie case.

. .~------------------------~

It should

2.

be emphasized, however, that the burden of persuasion always
remains on the plaintiff.
3.

1 like the reference to Judge Higginbotham's

views, and particularly the last sentence on page 9 of vour
opinion identifying factors that could - and often do - rebut any inference of racial bloc voting.

Perhaps this could

follow the description of the order and allocation of proof.
4.

Of course establishing even an unrebutted prima

facie case of. racial bloc voting does not end the case.

A

voting plan violates S2 only when it denies blacks an "equal
opportunity to participate in the political processes and to
elect candidates of their choice.•

One

elem~nt

of. the "to-

tality of the circumstances test• that District Courts may
appl~

is the extent of racial bloc voting.

StBtistical evi-

dence is relevant only to that particular element .
1 only wish that yout fine opinion could be for the
Court.

lt is likely that Sill Brennan's opinion, affirming

the District Court's almost total reliance on statistics,
will be read expansively by lower courts.
language proposed by Senator Oole
effect .

The compromise

is likely to have little

This would be regrettable, as the number of blacks

now elected regularly to imf)ortant positions makes clea.r,
happily, that many whites support qualified black candidates
regularly.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
1 fn / A~
~----------------------~----------~--

arne 03/22/86

---March 22, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

Thornburg v. Gingles, No. 83-1968

Justice Brennan's law clerk called to tell me that they
are substantially revising their opinion in this case to ' respond
to Justice 0 'Connor's opinion.
pletely

rewriting

major

portions

It sounds as if they are comof

their

opinion.

The

clerk

informed me that they will be recirculating in about two weeks.

.Jnprnnt QtDnrl Df tlft ~h .Jtatt•
..-uqinght~ ~.Qt. 21lc?'l~
CH"M I!I!:F!S 01'"

THE CHIEF" JUSTICE

April 2, 1986
83 - 1968 - Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Sandra:
I j oin your concurring opinion of March 24th.
Regards,

Justice Sandra O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

April 4, 1986

83-1968 Thornburg v. Ginqles

Dear Sandra:
Please join mP. in your opi.nion concurri.ng in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

1 think your opinion is quite excellent .
your making the changes 1 suggested.
L. F. P., Jr .

1 also appreciate

CI1AMBERS 0,.

.JUSTICE

w ...

April 15, 1986

.J. BRENNAN, .JR.

MEMO TO THE CONFERENCE

83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles

I was persuaded by Byron's letter of February 19

. a~

;j_t&

J-:v

fr~~or ~~~ .
extensive development of the legal standards that are applicable t1
to minority voters' §2 claims of unequal electoral opportuni ~ ~q~

Sandra's concurrence that lower courts would benefit

than I attempted in my initial draft.

In order to develop those

standards and to address some of the other concerns Sandra
raised, I have so substantially revised my first draft that the
version I circulate today is, in effect, a new opinion.
You will notice that I have altered the disposition of
~l..

@

?

\'

District 23 from an affirmance to a reverse and remand.
Development of the applicable legal principles convinced me that

presumption of equal opportunity.

I believe, and state in my

opinion, that in some situations it may be possible for
plaintiffs to rebut this presumption.

See pp. 41-42.

Because we

establish this presumption for the first time in this case, I
prefer to remand to afford appellees an opportunity to meet their
burden.

-2-

Although this "fairness" justification is the only one I
offer in the opinion for the remand, I have another which I would
like to bring to your attention in this memorandum.
Appellees suggest that blacks in District 23 had to rely
on bullet (single-shot) votingl in order to elect the
representatives of their choice.

Appellees argue that, where

blacks must rely on bullet voting in order to elect their chosen
candidates, black voters are forced to choose between two
options, both of which are unacceptable under §2.

Black voters

can either forfeit their opportunity to vote for a full slate of
candidates, and thus have a chance to elect one representative of
their choice; or they can vote for a full slate and elect no
representative.

By contrast, appellees contend, white voters are

assured of the ability to elect a representative of their choice

1

li prefer to use the term "bullet voting" rather than "singleshot voting" because the term "single-shot" carries with it the
incorrect connotation that it refers only to situations where one
vote is cast. While it is often the case that bullet voting will
be effective only where a single vote is cast, under certain
circumstances voters may vote for more than one candidate -- but
fewer than a full slate -- without hurting either of their
preferred candidates.
As a simple illustration, let me revise slightly the facts of
footnote 5 of my opinion, which describes the circumstances under
which bullet-voting may enable minority voters to elect a
representative of their choice. Assume a town of 600 whites and
400 blacks with an at-large election to choose four council
members. Each voter is able to cast four votes. Ten candidates
are running for office -- 2 blacks and 8 whites. Further assume
that the whites in this town will divide their votes evenly among
the white candidates. If the blacks "bullet vote" for the two
black candidates -- that is, if they "target" the black
candidates by withholding two of their votes from the white
candidates -- the election results should be as follows. Each
white candidate receives about 300 votes and each black candidate
receives 400 votes. The two black candidates have won election.

-3-

and they can do so without sacrificing their opportunity to vote
for a full slate.

Consequently, appellees conclude that where

black voters must depend on bullet voting they do not enjoy the
same opportunity to participate in the political process or to
elect representatives of their choice as whites do.
The election statistics reproduced at J.A. Ex.-8 seems to
support appellees' suggestion that black voters in House District
23 owe their success in the last three elections to bullet
voting.

In both the primary and general elections, voters in

House District 23 were entitled to cast 3 votes in each election.
It is clear that almost all blacks bullet-voted for the two black
candidates in the 1978 and 1982 primaries

99% and 91%,

respectively, of all the votes cast by blacks went to those
candidates.

In other words, blacks withheld their remaining vote

or votes from the white candidates.

It seems also that many

blacks bullet-voted in the 1982 general election -- 78% of all
the votes cast by blacks went to the one black candidate.

In the

1978 and 1980 general elections, blacks did not bullet-vote -only 36% and 35% of all the votes cast by blacks went to the
black candidate.
ran unopposed.

But, in 1978 and in 1980, the black candidate
Indeed, it appears that all of the candidates ran

unopposed -- that is, three candidates ran for three seats.
were guaranteed success.

All

Thus black voters could vote for a full

slate, confident of their ability to elect the black candidate.
While the District Court did observe generally that blacks
in all of the contested districts relied on bullet voting to
elect their preferred representatives, it made no findings

-4-

regarding the role of bullet voting in House District 23.
Because we cannot and should not make such findings here, I do
not believe that we should address at this time the merits of
appellees' argument that reliance on bullet voting rebuts any
presumption of equal opportunity that arises from sustained
success.

Furthermore, even if the District Court had found that

blacks in District 23 had relied on bullet voting in the last
three elections, it made no findings to explain the success of
candidates preferred by black voters in the previous three
elections.

This gap alone, I believe, requires reversal and

remand.
I perceive another, equally important reason to defer
consideration of the question whether reliance on bullet voting
shoQrc

presumption of equal opportunity that arises

from sustained success.

The Senate Report instructs that courts

----------~

should analyze S2 claims according to a "functional" rather than
"formalistic" view of the political process, S. Rep. 30, n. 120,
and with a "practical" approach to "reality."

s.

Rep. 30.

I

think we could use some assistance in determining the functional
significance of sustained, successful reliance on bullet voting
to claims of vote dilution through submergence in multimember
districts. Consequently, I believe that we should allow the issue
to receive some development in lower courts and in law review and
social science literature before we address it.

---------------

However, I would

like to share with you at this time what I have gleaned, from the
extensive research I have done for this new draft, to be the
functional significance of such reliance.

-5-

As an initial matter, it is important to recall the
factual context in which blacks in a multimember district need to
rely on bullet voting in order to elect their preferred
representatives.

Blacks must constitute a minority of the

district's population.

And, the white majority must vote

sufficiently as a bloc for candidates other than those preferred
by blacks to defeat the blacks' preferred candidates in the
absence of black bullet voting {or other unusual circumstances).
Thus, black electoral success obtained through the use of bullet
voting does not disprove the existence of significant white bloc
voting or the detrimental effect the use of a multimember
electoral structure generally has on the ability of blacks in the
district to elect representatives of their choice.
What black electoral success obtained through bullet
voting does show is this:

Under certain circumstances, by

withholding votes from candidates preferred by the majority,
blacks can overcome the handicap of being a minority in a
multimember district in which the majority votes substantially as
a bloc for different candidates.

As I understand it, blacks'

ability to use bullet voting effectively is mathematically
dependent on the percentage of all voters in the district who are
black and on a bloc-voting majority splitting their votes among
more candidates than there are open seats. See,
Rome v. United States, 446

u.s.

u.s.

~'

156, 184, n. 19 {1980)

City of
{quoting

Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years

After, pp. 206-207 {1975}}; Lijphart, Introduction to Part II, in
Representation and Redistricting Issues 104 {Grofman, Lijphart,

-6-

McKay, Scarrow, eds. 1982)

("[S]ingle-shot or bullet voting is

only effective • • • when the majority divides its votes among
several -- in our example of a four member district, more than
four-- candidates").2

Thus, blacks' ability to use bullet

voting effectively seems to be largely fortuitous.

It will vary

according to the number of candidates running, the split in white
support for those candidates, and the percentage of the voting
population that is black.

Through reliance on bullet voting,

blacks may be able to win several elections in a row, but the
multimember electoral structure, in combination with significant
white bloc voting, will continue to pose a real threat to blacks'
ability to elect their chosen candidates.
If my understanding of the mechanics of successful bullet
voting is correct, I am inclined to think that blacks' need to
rely on bullet voting to elect their chosen candidates rebuts any
presumption of equal opportunity that sustained success creates.
Nonetheless, I have not found much written on the subject, and,
before coming to rest on the issue, I would like to see what
lower courts and law review and social science articles will have
to say about it after this opinion is handed down.

2This appears to be what happened in the 1978 primary in
District 23. In that election, 7 candidates -- 2 blacks and 5
whites -- ran for 3 slots. As I explain above, blacks bullet
voted for the two black candidates, casting 99% of all the votes
they cast for these candidates. Further, blacks ranked these
candidates first and second in the field. By contrast, whites
cast only 10% of all the votes they cast for the black
candidates, and ranked them sixth and seventh in the field. It
seems likely, then, that the election of one black candidate was
due to whites splitting their votes among the 5 white candidates.
See J.A. Ex-5 & Ex-8.

-7-

I am less certain of my views concerning appellees'
suggestion that, where blacks must rely on bullet voting to elect
their preferred representatives in a multimember district, they
have less opportunity than whites to participate in the political
process.

The theoretical basis for this argument seems to be

that, unlike blacks, whites can vote for a full slate of
candidates, and thus influence the election of more than one
representative.

Thus, in theory, more than one representative

will be accountable to white voters and, consequently, whites
will receive "more representation" than blacks.

This is a much

subtler and more complex argument than the "interference with the
ability to elect" argument I describe above.

I definitely prefer

that this argument receive some scholarly and lower court
development before we address it.

OJ111trt of tqt ~ittb jbdt,S'
Jlulfington, ~. OJ. 2ll.;i't~

~ltlfrtm.t

CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 16, 1986

Re:

83-1968 - Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Bill,
You have certainly written a more complete
development of the law for §2 claims. It will require
me to revise my opinion rather extensively and I will
probably not be able to circulate anything for at
least the next two weeks.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~/?~,
Jd;L~~

S'~"" ~llc..u-- ~~

~

April 17, 1986

83-1968 Thornburg v. Ginqles

Dear Blll:
1 will await Sandra's further writing.

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

j;nprtmt <!f.ru.rt .rf tqt ~b j;tatu
'llasftingt.rn. ~. <!f. 2ll.;i'l-~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 20, 1986

Re:

No. 83-1968-Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Bill:
I

am still with you.
Sincerely,

-3*·
.

T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

.inprtm:t ~uurl 4tf tltt ~tb .ibdt•
._aslfinghm. ~. <ij. ~~~
CHAMBERS 01"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 22, 1986
Re:

No. 83-1968

Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Sandra,
I am still with you.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

arne 05/23/86

No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Sandra,
The revised draft of your opinion is excellent,
and I intend to join it.

When I mentioned my problem

with what you say about Bandemer, you suggested I
write you.
On page 16, you quote from

Bandemer to illus-

trate the point that the Court's exclusive focus on

~-)\

~e~

results is contrary to the re-

~

sults test announced in White and Whitcomb.

In my

/NV~~
dissenting opinion, I expressly disagreed with the
.1\

Court's characterization, reflected in part in the
language that you quote, of the evidence of discrirninatory effect required by our equal protection cases.
I criticized the Court for ignoring the fact that

DRAFT

05/23/86; 10:10 AM

page 2.

under equal protection analysis proof of heightened
effect may be necessary to prove not only effect but
also to give rise to an inference of invidious intent.
You could omit the cite to Bandemer, and rely directly
on White and Whitcomb.

The following might be substi-

tuted for the carry-over paragraph on pages 16-17:
"The 'results' test as reflected in White
and Whitcomb requires an inquiry into the
extent of the minority group's opportunities
to participate in the political processes.
See White, supra, at 766.

While electoral

success is a central part of the vote dilution inquiry, White held that to prove vote
dilution 'it is not enough that the racial
group allegedly discriminated against has
not had legislative seats in proportion to
its voting potential,' 412

u.s.,

at 765-766,

and Whitcomb flatly rejected the proposition

05/23/86; 10:10 AM

page 3.

DRAFT

that 'any group with distinctive interests
must be represented in legislative halls if
it is numerous enough to command at least
one seat and represents a minority living in
an area sufficiently compact to constitute a
single member district.'

403

u.s.,

at 156.

To the contrary, the plaintiffs succeeded
under the 'results' test in White because
they established 'that the political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by
the group in question--that its members had
less opportunity than did other residents in
the district to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their
choice.'

412

u.s.,

at 766."

My second suggestion concerns your concluding
paragraph in section II, on page 18.

You quote

05/23/86; 10:10 AM

page 4.

DRAFT

Bandemer for the proposition that "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning
elections."

My problem here is that in my dissent in

Bandemer, I criticized the Court for ignoring the political reality that winning elections is of critical
importance to political parties or groups.

It seems

to me that your language suggests that electoral suecess is important to a group's influence over political processes, but that the Court elevates election
results, particularly a minority group's failure to
achieve proportional representation, over all of the
other Zimmer factors.

Accordingly, I would prefer if

you would delete this reference to Bandemer.

Perhaps

the paragraph on page 18 could end with the third sentence in the paragraph, with the following alteration:
"The court should not focus solely on the
minority group's ability to elect represent-

05/23/86; 10:10 AM

DRAFT

atives of its choice, as the Court's version
of the 'results' test apparently does."
It is too bad that in this important case the
Court comes close to rewriting §2 to require, in effeet, proportional representation.
Sincerely,

page 5.

.Bu;n-ttm ~ourlltf tltt~tb .jtaftg
..htttJrington, ~. ~ 211~)1.~
CHAM15ERS 01'"

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , ..JR .

May 23, 1986

83-1968 Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Sandra,
The revised draft of your op1n1on is persuasive and
extremely well written.
I intend to join you.
I mentioned
that arguably there may be some tension between your reliance on the long quote from Bandemer and my dissent in that
case.
It would help me if you could modify this.
On page 16, you quote from Bandemer to illustrate the
point that WJB's exclusive focus on proportional election
results is contrary to the results test announced in White
and Whitcomb.
In my dissenting opinion in Bandemer, I disagreed with BRW's characterization in that case [reflected
in part in the language that you quote] of the evidence of
discriminatory effect required by our equal protection
cases.
I criticized Byron for ignoring the fact that under
equal protection analysis proof of heightened effect may be
necessary to prove not only effect but also to give rise to
an inference of invidious intent.
It would be helpful to me if you omit the full quote
from Bandemer, and rely primarily on White and Whitcomb.
The following could be substituted for the carry-over paragraph on pages 16-17:
"The 'results' test as reflected in White and
Whitcomb requires an inquiry into the extent
of the minority group's opportunities to participate in the political processes.
See
White, supra, at 766. While electoral success is a central part of the vote dilution
inquiry, White held that to prove vote dilution 'it is not enough that the racial group
allegedly discriminated against has not had
legislative seats in proportion to its voting
potential,' 412 u.s., at 765-766, and
Whitcomb flatly rejected the proposition that
'any group with distinctive interests must be
represented in legislative halls if it is

2.
numerous enough to command at least one seat
and represents a minority living in an area
sufficiently compact to constitute a single
member district.' 403 u.s., at 156. To the
contrary, the plaintiffs succeeded under the
'results' test in White because they established 'that the political processes leading
to nomination and election were not equally
open to participation by the group in question--that its members had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to
elect legislators of their choice.•
412
u.s., at 766. Just this term, the Court emphasized that this standard requires 'a substantially greater showing of adverse effects
than a mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of unconstitutional
vote dilution.'" Davis v. Bandemer,
u.s.
_, -

(1986).

It is unfortunate that in this important case the Court
ignores the relevant legislative history, and comes close to
rewriting §2 to require, in effect, proportional representation. Though much of the Court's 53-page opinion is unnecessary dicta, it is likely to be read as a binding construction of §2 in all situations.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

May 23, 1966

63-1966 Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Sandra,
The revised draft of your opinion is persuasive and
extremely well written. 1 intend to join you. 1 mentioned
that arguably there may be some tension between your reliance on the long quote from Bandemer and my dissent in that
case. lt would help me if you could modify this.
On page 16, you quote from Bandemer to illustrate the
point that WJB's excluqive focus on proportional election
results is contrary to the results test announced in White
and Whitcomb. ln my dissenting opinion in Bandemer, 1 disagreed \'lith BRW's characterization in that case [reflected
in part in the language that you quote) of the evidence of
discriminatory effect required by our equal protection
cases. l criticized Byron for ignoring the fact that under
equal protection analysis proof of heightened effect may be
necessary to prove not only effect but also to qive rise to
an inference of invidious intent.
lt would be helpful to me if you omit the full quote
from Bandeme~, and rely primarily on White and Whitcomb.
The following could be substituted for the carry-over paragraph on pages 16-17:
"The 'results' test as reflected in White and
Whitcomb requires an inquiry into the extent
of the minority group's opportun.ities to participate in the political processes. See
White, supra, at 766. While electoral success is a central part of the vote dilution
inquiry, White held that to prove vote dilution 'it is not enough that the racial group
allegedly discriminated against has not had
legislative seats in proportion to its voting
potential,' 412 u.s., at 765-766, and
Whitcomb flatly rejected the proposition that
'any group with distinctive interests must be
represented in legislative halls if it is

2.

numerous enough to command at least one seat
and represents a minority living in an area
sufficiently compact to constitute a single
member district.• 403 u.s., at 156. To the
contrary, the plaintiffs succeeded under the
•results• test in White because they established 'that the political processes leading
to nomination and Plection were not equally
open to participation by the group in question--that its members had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to
elect legislators of their choice.' 412
u.s., at 766. Just this term, the Court emphasized that this standard requires 'a substantially greater showing of adverse effects
than a mere lack of proportional representation to support a findinq of unconstitutional
vote dilution.'" Davi~ v. Bandemer,
u.s.
_ , - (1986).
It is unfortunate that in this important case the Court
ignores the relevant legislative history, and comes close to
rewriting S2 to require, in effect, proportional representation. Though much of the Court's 53-page opinion is unnecessary dicta, it is likely to be read as a binding construction of ~2 in all situations.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
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The "results" test as reflected in Whitcomb and White requires an
inquiry into the extent of the minority group's opportunities to
participate in the political processes.
766.

See White, supra, at

While electoral success is a central part of the vote dilu-

tion inquiry, White held that to prove vote dilution, "it is not
enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has
not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential,"
412 U.S., at 765-766, and Whitcomb flatly rejected the proposition that "any group with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command
at least one seat and represents a minority living in an area
sufficiently compact to constitute a single member district."
403

u.s.,

at 156.

To the contrary, the results test as described

in White requires plaintiffs to establish "that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally
open to participation by the group in question--that its members
had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators
of their choice."

412

u.s.,

at 766.

By showing both "a history

of disproportionate results" and "strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation," the plaintiffs in White met this standard, which, as the Court emphasized
just this Term, requires "a substantially greater showing of ad-

2.

verse effects than a mere lack of proportional representation to
support a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution."
Bandemer,

u.s.

__, __, --

(1986).

Davis v.

May 24, 1986

No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Sandra,
I am still with you.
Sincerely,

cc:

The Conference

5~~~
~ ~ ~1-o~J
j 1-

May 27, 1986

J-o~~1~

THORN GINA-POW

~ftud~

Thornb~ ~t hr ~

83-1968

Justice Powell,

concurr~~ Justi\: e

~~ .

O'Connor.
I

~1-~

zA-;

write

briefly

to

emphasize

my

agreement

with

Justice 0' Connor

that the Court has misconstrued Section

2.

it

In my view,

H...d

is clear beyond doubt the compromise
'\

version of Section 2 offered by Senator Dole was derived
primarily

from

this

Court's

decisions

in

White

v.

Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403

u.s.

124

(1971).

These

decisions

representation,

proportional

explicitly

rejected

approved

and

the

as

applicable standard the "equal opportunity to participate"
in the political processes.
incorporated

the

whether

opportunity

this

Dole

Moreover, Section 2b itself,

compromise,
exists

and

is

to

also
be

states

that

determined

in

light of the "totality of circumstances."
Disregarding
District

Court

this

below

clear
and

intention of Congress,

this

Court

today

~

focus~

the
the

inquiry almost solely on statistical evidence perceived to
reflect

"block

voting".

As

Justice

O'Connor

opinion

2.

persuasively shows, despite the language of §2 as amended
and its legislative history, the Court in effect adopts a
view

of

"racial

block

statistical evidence -

whether there was,

solely

on

that seems to require proportional

Little or

representation.

based

voting"

no weight

is

to be given to

independently of statistics, an "equal

opportunity to participate in the political processes."
I
said

add

that

a
one

word

about statistics.

can find

almost any point.

or devise

(Anne:

It often has been

"statistics"

to prove

ask Lexis or Westlaw to give

you a good quote on the use of statistics).

The District

Court made findings of fact with respect to the

.s

percentage~

- down to a fraction of one percent - as to how the vote
in

each

"whites".

district

was

Happily,

divided

secrecy

honored in this country.

between

of

the

"blacks"

ballot

is

and

strictly

Census figures purport to show

the racial composition of the population.
is not precisely accurate when taken,

But the census

(Anne:

ask Library

if there is official corrobation of this?), and because of
the mobility of our population, its statistics quickly are
out of date.

Thus, the racial composition of a political

district,

any

estimate.

at

Also

given
the

time,

categories

is

at

of

best
"black"

only
and

a

rough

"white"

3.

exclude

other

intelligence

ethnic
of

gro ps.crf'It

American

to

~

assume

reflects

on

the

J;.~ag.es

that

~y ignore the qualifications of candidates and
vote solely on the basis of their color.

Even if black
r~view

voters uniformly vote only for black candidates (a

I would reject), it is demonstratively true that qualified
minority

candidates

population

is

frequently

are

elected

predominately white.

(Anne:

where
ask

the

Library

In addition to the

for list of cities to put in a note).

numerous cities in our country that have minority mayors,
the statewide elections in Virginia last year - a state in
which

it

library

is

verif)

elected a

~-

estimated

fine

of

the

that only about
adult

30%

population

(Anne:

is

Have

minority

black citizen Lieutenant Governor , 0-f thy

It also is common _knowledge, particularly in the

southern states, that both of the major political parties
rarely inject race into a political campaign.
is obvious:

The reason

the black population in these states usually
QM..

/\

controls the result of a. election.

~-~-s-

·

simplistic

reliance

upon

statistics

A

factor in determining whether there
§2.

In sum, I reject the
as

~

aa.

~ontrolling
A
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been violation of
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice White

Circulated:
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1968

LACY H. THORNBURG, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
RALPH GINGLES ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
[May - , 1986]

concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Sections I, II, III A, III B, IV A and V ofthe Court's
opinion. I dissent from Section III C, from Section IV B, jlr"
_par(, and inpart from the judgment. I am also sufficiently
do~~ection VI that I do not join it.
The Court holds in Section III C that the crucial factor in
identifying polarized voting is the race of the voter and that
the race of the candidate is irrelevant. Under this test,
there is polarized voting if the majority of white voters vote
for different candidates than the majority of the blacks, regardless of the race of the candidates. I do not agree. Suppose an 8-member multimember district that is 60% white
and 40% black, the blacks being geographically located so
that 2 safe black single-member districts could be drawn.
Suppose further that there are 6 white and 2 black democrats
running against 6 white and 2 black republicans. Under the
Court's test, there would be polarized voting and a likely § 2
violation if all the republicans, including the 2 blacks are
elected, and 80% of the blacks in the predominantly black
areas vote democratic. I take it that there would also be a
violation in a single-member district that is 60% black, but
enough of the blacks vote with the whites to elect a black candidate who is not the choice of the majority of black voters.
This is interest-group politics rather than a rule hedging
against racial discrimination. I doubt that this is what ConJUSTICE WHITE,

•

83-1968-CONCUR/DISSENT
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gress had in mind in amending § 2 as it did, and it seems quite
at odds with the discussion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S
124, 149-160 (1971). Furthermore, on the facts of this case,
there is no need to draw the voter/candidate distinction.
The District Court did not and reached the correct result except, in my view, with respect to District 23.
I agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that we should reverse
outright with respect to District 23. I also agree with her
that neither the lack of white opposition to black candidates
nor the use of bullet voting to elect blacks should be a factor
weighing against the presumption of validity based on black
electoral success. Hence, I cannot join Section IV of the
Court's opinion in its entirety and dissent in part from its
judgment.

.h:prmu (!JDnrl Df tlft ~b ,ibdtg

:.ulfinghnt. ~. QJ.

2llp,.~

CHAMI5ERS OF"

.JUSTICE

w .. .

.J . BRENNAN , .JR .

May 29, 1986

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

No. 83-1968
Thornburg v. Gingles
Although I continue to believe that
the
most
equitable
disposition
of
District 23 would be to vacate and
remand, I am not so strongly tied to
that view that I could not JOln a
majority to reverse.
The Chief Justice
has not yet voted.
But if, when he
does, there are 5 to reverse outright, I
will make a 6th.
-1

~7/t-cC
w.J.B., Jr.

.§uvrrtnt <!fourt of tqt ~tb .§tatu

'IJasfrington. ~. Qt.

2llp.l!-~

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 4, 1986

Re:

No. 83-1968-Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear John:
Please join me in your opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
I am withdrawing my earlier
joinder of WJB's opinion.
Sincerely,

~·
T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

<!Jcttrl of ut~ ~~ .ihdte
-zuJrittghm. ~. <If. 2Ll.;i,.~

~tmt

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

June 25, 1986

No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear Bill:
I am joining John's writing in this case and therefore am with you in your opinion except Part IVB and House
District 23.

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

~mtt <!j:onrillftlf~~b .Shdttt

._,uftittgbm. ~. <!j:. 2.lT,?J!..;l
CHAMBERS OF

June 25, 1986

..JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 83-1968, Thornburg v. Gingles

Dear John:
Please join me in your opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

83-1968 Thornburg v. Gingles (Anne)
WJB for the Court 12/16/85
1st draft 2/5/86
2nd draft 4/15/86
3rd draft 4/21/86
4th draft 5/20/86
5th draft 5/27/86
6th draft 5/30/86
7rh draft 6/26/86
Joined by TM 2/6/86 (withdrew join 6/4/86)
JPS 2/11/86
HAB 3/13/86
SOC concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th

BRW
JPS

LFP
LFP

draft 3/13/86
draft 3/24/86
draft 5/14/86
draft 5/22/86
draft 6/3/86
draft 6/26/86
Joined by WHR 3/14/86
CJ 4/3/86
LFP 4/4/86
concurring in part and dissenting in part
1st draft 5/27/86
2nd draft 6/2/86
concurring in part and dissenting in part
1st draft 4/29/86
2nd draft 6/3/86
3rd draft 6/4/86
4th draft 6/26/86
Joined by TM 6/4/86
HAB 6/25/86
will await SOC's writing 2/11/86
will await SOC's further writing 4/17/86
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~;v{.fNo. 83-1968

LACY H. THORNBURG, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
RALPH GINGLES ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
[May -

, 1986]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires for the first time that we construe § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982.
42 U. S. C. § 1973. The specific question to be decided is
whether the three-judge District Court, convened in the
Eastern District of North Carolina pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 2284(a) and 42 U. S. C. § 1973(c), correctly held that the use
in a legislative redistricting plan of multimember districts in
five North Carolina legislative districts violated § 2 by impairing the opportunity of black voters "to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice."
§ 2(b), 96 Stat. 134.
I
BACKGROUND
In April 1982, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a legislative redistricting plan for the State's Senate
and House of Representatives. Appellees, black citizens of
North Carolina who are registered to vote, challenged seven
districts, one single-member 1 and six multimember 2 dis' Appellees challenged Senate District No. 2, which consisted of the
whole of Northampton, Hertford, Gates, Bertie, and Chowan Counties,
and parts of Washington, Martin, Halifax, and Edgecombe Counties.
2
Appellees challenged the following multimember districts: Senate
No. 22 (Mecklenburg and Cabarrus Counties-4 members), House No. 36
(Mecklenburg County-8 members), House No. 39 (part of Forsyth

~
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tricts, alleging that the redistricting scheme impaired black
citizens' ability to elect representatives of their choice in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and of § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. 3
After appellees brought suit, but before trial, Congress
amended § 2. The amendment was largely a response to this
Court's plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55
(1980), which had declared that, in order to establish a violation of either § 2 or of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested electoral
mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state
officials for a discriminatory purpose. Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be
proven by showing discriminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the "results test," applied
by this Court in White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and
by other federal courts before Bolden, supra. S. Rep.
No. 97-417, p. 28 (1982) (hereinafter S. Rep.).
Section 2, as amended, 96 Stat. 134, reads as follows:
"(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
County-5 members), House No. 23 (Durham County-3 members),
House No. 21 (Wake County-6 members), and House No. 8 (Wilson,
Nash and Edgecombe Counties-4 members).
3
Appellants initiated this action in September 1981, challenging the
North Carolina General Assembly's July 1981 redistricting. The history
of this action is recounted in greater detail in the District Court's opinion in
this case, Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 350-358 (EDNC 1984).
It suffices here to note that the General Assembly revised the 1981 plan in
April 1982 and that the plan at issue in this case is the 1982 plan.
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"(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based
on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected
by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." Codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1973.
The Senate Judiciary Committee majority Report accompanying the bill that amended § 2, elaborates on the circumstances tliat might be probative of a § 2 violation, noting
the following "typical factors:" 4
"1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in
the state or political subdivision that touched the right of
the members of the minority group to register, to vote,
or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
"2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the
state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
"3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision
has used unusually large election districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
' These factors were derived from the analytical framework of White v.
R egester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), as refined and developed by the lower
courts, in particular by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.
2d 1297 (1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976) (per curiam) . S. Rep. 28, n. 113.
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"4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the
members of the minority group have been denied access
to that process;
"5. the extent to which members of the minority group
in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
"6. whether political campaigns have been characterized
by overt or subtle racial appeals;
"7. the extent to which members of the minority group
have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
"Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
"whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on
the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of
the members of the minority group.
"whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous."
S. Rep. 28-29.
The District Court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test set forth in § 2(b) to appellees' statutory claim,
and, relying principally on the factors outlined in the Senate
Report, held that the redistricting scheme violated § 2 because it resulted in the dilution of black citizens' votes in all
seven disputed districts. In light of this conclusion, the
court did not reach appellees' constitutional claims. Gingles
v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (EDNC 1984).
Preliminarily, the court found that black citizens constituted a distinct population and registered-voter minority in
each challenged district. The court noted that at the time
the multimember districts were created, there were concentrations of black citizens within the boundaries of each
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that were sufficiently large and contiguous to constitute effective voting majorities in single-member districts lying
wholly within the boundaries of the multimember districts.
With respect to the challenged single-member district, Senate District No. 2, the court also found that there existed a
concentration of black citizens within its boundaries and
within those of adjoining Senate District No. 6 that was sufficient in numbers and in contiguity to constitute an effective
voting majority in a single-member district. The District
Court then proceeded to find that the following circumstances combined with the multimember districting scheme
to result in the dilution of black citizens' votes.
First, the court found that North Carolina had officially
discriminated against its black citizens with respect to their
exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to
1970 by employing at different times a poll tax, a literacy
test, a prohibition against bullet (single-shot) voting 5 and
designated seat plans 6 for multimember districts. The
court observed that even after the removal of direct barriers
to black voter registration, such as the poll tax and literacy
Bullet (single-shot) voting has been described as follows:
"'Consider [a] town of 600 whites and 400 blacks with an at-large election
to choose four council members. Each voter is able to cast four votes.
Suppose there are eight white candidates, with the votes of the whites split
among them approximately equally, and one black candidate, with all the
blacks voting for him and no one else. The result is that each white candidate receives about 300 votes and the black candidate receives 400 votes.
The black has probably won a seat. This technique is called single-shot
voting. Single-shot voting enables a minority group to win some at-large
seats if it concentrates its vate behind a limited number of candidates and if
the vote of the majority is divided among a number of candidates.'" City
of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 184, n. 19 (1980), quoting U. S.
Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After,
pp. 206-207 (1975).
6
Designated (or numbered) seat schemes require a candidate for election in multimember districts to run for specific seats, and can, under certain circumstances, frustrate bullet voting. See, e. g., City of Rome,
supra, at 185, n. 21.
5
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test, black voter registration remained relatively depressed;
in 1982 only 52.7% of age-qualified blacks statewide were
registered to vote, whereas 66.7% of whites were registered.
The District Court found these statewide depressed levels of
black voter registration to be present in all of the disputed
districts and to be traceable, at least in part, to the historical
pattern of statewide official discrimination.
Second, the court found that historic discrimination in education, housing, employment, and health services had resulted in a lower socioeconomic status for North Carolina
blacks as a group than for whites. The court concluded that
this lower status both gives rise to special group interests
and hinders blacks' ability to participate effectively in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
Third, the court considered other voting procedures that
may operate to lessen the opportunity of black voters to elect
candidates of their choice. It noted that North Carolina has
a majority vote requirement for primary elections and, while
acknowledging that no black candidate for election to the
State General Assembly had failed to win solely because of
this requirement, the court concluded that it nonetheless
presents a continuing practical impediment to the opportunity of black voting minorities to elect candidates of their
choice. The court also remarked on the fact that North Carolina does not have a subdistrict residency requirement for
members of the General Assembly elected from multimember
districts, a requirement which the court found could offset to
some extent the disadvantages minority voters often experience in multimember districts.
Fourth, the court found that white candidates in North
Carolina have encouraged voting along color lines by appealing to racial prejudice. It noted that the record is replete
with specific examples of racial appeals, ranging in style from
overt and blatant to subtle and furtive, and in date from the
1890's to the 1984 campaign for a seat in the United States
Senate. The court determined that the use of racial appeals
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in political campaigns in North Carolina persists to the
present day and that its current effect is to lessen to some
degree the opportunity of black citizens to participate effectively in the political processes and to elect candidates of
their choice.
Fifth, the court examined the extent to which blacks have
been elected to office in North Carolina, both statewide and
in the challenged districts. It found, among other things,
that prior to World War II, only one black had been elected
to public office in this century. While recognizing that "it
has now become possible for black citizens to be elected to office at all levels of state government in North Carolina," 590
F. Supp., at 367, the court found that, in comparison to white
candidates running for the same office, black candidates are
at a disadvantage in terms of relative probability of success.
It also found that the overall rate of black electoral success
has been minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the
total state population. For example, the court noted, from
1971 and 1982 there were at any given time only two-to-four
blacks in the 120-member House of Representatives-that is,
only 1.6% to 3.3% of House members were black. From
1975 to 1983 there were at any one time only one or two
blacks in the 50-member State Senate-that is, only 2% to 4%
of State Senators were black. By contrast, at the time of the
District Court's opinion, blacks constituted about 22.4% of
the total state population.
With respect to the success in this century of black candidates in the contested districts, see also Appendix B, infra,
the court found that only one black had been elected to House
District 36-after this lawsuit began. Similarly, only one
black had served in the Senate from District 22, from
1975-1980. Before the 1982 election, a black was elected
only twice to the House from District 39 (part of Forsyth
County); in the 1982 contest two blacks were elected. Since
1973 a black citizen had been elected each 2-year term to the
House from District 23 (Durham County), but no black had
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been elected to the Senate from Durham County. In House
District 21 (Wake County), a black had been elected twice to
the House, and another black served two terms in the State
Senate. No black had ever been elected to the House or
Senate from the area covered by House District No. 8 and no
black person had ever been elected to the Senate from the
area covered by Senate District No. 2.
The court did acknowledge the improved success of black
candidates in the 1982 elections, in which 11 blacks were
elected to the State House of Representatives, including 5
blacks from the multimember districts at issue here. However, the court pointed out that the 1982 election was conducted after the commencement of this litigation. The court
found the circumstances of the 1982 election sufficiently aberrational and the success by black candidates too minimal
and too recent in relation to the long history of complete denial of elective opportunities to support the conclusion that
black voters' opportunities to elect representatives of their
choice was not impaired.
Finally, the court considered the extent to which voting in
the challenged districts was racially polarized. Based on statistical evidence presented by expert witnesses, supplemented to some degree by the testimony of lay witnesses, the
court found that all of the challenged districts exhibit severe
and persistent racially polarized voting.
Based on these findings, the court declared the contested
portions of the 1982 redistricting plan violative of § 2 and enjoined appellants from conducting elections pursuant to those
portions of the plan. Appellants, the Attorney General of
North Carolina and others, took a direct appeal to this Court,
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253, with respect to five of the
multimember districts-House Districts 21, 23, 36, and 39,
and Senate District 22. Appellants argue, first, that the
District Court utilized a legally incorrect standard in determining whether the contested districts exhibit racial bloc voting to an extent that is cognizable under § 2. Second, they
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contend that the court used an incorrect definition of racially
polarized voting and thus erroneously relied on statistical evidence that was not probative of polarized voting. Third,
they maintain that the court assigned the wrong weight to
evidence of some black candidates' electoral success. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in concluding that
these multimember districts result in black citizens having
less opportunity than their white counterparts to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. We noted probable jurisdiction, 471 U. S. - (1985), and now affirm with respect to all of the districts except House District 23. With regard to District 23, the judgment of the District Court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
II
SECTION 2 AND VOTE DILUTION THROUGH USE
OF MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS
An understanding both of § 2 and of the way in which
multimember districts can operate to impair blacks' ability to
elect representatives of their choice is prerequisite to an
evaluation of appellants' contentions. First, then, we review amended § 2 and its legislative history in some detail.
Second, we explain the theoretical basis for appellees' claim
of vote dilution.
A
SECTION 2 AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Subsection 2(a) prohibits all States and political subdivisions from imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any standards, practices, or procedures
which result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote
of any citizen who is a member of a protected class of racial
and language minorities. Subsection 2(b) establishes that§ 2
has been violated where the "totality of the circumstances"
reveal that "the political processes leading to nomination or
election . . . are not equally open to participation by mem-
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hers of a [protected class] ... in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice." While explaining that "[t]he extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in
the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered" in evaluating an alleged violation, § 2(b)
cautions that "nothing in [§ 2] establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population."
The Senate Report which accompanied the 1982 amendments elaborates on the nature of § 2 violations and on the
proof required to establish these violations. 7 First and foremost, the Report dispositively rejects the position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), which required proof that. the contested electoral practice or
mechanism was adopted or maintained with the intent to discriminate against minority voters. 8 See, e. g., S. Rep. 2,
7

•

The Solicitor General urges this Court to give little weight to the Senate Report, arguing that it represents a compromise among conflicting
"factions," and thus is somehow less authoritative than most Committee
Reports. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8, n. 12, 24, n. 49.
We are not persuaded that the legislative history of amended § 2 contains
anything to lead us to conclude that this Senate Report should be accorded
little weight. We have repeatedly recognized that the authoritative
source for legislative intent lies in the committee reports on the bill. See,
e. g. Garcia v. United States, 469 U. S. - - , - - (1984); Zuber v. Allen,
396 u. s. 168, 186 (1969).
• The Senate Report states that amended § 2 was designed to restore
the "results test"-the legal standard that governed voting discrimination
cases prior to our decision in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980).
S. Rep. 15-16. The Report notes that in pre-Bolden cases such as
Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and Zimmer, 485 F. 2d 1297 (1973), plaintiffs could prevail by showing that, under the totality of the circumstances,
a challenged election law or procedure had the effect of denying a protected
minority an equal chance to participate in the electoral process. Under
the "results test," plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate that the challenged electoral law or structure was designed or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. S. Rep. 16.
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15-16, 27. The intent test was repudiated for three principal
reasons-it is "unnecessarily divisive because it involves
charges of racism on the part of individual officials or entire
communities," it places an "inordinately difficult" burden of
proof on plaintiffs, and it "asks the wrong question." !d., at
36. The "right" question, as the Report emphasizes repeatedly, is whether "as a result of the challenged practice or
structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of
their choice." 9 Id., at 28. See also id., at 2, 27, 29, n. 118,
36.
In order to answer this question, a court must assess the
impact of the contested structure or practice on minority
electoral opportunities "on the basis of objective factors."
Id., at 27. The Senate Report specifies factors which typically may be relevant to a § 2 claim: the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the
extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political
subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the State
or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination
against the minority group, such as unusually large election
districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions
against bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent to
which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in
the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals
The Senate Committee found that "voting practices and procedures
that have discriminatory results perpetuate the effects of past purposeful
discrimination." S. Rep. 40 (footnote omitted). As the Senate Report
notes, the purpose of the Voting Rights Act was " 'not only to correct an
active history of discrimination, the denying to Negroes of the right to register and vote, but also to deal with the accumulation of discrimination.'"
S. Rep. 5 (quoting 111 Cong. Rec. 8295 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
9
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in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of
the minority group have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction. S. Rep. 28-29; see also supra, at - - . The
Report notes also that evidence demonstrating that elected
officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group and that the policy underlying the State's or the political subdivision's use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous may have probative
value. S. Rep. 29. The Report stresses, however, that this
list of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor exclusive.
While the enumerated factors will often be pertinent to certain types of § 2 violations, particularly to vote dilution
claims, 10 other factors may also be relevant and may be considered. S. Rep. 29-30. Furthermore, the Senate Committee observed that "there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them
point one way or the other." Id., at 29. Rather, the Committee determined that "the question whether the political
processes are 'equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,'" id., at 30
(footnote omitted), and on a "functional" view of the political
process. Id., at 30, n. 120.
Although the Senate Report espouses a flexible, fact-intensive test for § 2 violations, it limits the circumstances under
which § 2 violations may be proved in three ways. First,
electoral devices, such as at-large elections, may not be considered per se violative of § 2. Plaintiffs must demonstrate
that, under the totality of the circumstances, the devices result in unequal access to the electoral process. I d., at 16.
Second, the conjunction of an allegedly dilutive electoral
mechanism and the lack of proportional representation alone
does not establish a violation. Ibid. Third, the results test
does not assume the existence of racial bloc voting; plaintiffs
must prove it. I d., at 33.
10
Section 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, not just vote dilution. S. Rep. 30.
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B
VOTE DILUTION THROUGH THE USE OF
MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS

Appellees contend that the legislative decision to employ
multimember, rather than single-member, districts in the
contested jurisdictions dilutes their votes by submerging
them in a white majority, 11 thus impairing their ability to
elect representatives of their choice. 12
The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law,
practice or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect their preferred represent11
Dilution of racial minority group voting strength may be caused by the
dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters or from the concentration of blacks into districts where
they constitute an excessive majority. Engstrom & Wildgen, Pruning
Thorns from the Thicket: An Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering, 2 Legis. Stud. Q. 465, 465-466 (1977). See also Derfner,
Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 Vand. L. Rev. 523, 553
(1973) (hereinafter Derfner); F. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment (hereinafter Parker), in Minority Vote Dilution
86-100 (Davidson ed., 1984) (hereinafter Minority Vote Dilution).
12
The claim we address in this opinion is one in which the plaintiffs alleged and attempted to prove that their ability to elect the representatives
of their choice was impaired by the selection of a multimember electoral
structure. We have no occasion to consider whether§ 2 permits, and if it
does, what standards should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority
group, which is not sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district, alleging that the use of a multimember district
·
impairs its ability to influence elections.
We note also that we have no occasion to consider whether the standards
we apply to respondents' claim that multimember districts operate to dilute the vote of geographically cohesive minority groups, which are large
enough to constitute a majorities in single-member districts and which are
contained within the boundaries of the challenged multimember districts,
are fully pertinent to other sorts of vote dilution claims, such as a claim
alleging that the splitting of a large and geographically cohesive minority
between two or more multimember or single-member districts resulted in
the dilution of the minority vote.
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atives. This Court has long recognized that multimember
districts and at-large voting schemes may "'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in]
the voting population."' 13 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S.
73, 88 (1966) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439
(1965)). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 617 (1982);
White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 765; Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U. S. 124, 143 (1971). The theoretical basis for this type
of impairment is that where minority and majority voters
consistently prefer different candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the
choices of minority voters. 14 See, e. g., Grofman, Alterna13
Commentators are in widespread agreement with this conclusion.
See, e. g., Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 85 (1979) (hereinafter Berry & Dye); Blacksher
& Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 34 Hastings L. J. 1 (1982) (hereinafter Blacksher & Menefee); Bonapfel, Minority
Challenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 Ga. L. Rev.
353 (1976) (hereinafter Bonapfel); Butler, Constitutional and Statutory
Challenges to Election Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to
Vote, 42 La. L. Rev. 851 (1982) (hereinafter Butler); Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Multimember Districts and Fair Representation, 120
Pa. L. Rev. 666 (1972) (hereinafter Carpeneti); Davidson & Korbel, AtLarge Elections and Minority Group Representation, in Minority Vote Dilution 65; Derfner; B. Grofman, Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality
Districts: Legal and Empirical Issues (hereinafter Grofman, Alternatives),
in Representation and Redistricting Issues 107 (B. Grofman, R. Lijphart,
H. McKay, & H. Scarrow eds., 1982) (hereinafter Representation andRedistricting Issues); Hartman, Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Powers, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 689 (1982); Jewell, The Consequences of Singleand Multimember Districting, in Representation and Redistricting Issues
129 (1982) (hereinafter Jewell); Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems on Political Representation, 11 Urb. Aff. Q. 345 (1976); Karnig, Black
Resources and City Council Representation, 41 J. Pol. 134 (1979); Karnig,
Black Representation on City Councils, 12 Urb. Aff. Q. 223 (1976); Parker
87-88.
14
Not only does "[v ]oting along racial lines" deprive minority voters of
their preferred representative in these circumstances, it also "allows those
elected to ignore [minority] interests without fear of political consequences," Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982), leaving the minority .
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tives, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 113-114.
Multimember districts and at-large election schemes, however, are not per se violative of minority voters' rights.
S. Rep. 16. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, supra, at 617; Regester,
supra, at 765; Whitcomb, supra, at 142. Minority voters
who contend that the multimember form of districting violates § 2, must prove that the use of a multimember electoral
structure operates to minimize or cancel out their ability to
elect their preferred candidates. See, e. g., S. Rep. 16.
While many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report
may be relevant to a claim of vote dilution through submergence in multimember districts, unless there is a conjunction
of the following circumstances, the use of multimember districts generally will not impede the ability of minority voters
to elect representatives of their choice. Stated succinctly, a
bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group. Bonapfel 355; Blacksher & Menefee
34; Butler 903; Carpeneti 696-699; Davidson, Minority Vote
Dilution: An Overview (hereinafter Davidson), in Minority
Vote Dilution 4; Grofman, Alternatives 117. Cf. Bolden, 446
U. S. , at 105, n. 3 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("It is obvious
that the greater the degree to which the electoral minority is
homogeneous and insular and the greater the degree that
bloc voting occurs along majority-minority lines, the greater
will be the extent to which the minority's voting power is diluted by multimember districting"). These circumstances
are necessary preconditions for multimember districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their ~hoice for the following reasons. First, the
minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a rnaeffectively unrepresented. See, e. g., Grofman, Should Representatives
Be Typical of Their Constituents?, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 97 (hereinafter Grofman, Should Representatives be Typical?); Parker
108.
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jority in a single-member district. 15 If it is not, as would be
the case in a substantially integrated district, the
multimember form of the district cannot be responsible for
minority voters' inability to elect its candidates. Cf. Rogers,
supra, at 616. See also, Blacksher & Menefee 51-56, 58;
Bonapfel 355; Carpeneti 696; Davidson 4; Jewell 130. Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. If the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember
electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests. Blacksher & Menefee 51-55, 58-60, and n. 344;
Carpeneti 696-697; Davidson 4. Third, the minority must be
able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently
as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed,
usually to defeat the minority's preferred
see, infra, at
candidate. See, e. g., Blacksher & Menefee 51, 53, 56-57,
60. Cf. Rogers, supra, at 616-617; Whitcomb, supra, at
158-159; McMillan v. Escambia County, Fla., 748 F. 2d
1037, 1043 (CA5 1984). In establishing this last circumstance, the minority group demonstrates that submergence
in a white multimember district impedes its ability to elect its
chosen representatives.
Finally, we observe that the usual predictability of the majority's success distinguishes structural dilution from the
mere loss of an occasional election. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1986) (opinion of WHITE, J.); Bolden,
supra, at 111, n. 7 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Whitcomb,
supra, at 153. See also Blacksher & Menefee 57, n. 333;
In this case respondents allege that within each contested multimember district there exists a minority group that is sufficiently large and
compact to constitute a single-member district. In a different kind of
case, for example a gerrymander case, plaintiffs might allege that the minority group that is sufficiently large and compact to constitute a singlemember district has been split between 2 or more multimember or singlemember districts, with the effect of diluting the potential strength of the
minority vote.
15
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Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and
the Voting Rights Act, 94 Yale L. J. 189, 200, n. 66 (1984)
(hereinafter Note, Geometry and Geography).

III
RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING
Having stated the general legal principles relevant to
claims that § 2 has been violated through the use of
multimember districts, we turn to the arguments of appellants and amicus curiae the United States addressing racially polarized voting. 16 First we describe the District
Court's treatment of racially polarized voting. Next, we
consider appellants' claim that the District Court used an incorrect legal standard to determine whether racial bloc voting in the contested districts was sufficiently severe to be
cognizable as an element of a § 2 claim. Finally, we consider
appellants' contention that the trial court employed an incorrect definition of racially polarized voting and thus erroneously relied on statistical evidence that was not probative of
racial bloc voting.
A

THE DISTRICT COURT'S TREATMENT OF RACIALLY
POLARIZED VOTING
The investigation conducted by the District Court into the
question of racial bloc voting credited some testimony of lay
witnesses, but relied principally on statistical evidence presented by appellees' expert witnesses, in particular that offered by Dr. Bernard Grofman. Dr. Grofman collected and
evaluated data from 53 General Assembly primary and general elections involving black candidacies. These elections
were held over a period of three different election years in
16
The terms "racially polarized voting" and "racial bloc voting" are used
interchangeably throughout this opinion.

:
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the six originally challenged multimember districts. 17 Dr.
Grofman subjected the data to two complementary methods
of analysis-extreme case analysis and bivariate ecological
regression analysis 18-in order to determine whether blacks
and whites in these districts differed in their voting behavior.
These analytic techniques yielded data concerning the voting
patterns of the two races, including estimates of the percentages of members of each race who voted for black candidates.
The court's initial consideration of these data took the form
of a three-part inquiry: did the data reveal any correlation between the race of the voter and the selection of certain candidates; was the revealed correlation statistically significant;
and was the difference in black and white voting patterns
"substantively significant?" The District Court found that
blacks and whites generally preferred different candidates
and, on that basis, found voting in the districts to be racially
correlated. 19 The court accepted Dr. Grofman's expert opinion that the correlation between the race of the voter and the
voter's choice of certain candidates was statistically signifiThe 1982 reapportionment plan left essentially undisturbed the 1971
plan for five of the original six contested multimember districts. House
District 39 alone was slightly modified. Brief for Appellees 8.
18
The District Court found both methods standard in the literature for
the analysis of racially polarized voting. 590 F. Supp., at 367-378, nn. 28,
and 32. See also Engstrom & McDonald, Quantitative Evidence in Vote
Dilution Litigation: Political Participation and Polarized Voting, 17 Urban
Lawyer 369 (Summer 1985); Grofman, Migalski & Noviello, The "Totality
of Circumstances Test" in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting
Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective, 7 Law & Policy 199 (Apr. 1985)
(hereinafter Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello).
19
The court used the term "racial polarization" to describe this correlation. It adopted Dr. Grofman's definition-"racial polarization" exists
where there is "a consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter
and the way in which the voter votes," Tr. 160, or to put it differently,
where "black voters and white voters vote differently." !d., at 203. We,
too, adopt this definition of "racial bloc" or "racially polarized" voting.
See, infra, at - - .
17
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cant. 2° Finally, adopting Dr. Grofman's terminology, see Tr.
195, the court found that in all but two of the 53 elections 21
the degree of racial bloc voting was "so marked as to be substantively significant, in the sense that the results of the individual election would have been different depending upon
whether it had been held among only the white voters or only
the black voters." 590 F. Supp., at 368.
The court also reported its findings, both in tabulated numerical form and in written form, that a high percentage of
black voters regularly supported black candidates and that
most white voters were extremely reluctant to vote for black
candidates. The court then considered the relevance to the
existence of legally significant white bloc voting of the fact
that black candidates have won some elections. It determined that in most instances, special circumstances, such as
incumbency and lack of opposition, rather than an a diminution in usually severe white bloc voting, accounted for these
candidates' success. The court also suggested that black
voters' reliance on bullet voting was a significant factor in
their successful efforts to elect candidates of their choice.
Based on all of the evidence before it, the trial court concluded that each of the districts experiences racially polarized
voting "in a persistent and severe degree." 590 F. Supp., at
367.
B
THE DEGREE OF BLOC VOTING THAT IS LEGALLY
SIGNIFICANT UNDER § 2
1

Appellants' Arguments
20
The court found that the data reflected positive relationships and that
the correlations did not happen by chance. 590 F. Supp. 368, and n. 30.
See also D. Barnes & J. Conley, Statistical Evidence in Litigation 32-34
(1986); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 Colum. L.
Rev. 702, 716-720 (1980); Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello 206.
21
The two exceptions were the 1982 State House elections in Districts 21
and 23. 590 F. Supp., at 368, n. 31.
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North Carolina and the United States argue that the test
used by the District Court to determine whether voting patterns in the disputed districts are racially polarized to an extent cognizable under § 2 will lead to results that are inconsistent with congressional intent. North Carolina maintains
that the court considered legally significant racially polarized
voting to occur whenever "less than 50% of the white voters
cast a ballot for the black candidate." Brief for Appellants
36. Appellants also argue that racially polarized voting is legally significant only when it always results in the defeat of
black candidates. I d., at 39-40.
The United States, on the other hand, isolates a single line
in the court's opinion and identifies it as the court's complete
test. According to the Solicitor General, the District Court
adopted a standard under which legally significant racial bloc
voting is deemed to exist whenever "'the results of the individual election would have been different depending upon
whether it had been held among only the white voters or only
the black voters in the election."' Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 29 (quoting Gingles, 590 F. Supp., at 368).
We read the District Court opinion differently.
2

The Standard for Legally Significant Racial Bloc Voting
The Senate Report states that the "extent to which voting
in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially
polarized," S. Rep. 29, is relevant to a vote dilution claim.
Further, courts and commentators agree that racial bloc voting is a key element of a vote dilution claim. See, e. g.,
Escambia County, 748 F. 2d, at 1043; United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F. 2d 1546, 1566 (CAll 1984);
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F . 2d 209, 223 (CA5 1978), cert. denied,
446 U. S. 951 (1980); Johnson v. Halifax County, 594 F.
Supp. 161, 170 (EDNC 1984); Blacksher & Menefee;
Engstrom & Wildgen, Pruning Thorns from the Thicket: An
Empirical Test for the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering,
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2 Legis. Stud. Q. 465, 469 (1977) (hereafter Enstrom &
Wildgen); Parker 107; Note, Geometry and Geography 199.
Because, as we explain below, the extent of bloc voting necessary to demonstrate that a minority's ability to elect its
preferred representatives is impaired varies according to
several factual circumstances, the degree of bloc voting
which constitutes the threshold of legal significance will vary
from district to district. Nonetheless, it is possible to state
some general principles and we proceed to do so.
The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting is twofold: to ascertain whether minority group
members in a particular district constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently
as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidates. See, supra, at - - . Thus, the question whether a
given district experiences legally significant racially polarized voting requires discrete inquiries into minority and
white voting practices. A showing that a significant number
of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates is one way of proving the political cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim, Blacksher & Menefee 59-60, and
n. 344, and, consequently, establishes minority bloc voting
within the context of § 2. And, in general, a white bloc vote
that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority
support plus white "crossover" votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting. ld., at 60. The amount
of white bloc voting that can generally "minimize or cancel,"
S. Rep. 28; Regester, 412 U. S., at 765, black voters' ability
to elect representatives of their choice, however, will vary
from district to district according to a number of factors, including the nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism; the presence or absence of other potentially dilutive
electoral devices, such as majority vote requirements, designated posts, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the percentage of registered voters in the district who are members
of the minority group; the size of the district; and, in
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multimember districts, the number of seats open and the
number of candidates in the field. 22 See, e. g., Butler
874-876; Davidson 5; Jones, The Impact of Local Election
Systems on Black Political Representation, 11 Urb. Aff. Q.
345 (1976); U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting
Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals 38-41 (1981).
Because loss of political power through vote dilution is distinct from the mere inability to win a particular election,
Whitcomb, 403 U. S., at 153, a pattern of racial bloc voting
that extends over a period of time is more probative of a
claim that a district experiences legally significant polarization than are the results of a single election. 23 Blacksher &
Menefee 61; Note, Geometry and Geography 200, n. 66 ("Racial polarization should be seen as an attribute not of a single
election, but rather of a polity viewed over time. The concern is necessarily temporal and the analysis historical because the evil to be avoided is the subordination of minority
groups in American politics, not the defeat of individuals in
particular electoral contests"). Also for this reason, in a district where elections are shown usually to be polarized, the
fact that racially polarized voting is not present in one or a
few individual elections does not necessarily negate the conclusion that the district experiences legally significant bloc
voting. Furthermore, the success of a minority candidate in
a particular election does not necessarily prove that the district did not experience polarized voting in that election; special circumstances, such as the absence of an opponent, mThis list of factors is illustrative, not comprehensive.
The number of elections that must be studied in order to determine
whether voting is polarized will vary according to pertinent circumstances.
One important circumstance is the number of elections in which the minority group has sponsored candidates. Where a minority group has never
been able to sponsor a candidate, courts must rely on other factors that
tend to prove unequal access to the electoral process. Similarly, where a
minority group has begun to sponsor candidates just recently, the fact that
statistics from only one or a few elections are available for examination
does not foreclose a vote dilution claim.
22
23
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cumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may explain
minority electoral success in a polarized contest. 24
As must be apparent, the degree of racial bloc voting that
is cognizable as an element of a § 2 vote dilution claim will
vary according to a variety of factual circumstances. Consequently, there is no simple doctrinal test for the existence of
legally significant racial bloc voting. However, the foregoing general principles should provide courts with substantial
guidance in determining whether evidence that black and
white voters generally prefer different candidates rises to the
level of legal significance under § 2.
3
Standard Utilized by the District Court
The District Court clearly did not employ the simplistic
standard identified by North Carolina-legally significant
bloc voting occurs whenever less than 50% of the white voters cast a ballot for the black candidate. Brief for Appellants 36. And, although the District Court did utilize the
measure of "substantive significance" that the United States
ascribes to it-"the results of the individual election would
have been different depending on whether it had been held
among only the white voters or only the black voters,'" Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 29 (quoting Gingles, 590
F. Supp., at 368)-the court did not reach its ultimate conclusion that the degree of racial bloc voting present in each district is legally significant through mechanical reliance on this
standard. 25 While the court did not phrase the standard for
legally significant racial bloc voting exactly as we do, a fair
24

This list of special circumstances is illustrative, not exclusive.
The trial court did not actually employ the term "legally significant."
At times it seems to have used "substantive significance" as Dr. Grofman
did, to describe polarization severe enough to result in the selection of different candidates in racially separate electorates. At other times , however, the court used the term "substantively significant" to refer to its ultimate determination that racially polarized voting in these districts is
sufficiently severe to be relevant to a § 2 claim.
25
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reading of the court's opinion reveals that the court's analysis
conforms to our view of the proper legal standard.
The District Court's findings concerning black support for
black candidates in the five multimember districts at issue
here clearly establish the political cohesiveness of black voters. As is apparent from the District Court's tabulated findings, reproduced in Appendix A, infra, black voters' support
for black candidates was overwhelming in almost every election. In all but 5 of 16 primary elections, black support for
black candidates ranged between 71% and 92%; and in the
general elections, black support for black Democrat candidates ranged between 87% and 96%.
In sharp contrast to its findings of strong black support for
black candidates, the District Court found that a substantial
majority of white voters would rarely, if ever, vote for a
black candidate. In the primary elections, white support for
black candidates ranged between 8% and 50%, and in the
general elections it ranged between 28% and 49%. See Appendix A, infra. The court also determined that, on average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the primary elections. In the general elections,
white voters almost always ranked black candidates either
last or next to last in the multicandidate field, except in
heavily Democratic areas where white voters consistently
ranked black candidates last among the Democrats, if not last
or next to last among all candidates. The court further observed that approximately two-thirds of white voters did not
vote for black candidates in general elections, even after the
candidate had won the Democratic primary and the choice
was to vote for a Republican or for no one. 26
In stating that 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidates in the primary election and that two-thirds of white voters did not
vote for black candidates in general elections, the District Court aggregated data from all six challenged multimember districts, apparently for
ease of reporting. The inquiry into the existence of vote dilution is district-specific. Courts must not rely on data aggregated from all the dis26
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While the District Court did not state expressly that the
percentage of whites who refused to vote for black candidates
in the contested districts would, in the usual course of events,
result in the defeat of the minority's candidates, that conclusion is apparent both from the court's factual findings and
from the rest of its analysis. First, with the exception of
House District 23, see infra, at--, the trial court's findings
clearly show that black voters have enjoyed only minimal and
sporadic success in electing representatives of their choice.
See Appendix B, infra. Second, where black candidates
won election, the court closely examined the circumstances of
those elections before concluding that the success of these
blacks did not negate other evidence, derived from all of the
elections studied in each district, that legally significant racially polarized voting exists in each district. For example,
the court took account of the benefits incumbency and running essentially unopposed conferred on some of the successful black candidates, 27 as well as of the very different order of
tricts under consideration in concluding that racially polarized voting exists
in each district. In the instant case, however, it is clear from the trial
court's tabulated findings and from the exhibits that were before it, 1 App.,
Exs. 2-10, that the court relied on data that was specific to each individual
district in concluding that each district experienced legally significant racially polarized voting.
27
For example, the court found that incumbency aided a successful black
candidate in the 1978 primary in Senate District 22. The court also noted
that in House District 23, a black candidate who gained election in 1978,
1980, and 1982, ran uncontested in the 1978 general election and in both the
primary and general elections in 1980. In 1982 there was no Republican
opposition, a fact the trial court interpreted to mean that the general election was for all practical purposes unopposed. Moreover, in the 1982 primary, there were only two white candidates for three seats, so that one
black candidate had to succeed. Even under this condition, the court remarked, 63% of white voters still refused to vote for the black incumbentwho was the choice of 90% of the blacks. In House District 21, where a
black won election to the six-member delegation in 1980 and 1982, the court
found that in the relevant primaries approximately 60% to 70% of white
voters did not vote for the black candidate, whereas approximately 80% of
blacks did. The court additionally observed that although winning the
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preference blacks and whites assigned black candidates, 28 in
reaching its conclusion that legally significant racial polarization exists in each district.
We conclude that the District Court's approach, which
tested data derived from three election years in each district,
and which revealed that blacks strongly supported black candidates, while, to the black candidates' usual detriment,
whites rarely did, satisfactorily addresses each facet of the
proper legal standard.

c

EVIDENCE OF RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING
1

Appellants' Argument
North Carolina and the United States also contest the evidence upon which the District Court relied in finding that
voting patterns in the challenged districts were racially polarized. They argue that the term "racially polarized voting"
must, as a matter of law, refer to voting patterns for which
the principal cause is race. They contend that the District
Court utilized a legally incorrect definition of racially polarized voting by relying on bivariate statistical analyses which
merely demonstrated a correlation between the race of the
voter and the level of voter support for certain candidates,
but which did not prove that race was the primary determinant of voters' choices. According to appellants and the
United States, only multiple regression analysis, which can
take account of other variables which might also explain votDemocratic primary in this district is historically tantamount to election,
55% of whites declined to vote for the Democratic black candidate in the
general election.
28
The court noted that in the 1982 primary held in House District 36, out
of a field of eight, the successful black candidate was ranked first by black
voters, but seventh by whites. Similarly, the court found that the two
blacks who won seats in the five-member delegation from House District 39
were ranked first and second by black voters, but seventh and eighth by
white voters.
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ers' choices, such as "party affiliation, age, religion, income[,]
incumbency, education, campaign expenditures," Brief for
Appellants 42, "media use measured by cost, ... name, identification, or distance that a candidate lived from a particular
precinct," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30,
n. 57, can prove that race was the primary determinant of
voter behavior. 29
Whether appellants and the United States believe that it is
the voter's race or the candidate's race that must be the primary determinant of the voter's choice is unclear; indeed,
their catalogs of relevant variables suggest both. 30 Age, religion, income, and education seem most relevant to the voter;
incumbency, campaign expenditures, name identification,
and media use are pertinent to the candidate; and party affiliation could refer both to the voter and the candidate. In
either case, we disagree: For purposes of § 2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent. It means simply that the race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or candidates;
that is, it refers to the situation where different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates.
Grofman, Migalski & Noviello 203. As we demonstrate
below, appellants' theory of racially polarized voting would
thwart the goals Congress sought to achieve when it
amended § 2 and would prevent courts from performing the
"functional" analysis of the political process, S. Rep. 30,
Appellants argue that plaintiffs must establish that race was the primary determinant of voter behavior as part of their prima facie showing of
polarized voting; the Solicitor General suggests that plaintiffs make out a
prima facie case merely by showing a correlation between race and theselection of certain candidates, but that defendants should be able to rebut by
showing that factors other than race were the principal causes of voters'
choices. We reject both arguments.
30
The Fifth Circuit cases on which North Carolina and the Solicitor General rely for their position are equally ambiguous. See Lee County
Branch of NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F. 2d 1473, 1482 (1984); Jones v.
City of Lubbock, 730 F. 2d 233, 234 (1984) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
29
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n. 119, and the "searching practical evaluation of the 'past
and present reality,"' id., at 30 (footnote omitted), mandated
by the Senate Report.
2

Causation Irrelevant to Section 2 Inquiry
The first reason we reject appellants' argument that racially polarized voting refers to voting patterns that are in
some way caused by race, rather than to voting patterns that
are merely correlated with the race of the voter, is that the
reasons black and white voters vote differently have no relevance to the central inquiry of § 2. By contrast, the correlation between race of voter and the selection of certain candidates is crucial to that inquiry.
Both § 2 itself and the Senate Report make clear that the
critical question in a § 2 claim is whether the use of a contested electoral practice or structure results in members of a
protected group having less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice. See, e. g., S. Rep. 2,
27, 28, 29, n. 118, 36. As we explained, supra, at - - ,
multimember districts may impair the ability of blacks to
elect representatives of their choice where blacks vote sufficiently as a bloc as to be able to elect their preferred candidates in a black majority, single-member district and where a
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat
the candidates chosen by blacks. It is the difference between the choices made by blacks and whites-not the reasons for that difference-that results in blacks having less
opportunity than whites to elect their preferred representatives. Grofman, Migalski & Noviello 208 ("It is the existence of racial polarization, not its etiology, that is at· issue").
Consequently, we conclude that under the "results test" of
§ 2, only the correlation between race of voter and selection
of certain candidates, not the causes of the correlation,
matters.

83-1968--0PINION
THORNBURG v. GINGLES

29

The irrelevance to a § 2 inquiry of the reasons why black
and white voters vote differently supports, by itself, our rejection of appellants' theory of racially polarized voting.
However, their theory contains other equally serious flaws
that merit further attention. As we demonstrate below, the
addition of irrelevant variables distorts the equation and
yields results that are indisputably incorrect under § 2 and
the Senate Report.
3
Race of Voter as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior
Appellants and the United States contend that the legal
concept of "racially polarized voting" refers not to voting patterns that are merely correlated with the voter's race, but to
voting patterns that are determined primarily by the voter's
race, rather than by the voter's other socioeconomic
characteristics.
The first problem with this argument is that it creates a
definitional conundrum. It ignores the fact that members of
geographically insular racial and ethnic groups frequently
share socioeconomic characteristics, such as income level,
employment status, amount of education, housing and other
living conditions, religion, language, and so forth. See,
e. g., Butler 902 (Minority group "members' shared concerns,
including political ones, are ... a function of group status,
and as such are largely involuntary .... As a group blacks
are concerned, for example, with police brutality, substandard housing, unemployment, etc., because these problems
fall disproportionately upon the group"); S. Verba & N. Nie,
Participation in America 151-152 (1972) (hereinafter Verba &
Nie) ("Socioeconomic status ... is closely related to race.
Blacks in American society are likely to be in lower-status
jobs than whites, to have less education, and to have lower
incomes.") Where such characteristics are shared, race or
ethnic group not only denotes color or place of origin, it also
functions as a shorthand notation for common social and economic characteristics. This conundrum is even more perni-
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cious where shared characteristics are causally related to
race or ethnicity. The opportunity to achieve high employment status and income, for example, is often influenced by
the presence or absence of racial or ethnic discrimination. A
definition of racially polarized voting which holds that black
bloc voting does not exist when black voters' choice of certain
candidates is most strongly influenced by the fact that the
voters have low incomes and menial jobs -when the reason
most of those voters have menial jobs and low incomes is
attributable to past or present racial discrimination-runs
counter to the Senate Report's instruction to conduct a
searching and practical evaluation of past and present reality,
S. Rep. 30, and interferes with the purpose of the Voting
Rights Act to eliminate the negative effects of past discrimination on the electoral opportunities of minorities. I d.,
at 5, 40.
Furthermore, under appellants' theory of racially polarized
voting, even uncontrovertible evidence that candidates
strongly preferred by black voters are always defeated by a
bloc voting white majority would be dismissed for failure to
prove racial polarization whenever the black and white populations could be described in terms of other socioeconomic
characteristics.
To illustrate, assume a racially-mixed, urban multimember
district in which blacks and whites possess the same socioeconomic characteristics that the record in this case attributes to
blacks and whites in Halifax County, a part of Senate District
2. The annual mean income for blacks in this district is
$10,465, and 47.8% of the black community lives in poverty.
More than half-51.5%-of black adults over the age of 25
have only an eighth grade education or less. Just over half
of black citizens reside in their own homes; 48.9% live in
rental units. And, almost a third of all black households are
without a car. In contrast, only 12.6% of the whites in the
district live below the poverty line. Whites enjoy a mean income of $19,042. White residents are better educated than
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blacks-only 25.6% of whites over the age of 25 have an
eighth grade education or less. Furthermore, only 26.2% of
whites live in rental units, and only 10.2% live in households
with no vehicle available. 1 App., Ex-44. As is the case in
Senate District 2, blacks in this hypothetical urban district
have never been able to elect a representative of their choice.
According to appellants' theory of racially polarized voting,
proof that black and white voters in this hypothetical district
regularly choose different candidates and that the blacks'
preferred candidates regularly lose could be rejected as not
probative of racial bloc voting. The basis for the rejection
would be that blacks chose a certain candidate, not principally because of their race, but principally because this candidate best represented the interests of residents who, because
of their low incomes, are particularly interested in government subsidized health and welfare services; who are generally poorly educated, and thus share an interest in job training programs; who are, to a greater extent than the white
community, concerned with rent control issues; and who
favor major public transportation expenditures. Similarly,
whites would be found to have voted for a different candidate, not principally because of their race, but primarily because that candidate best represented the interests of residents who, due to their education and income levels, and
property and vehicle ownership, favor gentrification, low
residential property taxes, and extensive expenditures for
street and highway improvements.
Congress could not have intended that courts employ this
definition of racial bloc voting. First, this definition leads to
results that are inconsistent with the effects test adopted by
Congress when it amended § 2 and with the Senate Report's
admonition that courts take a "functional" view of the political process, S. Rep. 30, n. 119, and conduct a searching and
practical evaluation of reality. !d., at 30. A test for racially
polarized voting that denies the fact that race and socioeconomic characteristics are often closely correlated permits nei-
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ther a practical evaluation of reality nor a functional analysis
of vote dilution. And, contrary to Congress' intent in adopting the "results test," appellants' proposed definition could
result in the inability of minority voters to establish a critical
element of a vote dilution claim, even though both races engage in "monolithic" bloc voting, id., at 33, and generations of
black voters have been unable to elect a representative of
their choice.
Second, appellants' interpretation of "racially polarized
voting" creates an irreconcilable tension between their proposed treatment of socioeconomic characteristics in the bloc
voting context and the Senate Report's statement that "the
extent to which members of the minority group ... bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health" may be relevant to a § 2 claim. , I d., at 29.
We can find no support in either logic or the legislative history for the anomalous conclusion to which appellants' position leads-that Congress intended, on the one hand, that
proof that a minority group is predominately poor, uneducated, and unhealthy should be considered a factor tending to
prove a § 2 violation; but that Congress intended, on the
other hand, that proof that the same socioeconomic characteristics greatly influence black voters' choice of candidates
should destroy these voters' ability to establish one of the
most important elements of a vote dilution claim.
4

Race of Candidate as Primary Determinant of
Voter Behavior
North Carolina's and the United State's suggestion that ra. cially polarized voting means that voters select or reject candidates principally on the basis of the candidate's race is also
misplaced.
First, both the language of§ 2 and a functional understanding of the phenomenon of vote dilution mandate the conclusion that the race of the candidate per se is irrelevant to racial
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bloc voting analysis. Section 2(b) states that a violation is
established if it can be shown that members of a protected
minority group "have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to . . . elect representatives of their choice."
(Emphasis added). Because both minority and majority voters often select members of their own race as their preferred
representatives, it will frequently be the case that a black
candidate is the choice of blacks, while a white candidate is
the choice of whites. Cf. Letter to the Editor from Chandler
Davidson, 17 New Perspectives 38 (Fall 1985). Indeed, the
facts of this case illustrate that tendency-blacks preferred
black candidates, whites preferred white candidates. Thus,
as a matter of convenience, we and the District Court may
refer to the preferred representative of black voters as the
"black candidate" and to the preferred representative of
white voters as the "white candidate." Nonetheless, the fact
that race of voter and race of candidate is often correlated is
not directly pertinent to a § 2 inquiry. Under § 2, it is the
status of the candidate as the chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate, that is
important.
An understanding of how vote dilution through submergence in a white majority works leads to the same conclusion.
The essence of a submergence claim is that minority group
members prefer certain candidates whom they could elect
were it not for the interaction of a white majority that votes
as a significant bloc for different candidates with the challenged electoral law or structure. Thus, as we explained in
Part III, supra, the existence of racial bloc voting is relevant
to a vote dilution claim in two ways. Bloc voting by blacks
tends to prove that the black community is politically cohesive, that is, it shows that blacks prefer certain candidates
whom they could elect in a single-member, black majority
district. Bloc voting by a white majority tends to prove that
blacks will generally be unable to elect representatives of
their choice. Clearly, only the race of the voter, not the race
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of the candidate, is relevant to vote dilution analysis. See,
e. g., Blacksher & Menefee 59-60; Grofman, Should Representatives be Typical? 98; Note, Geometry and Geography
207.
Second, appellants' suggestion that racially polarized voting refers to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates because they prefer members of their own race or are
hostile to blacks, as opposed to voting patterns where whites
vote for white candidates because the white candidates spent
more on their campaigns, utilized more media coverage, and
thus enjoyed greater name recognition than the black candidates, fails for another, independent reason. This argument, like the argument that the race of the voter must be
the primary determinant of the voter's ballot, is inconsistent
with the purposes of § 2 and would render meaningless the
Senate Report factor that addresses the impact of low socioeconomic status on a minority group's level of political
participation.
Congress intended that the Voting Rights Act eradicate inequalities in political opportunities that exist due to the vestigial effects of past purposeful discrimination. S. Rep. 5, 40;
H. R. Rep. No. 97-227, p. 31 (1981). Both this Court and
other federal courts have recognized that political participation by minorities tends to be depressed where minority
group members suffer effects of prior discrimination such as
inferior education, poor employment opportunities, and low
incomes. See, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at
768~769; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County,
Miss., 554 F. 2d 139, 145-146 (CA5) (en bane), cert. denied,
434 U. S. 968 (1977). See also Verba & Nie 152. The Senate Report acknowledges this tendency and instructs that
"the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear
the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process," S. Rep. 29 (footnote omitted), is a factor which may be probative of unequal opportu-
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nity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives. Courts and commentators have recognized
further that candidates generally must spend more money in
order to win election in a multimember district than in a single-member district. See, e. g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.
Supp. 704, 720-721 (WD Tex. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. White v. Regester, supra. Berry & Dye 88;
Davidson & Fraga, Non partisan Slating Groups in an AtLarge Setting, in Minority Vote Dilution 122-123; Derfner
554, n. 126; Jewell131; Karnig, Black Representation on City
Councils, 12 Urb. Aff. Q. 223, 230 (1976). If, because of inferior education and poor employment opportunities, blacks
earn less than whites, they will not be able to provide the
candidates of their choice with the same level of financial support that whites can provide theirs. Thus, electoral losses
by candidates preferred by the black community may well be
attributable in part to the fact that their white opponents
outspent them. But, the fact is that, in this instance, the
economic effects of prior discrimination have combined with
the multimember electoral structure to afford blacks less
opportunity than whites to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice. It would be
both anomalous and inconsistent with congressional intent to
hold that, on the one hand, the effects of past discrimination
which hinder blacks' ability to participate in the political
process tend to prove a § 2 violation, while holding on the
other hand that, where these same effects of past discrimination deter whites from voting for blacks, blacks cannot make
out a crucial element of a vote dilution claim. Accord,
Escambia County, 748 F. 2d, at 1043 (" 'the failure of the
blacks to solicit white votes may be caused by the effects of
past discrimination"') (quoting United States v. Dallas
County Comm'n, 739 F. 2d 1529, 1536 (CAll 1984)); United
States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F. 2d 1546, 1567
(CAll 1984), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 469 U. S. - (1984).

,.
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5
Racial Animosity as Primary Determinant of
Voter Behavior
Finally, we reject the suggestion that racially polarized
voting refers only to white bloc voting which is caused by
white voters' racial hostility toward black candidates. 31 To
accept this theory would frustrate the goals Congress sought
to achieve by repudiating the intent test of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U. S. 55 (1980), and would prevent minority voters who
have clearly been denied an opportunity to elect representatives of their choice from establishing a critical element of a
vote dilution claim.
In amending § 2, Congress rejected the requirement announced by this Court in Bolden, supra, that § 2 plaintiffs
must prove the discriminatory intent of state or local governments in adopting or maintaining the challenged electoral
mechanism. 32 Appellants' suggestion that the discriminatory
intent of individual white voters must be proven in order to
make out a § 2 claim must fail for the very reasons Congress
rejected the intent test with respect to governmental bodies.
See Engstrom, The Reincarnation of the Intent Standard:
It is true, as we have recognized previously, that racial hostility may
often fuel racial bloc voting. United J ewish Organizations v. Carey , 430
U. S. 144, 166 (1977); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S., at 623. But, as we explain in this decision, the actual motivation of the voter has no relevance to
a vote dilution claim. This is not to suggest that racial bloc voting is raceneutral; because voter behavior correlates with race, obviously it is not.
It should be remembered, though, as one commentator has observed, that
"[t]he absence of racial animus is but one element of race neutrality."
Note, Geometry and Geography 208.
32
The Senate Report rejected the argument that the words "on account
of race," contained in § 2(a), create any requirement of purposeful discrimination. "[l]t is patently [clear] that Congress has used the words 'on
account of race or color' in the Act to mean 'with respect to' race or color,
and not to connote any required purpose of racial discrimination." S. Rep.
27-28, n. 109.
31
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Federal Judges and At-Large Election Cases, 28 How. L. J.
495 (1985).

The Senate Report states that one reason the Senate Committee abandoned the intent test was that "the Committee
... heard persuasive testimony that the intent test is unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the
part of individual officials or entire communities." S. Rep.
36. The Committee found the testimony of Dr. Arthur S.
Flemming, Chairman of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights particularly persuasive. He testified:
"'[Under an intent test] [l]itigators representing excluded minorities will have to explore the motivations of
individual council members, mayors, and other citizens.
The question would be whether their decisions were motivated by invidious racial considerations. Such inquiries can only be divisive, threatening to destroy any existing racial progress in a community. It is the intent
test, not the results test, that would make it necessary
to brand individuals as racist in order to obtain judicial
relief.'"
Ibid. (footnote omitted).
The grave threat to racial progress and harmony which
Congress perceived from requiring proof that racism caused
the adoption or maintenance of a challenged electoral mechanism is present to a much greater degree in the proposed requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that racial animosity
determined white voting patterns. Under the old intent
test, plaintiffs might succeed by proving only that a limited
number of elected officials were racist; under the new intent
test plaintiffs would be required to prove that most of the
white community is racist in order to obtain judicial relief.
It is difficult to imagine a more racially divisive requirement.
A second reason Congress rejected the old intent test was
that in most cases it placed an "inordinately difficult burden"
on § 2 plaintiffs. Ibid. The new intent test would be
equally, if not more, burdensome. In order to prove that a

83-1968-0PINION
38

THORNBURG v. GINGLES

specific factor-racial hostility-determined white voters'
ballots, it would be necessary to demonstrate that other potentially relevant causal factors, such as socioeconomic
characteristics and candidate expenditures, do not correlate
better than racial animosity with white voting behavior. As
one commentator has explained:
"Many of the[se] independent variables ... would be
all but impossible for a social scientist to operationalize
as interval-level independent variables for use in a multiple regression equation, whether on a step-wise basis or
not. To conduct such an extensive statistical analysis as
this implies, moreover, can become prohibitively
expensive.
"Compared to this sort of effort, proving discriminatory intent in the adoption of an at-large system is both
simple and inexpensive." McCrary, Discriminatory Intent: The Continuing Relevance of "Purpose" Evidence
in Vote-Dilution Lawsuits, 28 How. L. J. 463, 492
(1985).
The final and most dispositive reason the Senate Report
repudiated the old intent test was that it "asks the wrong
question." S. Rep. 36. Amended§ 2 asks instead "whether
minorities have equal access to the process of electing their
representatives." I bid.
Focusing on the discriminatory intent of the voters, rather
than the behavior of the voters, also asks the wrong question.
All that matters under § 2 and under a functional theory of
vote dilution is voter behavior, not its explanations. Moreover, as we have explained in detail, supra, requiring proof
that racial considerations actually caused voter behavior will
result-contrary to congressional intent-in situations where
a black minority that functionally has been totally excluded
from the political process will be unable to establish a § 2 violation. The Senate Report's remark concerning the old intent test thus is pertinent to the new test: The requirement
that a "court . . . make a separate . . . finding of intent, after
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accepting the proof of the factors involved in the White [v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755] analysis . . . [would] seriously
clou[d] the prospects of eradicating the remaining instances
of racial discrimination in American elections." !d., at 37.
We therefore decline to adopt such a requirement.
6

Summary
In sum, we hold that the legal concept of racially polarized
voting, as it relates to claims of vote dilution, refers only to
the existence of a correlation between the race of voters and
the selection of certain candidates. Plaintiffs need not prove
causation or intent in order to prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting and defendants may not rebut that case with
evidence of causation or intent.
IV
THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SOME BLACK
CANDIDATES' SUCCESS
North Carolina and the United States maintain that the
District Court failed to accord the proper weight to the success of some black candidates in the challenged districts.
Black residents of these districts, they point out, achieved
improved representation in the 1982 General Assembly election. 33 They also note that blacks in House District 23 have
enjoyed proportional representation consistently since 1973
and that blacks in the other districts have occasionally en33
The relevant results of the 1982 General Assembly election are as follows. House District 21, in which blacks make up 21.8% of the population,
elected one black to the six-person House delegation. House District 23,
in which blacks constitute 36.3% of the population, elected one black to the
three-person House delegation. In House District 36, where blacks constitute 26.5% of the population, one black was elected to the eight-member
delegation. In House District 39, where 25.1% of the population is black,
two blacks were elected to the five-member delegation. In Senate District 22, where blacks constitute 24.3% of the population, no black was
elected to the Senate in 1982.
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joyed nearly proportional representation. 34 This electoral
success demonstrates conclusively, appellants and the United
States argue, that blacks in those districts do not have "less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b). Essentially, appellants and the United States contend that if a racial minority
gains proportional or nearly proportional representation in a
single election, that fact alone precludes, as a matter of law,
finding a § 2 violation.
Section 2 provides that "[t]he extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office . . . is one circumstance which may be considered." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b).
The Senate Committee Report also identifies the extent to
which minority candidates have succeeded as a pertinent factor. S. Rep. 29. However, the Senate Report expressly
states that "the election of a few minority candidates does not
'necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the black
vote,'" noting that if it did, "the possibility exists that the
majority citizens might evade [§ 2] by manipulating the election of a 'safe' minority candidate." !d., at 29, n. 115, quoting Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F . 2d 1297, 1307 (CAS 1973)
(en bane), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board
v. Marshall , 424 U. S. 636 (1976) (per curiam) . The Senate
Committee decided, instead, to "'require an independent
consideration of the record."' S. Rep. 29, n. 115. The Senate Report also emphasizes that the question whether "the
political processes are 'equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality."'
I d., at 30 (footnote omitted). Thus, the language of § 2 and
its legislative history plainly demonstrate that proof that
The United States points out that, under a substantially identical
predecessor to the challenged plan, see n. 15, supra, House District 21
elected a black to its six-member delegation in 1980, House District 39
elected a black to its five-member delegation in 1974 and 1976, and Senate
District 22 had a black Senator between 1975 and 1980.
34
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some minority candidates have been elected does not foreclose a § 2 claim.
Moreover, in conducting its "independent consideration of
the record" and its "searching practical evaluation of the 'past
and present reality,"' the District Court could appropriately
take account of the circumstances surrounding recent black
electoral success in deciding its significance to appellees'
claim. In particular, as the Senate Report makes clear, I d.,
at 29, n. 115, the court could properly notice the fact that
black electoral success increased markedly in the 1982 election -an election that occurred after the instant lawsuit had
been filed-and could properly consider to what extent "the
pendency of this very litigation [might have] worked a onetime advantage for black candidates in the form of unusual
organized political support by white leaders concerned to
forestall single-member districting." 35 590 F. Supp., at 367,
n. 27.
Nothing in the statute or its legislative history prohibited
the court from viewing with some caution black candidates'
success in the 1982 election, and from deciding on the basis of
all the relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to
blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections. Consequently, we hold that the District
Court did not err, as a matter of law, in refusing to treat the
fact that some black candidates have succeeded as dispositive
of appellees' § 2 claim. Where multimember districting gen36

See also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297, 1307 (CA5 1973)
("[W]e cannot endorse the view that the success of black candidates at the
polls necessarily forecloses the possibility of dilution of the black vote.
Such success might, on occasion, be attributable to the work of politicians,
who, apprehending that the support of a black candidate would be politically expedient, campaign to insure his election. Or such success might be
attributable to political support motivated by different considerationsnamely that election of a black candidate will thwart successful challenges
to electoral schemes on dilution grounds. In either situation, a candidate
could be elected despite the relative political backwardness of black residents in the electoral district").
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erally works to dilute the minority vote, it cannot be defended on the ground that it sporadically and serendipitously
benefits minority voters.
The District Court did err, however, in ignoring the significance of the sustained success black voters have experienced in House District 23. In that district, the last six elections have resulted in proportional representation for black
residents. This consistent pattern of proportional representation justifies a presumption that the opportunity of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice is equal to
that of the majority.
In some situations, it may be possible for § 2 plaintiffs to
rebut this presumption by demonstrating that this success
does not accurately reflect the minority group's ability to
elect its preferred representatives. The minority group
would have to show that special circumstances enabled them
to elect their chosen candidates, despite the fact that a white
majority generally votes sufficiently as a bloc for other candidates so as, under usual conditions, to defeat the minority's
candidates. 36 Appellees presented evidence tending to show
that black electoral success in at least two of the last three ·
elections was due to lack of opposition, rather than the absence of significant white bloc voting. They did not, however, offer any explanation for the success of black candidates in the previous three elections, and for this reason
failed satisfactorily to rebut the presumption of equal
opportunity. 37
36
We have no occasion in this case to decide what types of special circumstances could rebut this presumption of equal opportunity.
37
Appellees suggest that black voters in House District 23 succeeded in
electing their preferred candidates only through heavy reliance on bullet
voting. Appellees contend that where blacks must rely on bullet voting in
order to elect representatives of their choice they are forced to choose between two options, both of which are unacceptable under § 2. Black voters can either forfeit their right to vote for a full slate of candidates, and
thus have a chance to elect one representative of their choice, or they can
vote for a full slate and elect no representative. By contrast, appellees
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Because we articulate this presumption for the first time
today, we believe that appellees should be afforded a chance
to meet their burden. For this reason, we reverse and remand with respect to District 23 for further proceedings.

v
ULTIMATE DETERMINATION OF VOTE DILUTION
Finally, appellants and the United States dispute the District Court's ultimate conclusion that the multimember districting scheme at issue in this case deprived black voters of
argue, white voters are assured of the ability to elect a representative of
their choice and can do so without sacrificing their right to vote for a full
slate. Consequently, appellees conclude that where black voters must depend on bullet voting they do not enjoy the same opportunity to participate
in the political process or to elect representatives of their choice as whites
do.
The other aspect of the bullet voting argument is that black electoral success obtained through bullet voting shows only that under certain circumstances, by withholding votes from candidates preferred by the majority,
blacks can overcome the handicap of being a minority in a multimember
district in which the majority votes substantially as a bloc for different candidates. Because blacks' ability to use bullet voting effectively is mathematically dependent on the percentage of all voters in the district who are
black and on a bloc-voting majority splitting their votes among more candidates than there are open seats, blacks' ability to use bullet voting effectively is largely fortuitous. It will vary according to the number of candidates running, the split in white support for those candidates, and the
percentage of the voting population that is black. Through reliance on
bullet voting blacks may be able to win several elections in a row, but, the
argument goes, the multimember electoral structure, in combination with
significant white bloc voting, continues to pose a real threat to blacks' ability to elect their chosen candidates.
While the District Court did note generally that black voters in the contested jurisdictions had relied extensively on bullet voting, it made no specific findings regarding the role of bullet voting in House District 23. We
decline to make such findings here. Furthermore, we leave it to the District Court to consider in the first instance the merits of appellees' argument that where black voters must rely on bullet voting in order to elect
the representatives of their choice, any presumption of equal opportunity
which arises from sustained black electoral success maybe rebutted.
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an equal opportunity to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.
A

As an initial matter, both North Carolina and the United
States contend that .the District Court's ultimate conclusion
that the challenged multimember districts operate to dilute
black citizens' votes is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review on appeal. In support of their proposed standard of review, they rely primarily on Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 466 U. S. 485
(1984), a case in which we reconfirmed that, as a matter of
constitutional law, there must be independent appellate review of evidence of "actual malice" in defamation cases. Appellants and the United States argue that because a finding of
vote dilution under amended § 2 requires the application of a
rule of law to a particular set of facts it constitutes a legal,
rather than factual, determination. Reply Brief for Appellants 7; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19.
Neither appellants nor the United States cite our several
precedents in which we have treated the ultimate finding of
vote dilution as a question of fact subject to the clearly-erro-.
neous standard of Rule 52(a). See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U. S., at 622-627; City of Rome v. United States, 446
U. S. 156, 183 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at
765-770. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. - - ,
(1985).
In Regester, supra, we noted that the District Court had
based its conclusion that minority voters in two multimember
districts in Texas had less opportunity to participate in the
political process than majority voters on the totality of the
circumstances and stated that
"we are not inclined to overturn these findings, representing as they do a blend of history and an intensely
local appraisal of the design and impact of the . . .
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multimember district in the light of past and present reality, political and otherwise." ld., at 769-770.
Quoting this passage from Regester with approval, we expressly held in Rogers v. Lodge, supra, that the question
whether an at-large election system was maintained for discriminatory purposes and subsidiary issues, which include
whether that system had the effect of diluting the minority
vote, were questions of fact, reviewable under Rule 52(a)'s
clearly-erroneous standard. 458 U. S., at 622-623. Similarly, in City of Rome v. United States, we declared that the
question whether certain electoral structures had a "discriminatory effect," in the sense of diluting the minority vote, was
a question of fact subject to clearly-erroneous review. 446
U. S., at 183.
We reaffirm our view that the clearly-erroneous test of
Rule 52(a) is the appropriate standard for appellate review of
a finding of vote dilution. As both amended § 2 and its legislative history make clear, in evaluating a statutory claim of
vote dilution through districting, the trial court is to consider
the "totality of the circumstances" and to determine, based
"upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and
present reality,"' S. Rep. 30 (footnote omitted), whether the
political process is equally open to minority voters. "'This
determination is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each
case,"' Rogers, supra, at 621, quoting Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.
2d 209, 224 (CA5 1978), and requires "an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact" of the contested electoral
mechanisms. 458 U. S., at 622. The fact that amended § 2
and its legislative history provide legal standards which a
court must apply to the facts in order to determine whether
§ 2 has been violated does not alter the standard of review.
As we explained in Bose, Rule 52(a) "does not inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those
that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a
finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the
governing rule of law." 466 U. S., at 501, citing Pullman-
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Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 287 (1982); Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 855,
n. 15 (1982). Thus, the application of the clearly-erroneous
standard to ultimate findings of vote dilution preserves the
benefit of the trial court's particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality without endangering the rule oflaw.
B
The District Court in this case carefully considered the totality of the circumstances and found that in each district racially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimination in
voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health
services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial
prejudice acted in concert with the multimember districting
scheme to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally
in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.
It found that the success a few black candidates have enjoyed
in these districts is too recent, too limited, and, with regard
to the 1982 elections, perhaps too aberrational, to disprove
its conclusion. Excepting House District 23, with respect to
which the District Court committeo legal error, see supra, at
- - , we affirm the District Court's judgment. We cannot
say that the District Court, composed of local judges who are
well-acquainted with the political realities of the State,
clearly erred in concluding that use of a multimember electoral structure has caused black voters in the districts other
than House District 23 to have less opportunity than white
voters to elect representatives of their choice.
VI
SUMMARY

In response to the Court's opinion, JuSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the Court has abandoned the results test and has
defied § 2's admonition that it does not "establish[] a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
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to their proportion in the population." Section 2(b). According to JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in stating that a minority
group will not be able to prove that the use of a multimember
structure interferes with minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice unless the group is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district, supra, at-- (Circulating Draft 15),
the Court adopted proportional representation as "the linchpin of vote dilution claims." Post, at-- (SOC Circulating
Draft 11). "The Court's standard for vote dilution," JusTICE
O'CONNOR warns, "makes actionable every deviation from
usual, rough proportionality in representation for any cohesive minority group as to which this degree of proportionality
is feasible within the framework of singlemember districts"a result which "is inconsistent with the results test and with
§ 2's disclaimer of a right to proportional representation."
Post, at - - (SOC Circulating Draft 14). JUSTICE O'CoNNOR erroneously describes the Court's standard for vote dilution. It is just not the case that the standard employed by
the Court is a simplistic test for proportional representation.
As this opinion makes abundantly clear, in order to prevail
under § 2, minority voters who challenge the use of
multimember districts on the theory that their ability to elect
candidates of their choice has been diminished must prove far
more than lack of proportional representation. See, e. g.,
supra, at-- (Circulating Draft 12). They must prove that
they have been injured by the selection of the multimember
electoral structure; that is, in the language of§ 2, they must
demonstrate that the contested structure interfered with
their "opportunity . . . to elect representatives of their
choice." The reason that a minority group making such a
challenge must show, as a threshold matter, that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district is this: Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives in the
absence of the challenged structure, they cannot claim to
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have been injured by that structure. The single-member
district is generally the appropriate standard against which
to measure minority group potential to elect because it is the
smallest political unit from which representatives are
elected. Thus, if the minority group is spread evenly
throughout a multimember district, or, although geographically compact, the minority group is so small in relation to the
surrounding white population that it could not constitute a
majority in a single-member district, these minority voters
cannot maintain that they would have been able to elect representatives of their choice in the absence of the
multimember electoral structure. As two commentators
have explained,
"To demonstrate [that minority voters are injured by atlarge elections], the minority voters must be sufficiently
concentrated and politically cohesive that a putative districting plan would result in districts in which members
of a racial minority would constitute a majority of the
voters, whose clear electoral choices are in fact defeated
by at-large voting. If minority voter's residences are
substantially integrated throughout the jurisdiction, the
at-large district cannot be blamed for the defeat of minority-supported candidates . . . . [This standard] thus
would only protect racial minority votes from diminution
proximately cause by the districting plan; it would not
assure racial minorities proportional representation."
Blacksher & Menefee 55-56 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, under the Court's opinion, a minority group
does not prove its potential ability to elect candidates of its
choice merely by demonstrating that it could constitute a majority in a single-member district; it must also show that it is
politically cohesive. Once minority voters have established
that they possess the potential ability to elect representatives, they must also demonstrate that submergence in a
white majority multimember district usually operates to pre-
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vent them from doing so. This means that minority voters
must prove that that whites vote sufficiently as a bloc so as to
enable them usually to defeat the minority's chosen candidates. And, because loss of political power through vote dilution is distinct from the mere inability to win a particular
election, a pattern of racial bloc voting that extends over a
period of time is usually more probative of a minority group's
dilution claim than are the results of a single election.
Under a "functional" view of the political process mandated
by § 2, S. Rep. 30, n. 120, the most important Senate Report
factors bearing on § 2 challenges to multimember districts are
the "extent to which minority group members have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction" and the "extent to
which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized." I d., 28-29. If present, the
other factors, such as the lingering effects of past discrimination, the use of appeals to racial bias in election campaigns,
and the use of electoral devices which enhance the dilutive effects of multimember districts when substantial white bloc
voting exists-for example anti-bullet voting laws and majority vote requirements-are supportive of, but not essential
to, a minority voter's claim.
In recognizing that some Senate Report factors are more
important to. multimember district vote dilution claims than
others, the Court does not, as JUSTICE O'CoNNOR implies, violate the intent of Congress; rather, the Court effectuates it.
It is obvious that unless minority group members experience
substantial difficulty electing representatives of their choice
they cannot prove that a challenged electoral mechanism impairs their ability "to elect." Section 2(b). And, where the
contested electoral structure is a multimember district, commentators and courts agree that in the absence of significant
white bloc voting it cannot be said that the ability of minority
voters to elect their chosen representatives is inferior to that
of white voters. See, e. g., Escambia County, 748 F. 2d, at
1043; Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F. 2d at, 1566; Nevett,
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571 F. 2d, at 223; Halifax County, 594 F. Supp., at 170;
Blacksher & Menefee; Engstrom & Wildgen 469; Parker 107;
Note, Geometry and Geography 199. Consequently, if a
demonstrated inability to elect and white bloc voting are not
proven, minority voters have not established that the
multimember structure interferes with their ability to elect
their preferred candidates. Minority voters may be able to
prove that they still suffer social and economic effects of past
discrimination, that appeals to racial bias are employed in
election campaigns, and that a majority vote is required to
win a seat, but they have not demonstrated a substantial inability to elect caused by the use of a multimember district.
By recognizing the primacy of the history and extent of minority electoral success and of racial bloc voting, the Court
simply requires that § 2 plaintiffs prove their claim before
they may be awarded relief.
Thus, in order to prevail on a § 2 claim alleging dilution of
their ability to elect representatives through the use of
multimember districts, plaintiffs must demonstrate that despite the fact that they possess the potential ability to elect
representatives, due to the interaction of the multimember
structure and white bloc voting they have suffered substantial difficulty over a course of time in in electing their chosen
candidates. This complex and fact-intensive test is a far cry
from the simplistic proportional representation standard
which JUSTICE O'CONNOR attributes to the Court. And,
contrary to JusTICE O'CONNOR's assertions, it will not
"make[] actionable every deviation from usual, rough proportion.ality." Post, at-- (SOC Circulating Draft 11).
In contrast to the Court, JUSTICE O'CONNOR offers no coherent theory to explain how and when multimember districts operate to diminish the ability of minority voters to
elect their preferred candidates. For example, while seeming to recognize that if the concept of multimember district
vote dilution is to have any meaning, there must be a predicate showing of potential political strength which can be di-
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minished by the use of a multimember district, JUSTICE
O'CONNOR proposes no alternative measure of voting
strength to that utilized by the Court. The JusTICE merely
notes that district lines can be drawn in many ways with
many different effects on the ability of minority voters to
elect their preferred representatives. This observation,
while correct and while perhaps pertinent to the question of
remedies for § 2 violations, does not explain why or if a minority group's ability to elect representatives of its choice can be
impaired by the use of a multimember structure where the
group could not constitute a majority in a single-member district. Moreover, JUSTICE O'CONNOR's suggestion that the
ability of a minority group to constitute a majority in a singlemember district is not a threshold requirement for a claim
that the use of multimember districts impairs the ability of
minority voters who live within those districts to elect representatives is not supported by, but is contrary to, scholarly
authority. 38
See, e. g., Blacksher & Menefee . 51-56;
Bonapfel 355; Carpeneti 696; Davidson 4; Jewell 130.
Finally, JUSTICE O'CONNOR suggests that evidence that a
candidate preferred by a minority group in a particular election was rejected by white voters for reasons other than the
reasons that made that candidate the choice of minority voters is relevant to the question whether white bloc voting will
consistently result in the defeat of minority candidates.
Post, at - - (SOC Circulating Draft 17). JUSTICE O'CoNNOR postulates that such evidence implies that another candidate, equally preferred by minority voters, might be able to
attract substantial white support in some future election.
I d. The JUSTICE states that Congress must have intended
that explanations why white voters reject minority candi38

Indeed, in sharp contrast to the substantial scholarly authority that
supports the Court's standard for a multimember district vote dilution
claim, see supra, at (Circulating Draft 13-16, 20-22), none of the
propositions concerning vote dilution proposed by JuSTICE O'CONNOR's
have any scholarly support.
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dates be allowed in order to prove that candidates elected
without decisive minority support would be willing to take
the minority's interests into account. I d.
We disagree. First, · the inquiry proposed by JUSTICE
O'CONNOR is meaningless and unworkable. How is a court
to determine which qualities were essential to the support of
a candidate by the minority group and which were expendable? Why should it not be assumed that voters choose a
"package" when they vote for a particular candidate? Second, and more importantly, JusTICE O'CONNOR's focus on the
notions that in some cases minority voters might be able to
elect their preferred candidates if they would only choose
them with more of an eye to white voters' preferences and
that minority voters suffer no injury under § 2 where representatives elected by the whites represent minority voters
with respect to issues about which white and minority voters
agree contravenes both the language and the purpose of § 2.
While § 2 does not create a right to proportional representation, it does confer upon minority voters a right to an "opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice" that is equal to that enjoyed by
other members of the electorate. Section 2(b)(emphasis
added). If minority voters can prove that a challenged electoral mechanism or structure results in an unequal opportunity to elect representatives, by the very terms of the statute, they are entitled to relief under § 2. ("A violation of
[§ 2] is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political process leading to nomination or election ... are not equally open to participation by
members of [a protected class] in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.") Where a violation of§ 2 has been established,
surely Congress did not intend that courts send minority voters back to select candidates more palatable to whites or that
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courts tell minority voters to count upon representatives chosen by whites to represent them. 39
The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.

Finally, this opinion is not inconsistent with Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U. S. 124 (1971), and Regester, supra, as JuSTICE O'CONNOR suggests.
In Whitcomb we held that the plaintiff in a vote dilution case must "carry
the burden of proving that multi-member districts ... operate to dilute or
cancel the voting strength of racial ... elements," supra, at 144; in
Regester, we upheld a finding of vote dilution that had been established by
reference to many of the factors now incorporated in the Senate Report
factors, S. Rep. 28-29. The Court's opinion today is fully consistent in all
relevant respects with both precedents. The Court merely provides the
"functional analysis," mandated by the Senate Report, S. Rep. 30, n. 120,
of how multimember districts can operate to dilute or cancel the voting
strength of minorities.
39
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APPENDIX A
Percentages of Votes Cast by Black and White Voters for
Black Candidates in the Five Contested Districts

Senate District 22

1978 (Alexander)
1980 (Alexander)
1982 (Polk)

Primary
White Black
47
87
23
78
32
83

General
White Black
41
94
n/a
n/a
94
33

House District 21

1978 (Blue)
1980 (Blue)
1982 (Blue)

Primary
White Black
21
76
31
81
82
39

General
White Black
n/a
n/a
44
90
45
91

House District 23
Primary
White Black
1978 Senate
Barns (Repub.)
1978 House
Clement
Spaulding
1980 House
Spaulding
1982 House
Clement
Spaulding

General
White Black

n/a

n/a

17

5

10
16

89
92

n/a
37

n/a
89

n/a

n/a

49

90

26
37

32
90

n/a
43

n/a
89
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House District 36
Primary
White Black
22
71
50
79
39
71

1980 (Maxwell)
1982 (Berry)
1982 (Richardson)

General
White Black
28
92
42
92
29
88

House District 39
Primary
White Black
1978 House
Kennedy, H.
Norman
Ross
Sumter (Repub)
1980 House
Kennedy, A.
Norman
1980 Senate
Small
1982 House
Hauser
Kennedy, A.
590 F. Supp., at 369-371.

General
White Black

28
8
17
n/a

76
29
53
n/a

32
n/a
n/a
33

93
n/a
n/a
25

40
18

86
36

32
n/a

96
n/a

12

61

n/a

n/a

25
36

80
87

42
46

87
94
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APPENDIX B
Black Candidates Elected From 7 Originally Contested
Districts
District
(No. Seats)
House 8 (4)
House 21 (6)
House 23 (3)
House 36 (8)
House 39 (5)
Senate 2 (2)
Senate 22 (4)

Prior to
1972 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
lr
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

See Brief for Appellees, table printed between pages 8 and 9;
App. 93-94.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1968

LACY H. THORNBURG, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
RALPH GINGLES ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
[March - , 1986]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in. the judgment in part
and dissenting in part.
As I see it, our task in this case is first to discern Congress'
intent in amending § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and
then to determine whether the decision of the three-judge
District Court was faithful to that intent. I write separately
because I am convinced that the Court largely fails to address
the vexing issues of congressional intent this case raises.
This omisSion marsthe Court's anaiJsiS m several respects
and renders the Court's affirmance of the District Court's
judgment incorrect with respect to House District 23.
Two issues are central to the resolution of this case: how
~~--~~-~~~~~~~~~~
should federal courts evaluate and weigh (1) "the extent to
which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized," S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 29 (hereinafter S. Rep.), and (2) "the extent to which members of the
minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction"? Ibid. When a districting plan is challenged these
two factors will often be crucial to the application of the "totality of the circumstances" test contemplated by amended
§ 2 for establishing that a challenged electoral mechanism has
a discriminatory effect. The Court fails to provide anJ;:..guidanc~ints. It al'fir"'ms essentially on the
theory that whatever the right standards are for assessing
and weighing these two factors, on the facts of this case the
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conclusions reached by the District Court-that black electoral success was not sufficient to be given much weight, and
that racially polarized voting was so extensive as to be given
great weight-are not clearly erroneous.
Although I a~ with the Court that the c~arly-erropeous
test of Rule 52(a) is the ap ro riate standard for review of
factual findings, t e District ourt erred as am ter f win
severarrespects. In t e case o House District 23, I believe
thattll:eseerrors require reversal, but with regard to the
other districts I agree with the Court that the judgment
should be affirmed on this record.
I
This case is the first in which the Court has given plenary
consideration to a claim arising under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 as amended in 1982, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. Particularly when we construe a statute for the first time, it is
essential t at we careful evaluate the Ian age in which
Congress- as chosen to speak. When that is done here, several preliminary conclusions may fairly be drawn. First,
subsection 2(b) supplies the test for determining when a voting practice or procedure violates subsection 2(a), that is,
· abridges the right to vote on account of race or color:
"if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown
that th-e-pomical processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to partk.ffiatiQn by members of a class of citizens
prot~cted-E_y subsection (a) in that its members ha~ e less
opportunity than othe:r.:._ members of'tlie electorate _!o
partici ateTn the
i·
ess and to elect representative s of their choice." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b).

Under this test, in the words of the Senate Report, "[i]f as a
result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not
have an equal opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their choice, there is a
violation of this section." S. Rep. 28.
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The remaining provisions of subsection 2(b) make clear
that Congress r~ u'red eguality of o 2Q.rtunity, not equality
of results, while recognizing t at results may be probative of
equal opportunity or its absence:
"The extent to which members of a protected class have
been elected to office in the State or political subdivision
is ~ne ci_rcum~anc.e which may be considered: "Provided,
That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population." 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973(b).
Section 2 thus makes electoral success or failure _Qy minority
~~---------~~
ca!l~id~t~ a_
!!.)l'!!Po.!!ant fac or in assessing whether a challengea eieCforar mechanism deprives mmoritles of an equal
oppo[tumty _!o ~pa e in the polifiCal process and to elect
repre~ of their choice, without in any way requiring
proportional representation.
The Senate Report places these general requirements
in a more detailed historical perspective, explaining that
amended § 2 is intended to codify the "results" test ~ployed
invWhitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), and White v.
· Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and to reject the "intent" test
propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55 (1980). S. Rep. 27-28. Consequently, "plaintiffs
may choose to establish discriminatory results without
proving any kind of discriminatory purpose." S. Rep. 28.
Indeed, White's phrasing of the "results" test closely resembles the language of amended § 2:
"[W]e have entertained claims that multimember districts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial groups. To sustain
such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats
in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs'
burden is to produce evidence to support findings that

;
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the political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group in
question-that its members had less opportunity than
did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice."
412 U. S., at 765-766 (citations omitted).
Although § 2 does not speak in terms of "vote dilution," I
proof ~~ution can est~blish
a denial of e ual opportumty to articipate and to elect under
the--white test codifiedTrl§ 2 as amended. The phrase "vote
dilution," in the legal sense, simply refers to the impermissible discriminatory effect that a multimember or other districting plan has when it operates "to cancel out or minimize
the voting strength of racial groups." White, supra, at 765.
See also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965). The
legal concept of "vote dilution" is a limited one that is called
into play only on a showing that minority voting strength has
been minimized or cancelled out. A showing that minority
voting strength is not maximized by a districting plan is
insufficient. See Whitcomb, supra, at 156-157. There is an
implicit threshold requirement that a plan substantially
. impair minority voting strength before a court may conclude
that vote dilution has resulted in a denial of equal opportunity
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives. See Bolden, supra, at 122 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (lack of proportional representation does not establish
vote dilution, which requires "demonstrating that [the minority group] has been effectively fenced out of the political
process").
This is not to say that the threshold requirement is rigid or
insurmountaEle. ~'actors sucn as the lingering effects of
past discrimination are relevant in part precisely because
they may indicate that a relatively smaller incremental diminution in black voting strength would, in a particular case,
constitute minimization and deny black voters equal opportunity within the meaning of § 2. Alternatively, such factors
agr~e ~ t~at

;
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may interact with multimember districts in such a way as to
magnify the impairment of minority voting strength that
such districts inherently tend to produce. Much is necessarily left to the district courts in determining whether this
threshold effect has been shown, but unless it is present, a § 2
violation has not occurred.
In or~~~-n ed districting plan
results in sufficient vote dilution to establish a viol ti of§ 2,
a court must also, of necessity, h~ive Ian or
plans in mind so that it can measure the effects of the challenged plan. "[T]he phrase [vote dilution] itself suggests a
norm with respect to which the fact of dilution may be ascertained." Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v.
Brooks, - - U. S. - - , - - (1984) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from summary affirmance). If no alternative plan
would result in an improvement in the position of minority
voters, it would be impossible to conclude that the challenged
plan, in conjunction with other relevant circumstances, had
caused a denial of equal opportunity to participate and elect.
Neither the ~age and legislative history of amepded § 2
nor this Court's pre-Bolden cases squarely address the question how courts should go about selecting a norm against
whiC11vote diiUBon can ·be measured in cases challenging
multimember districts. It has been suggested that "[i]n the
case of multi-member districts, the norm available for at least
theoretical purposes is the single-member district," Mississippi Republican Executive Committee, supra, at - (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). But this suggestion does not
end the matter, for any multimember district could be divided into single-member districts in a variety of ways.
Consequently, assuming that the vote-diluting effects of a
multimember district are to be measured against a hypothetical single-member plan, the choice as to how those singlemember districts are to be drawn becomes critical.

-------

t
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tricts, there were concentrations of black citizens within
the boundaries of each that were sufficient in numbers
and contiguity to constitute effective voting majorities in
single-member districts lying wholly within the boundaries of the multi-member districts, which singlemember districts would satisfy all constitutional requirements of population and geographical configuration."
590 F. Supp., at 358.
It i not self-evident that this choice was correct. Appellants, howe;e;;--11aVe not challenged this aspect of the District Court's decision or offered an alternative standard
against which, in their view, the District Court should have
assessed the evidence of vote dilution that was presented to
it. Accordingly, we have no occasion to decide whether § 2
confers a right to the creation of safe electoral districts or
their equivalent, or, if not, whether the district court is precluded from employing safe electoral districts as a benchmark
- for evaluating a claim that multimember districts result in
vote dilution to an extent that violates § 2's equal opportunity
standard.
Once a baseline for evaluating the effects of multimember
districting is selected, a court faces the difficult task of determining whether the challenged districting plan causes a diminution of black voting strength and a concomitant reduction
in the prospects for black electoral success that amounts to a
denial of equal electoral opportunity. I do not suggest that
there is any mechanical formula for peforming this sensitive
task, any more than there appears to be a mechanical formula
for selecting a baseline for comparison. A district court
must, as White indicates, engage in "an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the . . . multimember district," 412 U. S., at 769-770, and that appraisal is necessarily
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one in which the court's familiarity with local history and conditions, "political and otherwise," id., at 770, plays a large
role. The purpose for which that appraisal is undertaken,
however, must be kept in mind. A court cannot condemn a
multimember district simply because, under any districting
scheme, it is convinced that black voters will operate under
one or another handicap. The court must be satisfied that
the "design and impact" of the district, in light of other electoral rules and the totality of the circumstances, results in a
substantial augmentation of those handicaps.
Any other rule would be tantamount to a per se condemnation of multimember districts in every locale in which the social and economic status of blacks is significantly depressed
by reason of past discrimination. Congress repudiated such
results. The Senate Report endorsed for purposes of § 2 the
"'axiom[]'" that "'at large and multi-member districting
schemes are not per se unconstitutional'," S. Rep. 33 (quoting
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297, 1304 (CA5 1973), aff'd
sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424
U. S. 636 (1976) (per curiam)), and represented that codification of the results test, as employed in White and in some two
. dozen decisions of the Courts of Appeals following that decision, would "not result in wholesale invalidation of electoral
structures." S. Rep. 35. So long as courts examine the totality of the circumstances with due regard for the requirement that a multimember district must be shown to minimize
black voting strength as compared to whatever norm is properly employed, it should be possible to keep this balance troe.
II

The District Court assigned great weight to appellees' statistical evidence of "racial vote QOlanzabon," which it found
to be severe and persistent in each of the challenged districts.
590 F. Supp., at 367. Without explicitly addressing appellants' principal challenge to the validity of this statistical evidence, the Court holds that the District Court's findings of
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severe racially polarized voting are not clearly erroneous.
In so doing, the Court ado ts as its litmus test for evaluating
the significance ofracially polarized voting the Senate ReporPSSta emen
a cour mus etermine whether "racial
po~S _£ aun exce~ve role in t e political pr.QCeSS;-, in a
particular community. Ante, a t - - (quoting 8. Rep. 33).
The impression conveyed-that the Court is simply following
congressional intent-is misleading; and the implicationthat the kind of statistical evidence on which the District
Court relied is wholly unproblematic-is quite wrong.
Initially, it should be remembered that because we wisely
employ the secret ballot in this country statistical evidence
ma:i wel~ be incapable of measuring with exactitude ow ran t is case, however, given the
cia!_groups actl!_a ly vote.
large statistical dis arities yielded by appellees' regression
analysis, any error attributable to the impossibility of direct
observation of voting behavior would seem very unlikely to
have altered the general statistical pattern of racially polarized voting results in each of the challenged districts. While
it would be open to defendants to show that statistical evidence was materially flawed in this or other respects, appellants do not argue that the District Court's decision to credit
· the statistical evidence in this case was clearly erroneous.
Ap:e_ellants_i9 contend, h~~ver, that appellees' statistical
regression an 1 · f v in
a e
· e 1 in ufficient
because it takes no account of ex2_lanator;y variables other
than race.
rief for Appellants 41-44. The District Court
reliedOn data based on nothing more than the correlation between the percentage of votes for black candidates and the
percentage of black residents in particular precincts. Appellants remind us that in many communities blocs of voters may
prefer different candidates simply because their interests diverge on economic, social or other issues as to which the candidates must take a stand. Where factors other than racial
prejudice account for differences in racial voting patterns, appellants argue, voters are not engaging in the "unfortunate
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practice of voting for or against a candidate because of his
race" that constitutes "racial bloc voting" as described in
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 166
(1977) (opinion of JUSTICE WHITE). See also Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982) ("without bloc voting the
minority candidates would not lose elections solely because of
their race").
By endorsing the District Court's acceptance of the inquiry
into racial bloc voting as involving, in the first instance, only
"the existence vel non of difference in the voting patterns of
blacks and whites," ante, at--, the Court apparently rejects this argument without more ado. The Court's conclusion rests on the District Court's finding that the methods of
regression analysis employed by appellees' expert witness to
arrive at his estimates of the extent to which blacks and
whites vote differently from each other are "standard in the
literature for the analysis of racially polarized voting."
Ante, at - - , n. l3. But this is no answer to appellants'
contention that the legal concept of racially polarized voting
under § 2 refers to voting based on considerations of race.
Appellants' argument is not devoid of support in the case
· law interpreting § 2 as amended. The Fifth Circuit has
stated that "in the factual development of the existence of
polarized voting" the quest1on is "whether race or ethnicity
·ection
was such deter i ant of votin reference in
of black or brown candidates by a white majority t~ the
at-large district, with its components, denied minority voters
effeCtiVe""Voting opportilliltY.'' Lee County Branch of
NAACP v. City ofOpelika, 748 F. 2d 1473, 1482 (CA5 1984)
(quoting Jones v. City of Lubbock, 730 F. 2d 233, 234 (CA5
1984) (Hig:_ginbotEa~ J., concurring)). Therefore, the court
cautioned, '4i]tWflf often be necessary to examine factors
other than race that may also correlate highly with election
outcomes~ampaign expenditure, p arty identification,"income, ~edia advertising,~ligiorY,ilame recognitiort:Position
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on key issues, and so forth." City of Opelika, supra, at
148~---- ~
The legislative history of § 2 as amended does not clearly
indicate how courts should determine the existence of racially
polarized voting. The Senate Report states:
"The results test makes no assumptions one way or the
other about the role of racial political considerations in a
particular community. If plaintiffs assert that they are
denied fair access to the political process, in part, because of the racial bloc voting context within which the
challenged election system works, they would have to
prove it." S. Rep. 34 (emphasis in original).
This statement need not be read, however, to require
plaintiffs to prove that sharply divergent racial voting patterns result from race-based voting. Unrebutted statistical
evidence that whites consistently refuse to support black candidates will support an inference that racial politics plays a
dominant role in a particular community. See City of Lub~
bock, supra, at 236 (Higginbot®m, J., concurring). Moreover, the Senate Report on§ 2 as amended relied on a body of
federal appellate court cases employing the White test in re. viewing election districting plans. S. Rep. 32. Although
there was n~wel!:-dev__elgped ana_!ysis of the concept of racial
bloc voting in this body of cases, courts did not suggest that
plaintiffs were required to establish that very wide divergences in racial voting patterns were caused by race-based
preferences or prejudices. See, e. g., Kirksey v. Board of
Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F. 2d 139, 149 (CA5) (en
bane), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 968 (1977); Dove v. Moore, 539
F. 2d 1152, 1155 (CA8 1976); Wallace v. House, 515 F. 2d
619, 624 (CA5), vacated on other grounds, 425 U. S. 947 1
(1975). In light of this case law, it seems more likely than
not that Congress in en"dea that statistical roof of ol ized
rac1a vo m at erns cou esta ish a prima facie_sase of
racial bloc voting for § 2 purposes, without particular regard
- for the causes of such patterns.
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The question remains, however, whether defendants may
rebut ~g by proof that race-based voting is not
wi(!esprea , an t at iver ent soc1a or economic interests
explain the polarized voting patterns. In my view, it may
well be open to a d1stnc cour examining a claim of racially
polarized voting to examine other explanations offered by defendants for voting statistics in order to determine whether
race was the dominating factor in the relevant political contests. Any contrary rule would seem inconsistent with the
Senate Report's repeated emphasis on "intensive racial politics," on "racial political considerations," and on whether
"racial politics . . . dominate the electoral process" as the
essence of the "racial bloc voting" that Congress deemed relevant to showing a § 2 violation. S. Rep. 33-34.
Armellants.. argJJ.e that in this case there are other explanation~ for the divergent racial voting patterns shown by appellees' statistical evidence, but they have offered no prJ>of to
sub~ms. I therefore agree with the Court /~
that on these facts the District Court's finding that appellees
had established the existence of legally significant racially
polarized voting was not clearly erroneous.
I do not a ee, hQ}Y_ever, with the Court's unqualified. insistence that "evidence that minoritl and majority voters
would select different sets oi candidates if elections were held
in segreg;ted electwates" can be "highly probative of vote
dilution", regardless of the extent of majority ~pport for
candidates preferred by the racial minority. Anle, at--,
n. 18. Under this approach, it would follow that vote dilu- ~
tion could routinely be established even if a very large minority of white voters consistently supported candidates preferred by black voters. Thus, the Court apparently believes
that the fact that in the "general election in which white support for a black candidate reached the highest level--49%,
black support was 41% higher-90%," ante, at--, is evidence of racially polarized voting for § 2 purposes. Congress
thought otherwise. As the Senate Report shows, Congress

I
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clearly understood that where "minority voters ... receive
substantial support from white voters," "it would be exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to show that they were effectively
excluded from fair access to the political process under the
results test." S. Rep. 33. It simply cannot be said that an
election in which 49% of the white voters support a black candidate exhibits, on its face, "monolithic" racial bloc voting or
"intensive racial politics," or that this degree of support is not
"substantial." S. Rep. 33, 34.
The Court attempts to justify its position on the basis of an
unsupported claim that "[w ]here a substantial white majority
consistently chooses a different set of candidates from that
preferred by the black minority, blacks will find it very difficult to elect representatives of their choice." Ante, at--,
n. 18. This formulation assumes an answer to the critical
question: whether, given a particular norm or baseline
against which to measure vote dilution, blacks will find it sufficiently more difficult to elect representatives of their choice
under a challenged electoral system that the court can conclude that black voting strength has been minimized or cancelled out. Certainly in cases such as this one, where there
is no anti-single shot law or numbered-seat requirement, see
ante, at - - , nn. 5-6, it will sometimes be possible for black
voters in multimember districts to enjoy a degree of electoral
success comparable to what they could anticipate under a single-member district plan, particularly if a sizeable minority of
white voters support black candidates. Whatever the degree of white support for black candidates, where black electoral success is not substantially impaired in a multimember
district as compared to what would be expected in the baseline case, it cannot be concluded that the multimember district plan causes minimization of black voting strength by interacting with racially polarized voting. Cf. Mississippi
Republican Executive Committee, - - U. S., at - (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from summary affirmance). The
fact that blacks and whites might elect different candidates in
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segregated elections may therefore be irrelevant in such a
case.
Were we confronted in this case with a pattern of electoral
results in which white voters consistently gave substantial
support to black candidates, I would have great difficulty upholding a finding attaching great weight to statistical evidence of "racially polarized voting." On the facts of this
case, however, I al\L_not pr~pared tQhold tlgtt whjte~ c_Q!}.sistenllua e~~llitl, sup ort t-Q_~~di at in an of
the challenged districts. Accordingly, I would leave undistur~t Court's decision to give great weight to
racial bloc voting in each of the challenged districts.
Nonetheless, the District QQ.urt clearly erred-and the
Court repeats this error-in aggregating data from all of the
challenged districts, and then relying on the fact that "on
average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the primary eleetionS."- Ante, at - - . Although
Senate District 22 encompasses House District 36, with that
exception the districts at issue in this case are distributed
throughout the State of North Carolina, and I see no w~rrant
for evaluating them in the aggregate rather _Qlan individually~ ''IDrlntensefy local appraisal of the
design and impact of the ... multimember district," 412
U. S., at 769-770, and racial voting statistics from one district are ordinarily irrelevant in assessing the totality of the
circumstances in another district. The risk of erroneous adjudications under § 2 is greatly increased when a court draws
no distinction between a district, such as House District 8, in
which fewer than 10% of white voters supported a black candidate in each of the state legislative elections studied, and
one such as House District 21, in which in four of the five
elections studied more than 30% of white voters supported a
black candidate. In view of the specific evidence from each
district that the District Court also considered, however, I
cannot say that its ultimate conclusion that there was severe
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racial bloc voting was clearly erroneous with regard to any of
the challenged districts.
III
The District Court also committed clear legal error y ith
respect to'111e onTy "faaar Con e ss express! -mentioned in
§ 2 as a
.
extent to whic members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b). As the evidence ..summarized by the Court in table fo
s ows, ante, at - - , App.
B, the ~ ~ gree o ac e ector~ success differ@_~dely in the
seven ongmall contested districts. In :RouseDistrict 8 and
Senate District 2, neither of which is contested in this Court,
no black candidate had ever been elected to the offices in
question. In House District 21 and House District 36, the
only instances of black electoral success came in the two most
recent elections, one of which took place during the pendency
of this litigation. By contrast, in House District 39 and Senate District 22, black successes, although intermittent, dated
back to 1974, and a black candidate had been elected in each
of these districts in three of the last five elections. Finally,
in House District 23 a black candidate had been elected in
each of the last six elections.
The District Court, drawing no distinctions among these
districts for purposes of its findings, concluc}ed that "the
overall results achieved to date at all levels of elective office
are minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the total
population." 590 F. Supp., at 367. Although the District
Court clearly erred to the extent that it considered electoral
success in the aggregate, rather than in each of the challenged districts, the Court studiously avoids comment on this
point. Instead, the Court notes that the Senate Report endorsed Z i mmer's admonition that the election of a few black
candidates does not "necessarily foreclose the possibility of
dilution of the black vote," 485 F. 2d, at 1307, and asserts
that the District Court was free to regard the results of the
1982 elections with suspicion and to decide "on the basis of all
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the relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to
blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections." Ante, at--.
The Court does not explain, however, how the District
Court could possibly have given any weight to "blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections" in House District 23, where a black candidate has been
elected in six consecutive elections. Nor does the Court explain how this technique would apply in Senate District 22,
where a black candidate was elected in three consecutive
elections from 1974 to 1978, but no black candidate was
elected in 1982, or in House District 39, where black candidates were elected in 1974 and 1976 as well as in 1982.
The Court also relies on the Senate Report's statement
that courts should perform a "searching practical evaluation
of the 'past and present reality'," S. Rep. 30, in order to
ascertain whether the political processes are equally open.
The question, however, is not simply whether the political
processes are equally open, but whether a particular electoral.
mechanism, in combination with any other relevant circumstances, causes the minimization or cancellation of black voting strength and thus denies black voters equal electoral
opportunity. The District Court's dismissive treatment of
evidence of black electoral successes loses sight of that question, as is shown by its finding that black electoral success
was too minimal and too recent "to compel or even arguably
to support an ultimate finding that a black candidate's race is
no longer a significant adverse factor in the political processes of the state-either generally or specifically in the
areas of the challenged districts." 590 F. Supp., at 367.
Even if race is "a significant adverse factor," consistent black
electoral success can establish that a multimember district
does not interact with that factor to cause a substantial diminution in black voting strength. Contrary to what the District Court thought, these pre-1982 successes, which were
"proportional or nearly proportional," ante, at--, to black

I
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population in these three multimember districts, certainly
lend some support for a finding that black voters in these districts enjoy an equal opportunity to elect representatives of
their choice.
Although the District Court did not expressly so state, we
may infer that the court believed that single-member districts in which blacks constituted an effective majority would
have produced a significantly greater degree of black electoral success than had actually resulted in the elections from
1972 on. I cannot say that this implicit finding was clearly
erroneous with respect to most of the challenged districts,
but it seems to me simply impossible to draw this conclusion
with respect to House District 23. Blacks comprise 36.3% of
the population in that district, and constitute 28.6% of the
registered voters. In each of the six elections since 1970 one
of the three representatives from this district has been a
black. There is no finding, or any reason even to suspect,
that the successful black candidates in District 23 did not in
fact represent the interests of black voters. The District
Court did not suggest that racially polarized voting would diminish if single-member districts were employed, it did not
find that black success in previous elections was aberrant,
and it did not indicate that it would have been possible to
draw up single-member districts in which blacks had a realistic chance of electing two of the three representatives from
District 23.
Zimmer's caveat against necessarily foreclosing a vote dilution claim on the basis of isolated black successes cannot be
pressed this far. Indeed, the 23 Court of Appeals' decisions
on which the Senate Report relied, and which are the best
evidence of the scope of this caveat, contain no example of
black electoral success that even remotely approximates the
consistent, decade-long pattern in District 23. See, e. g.,
Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F. 2d 191, 195 (CA5 1973) (no
black candidates elected); Wallace v. House, 515 F. 2d 619,
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623 vacated on other gTounds, 425 U. S. 947 (1975) (one black
candidate elected).
I do not propose that consistent and virtually proportional
black electoral success should always, as a matter of law, bar
finding a § 2 violation. But, as a general rule, such success is
entitled to great ~t in evaluatil!_g_ whe_t~~~enged
eleef~as, on t}1e totality_of the circu~tances, '
opera~d~~b~~egu~~unity to_r.articipate anato elecC With respect to HQ.~se District 2]} the
District Court's failure to accord black electoral success such
weight was clearly erroneous, and the District Court identified no reason for not giving this degree of success preclusive
effect. Accordingly, I would hold that appellees failed to es- / ~
tablish a violation of § 2 in District 23.

f<7.- ,

IV
Congress believed that codification of the "results" test in
§ 2 would "clearly establish the standards for proving a violation of that section." S. Rep. 2. · Unfortunately, the "results" test as interpreted by the Court today is instead
typified by the "unknown contours and unforeseeable consequences" Congress sought to avoid by relying on the "reliable
· and reassuring track record of court decisions using the ["results"] standard." S. Rep. 31, 32. Because I think that the
"results" test is not as standardless as the Court would have
it, I do not joiiL1l!e Court's oninion. Because the District
Court clearly erred in finding a violation of § 2 in House District 23, I dissent from the Court's affirmance of its judgment
in this respect.

To: The Chief Justice
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Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part.
As I see it, our task in this case is first to discern Congress'
intent in amending § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and
then to determine whether the decision of the three-judge
District Court was faithful to that intent. I write separately
because I am convinced that the Court largely fails to address
the vexing issues of congressional intent this case raises.
This omission mars the Court's analysis in several respects
and renders the Court's affirmance of the District Court's
judgment incorrect with respect to House District 23.
Two issues are central to the resolution of this case: how
should federal courts evaluate and weigh (1) "the extent to
which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized," S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 29 (hereinafter S. Rep.), and (2) "the extent to which members of the
minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction"? Ibid. When a districting plan is challenged these
two factors will often be crucial to the application of the "totality of the circumstances" test contemplated by amended
§ 2 for establishing that a challenged electoral mechanism has
a discriminatory effect. The Court fails to provide any guidance on either of these points. It affirms essentially on the
theory that whatever the right standards are for assessing
and weighing these two factors, on the facts of this case the
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conclusions reached by the District Court-that black electoral success was not sufficient to be given much weight, and
that racially polarized voting was so extensive as to be given
great weight-are not clearly erroneous.
Although I agree with the Court that the clearly-erroneous
test of Rule 52(a) is the appropriate standard for review of
factual findings, the District Court erred as a matter oflaw in
several respects. In the case of House District 23, I believe
that these errors require reversal, but with regard to the
other districts I agree with the Court that the judgment
should be affirmed on this record.
I

This case is the first in which the Court has given plenary
consideration to a claim arising under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 as amended in 1982, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. Particularly when we construe a statute for the first time, it is
essential that we carefully evaluate the language in which
Congress has chosen to speak. When that is done here, several preliminary conclusions may fairly be drawn. First,
subsection 2(b) supplies the test for determining when a voting practice or procedure violates subsection 2(a), that is,
abridges the right to vote on account of race or color:
"if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b).
Under this test, in the words of the Senate Report, "[i]f as a
result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not
have an equal opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their choice, there is a
violation of this section." S. Rep. 28.
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The remaining provisions of subsection 2(b) make clear
that Congress required equality of opportunity, not equality
of results, while recognizing that results may be probative of
equal opportunity or its absence:
"The extent to which members of a protected class have
been elected to office in the State or political subdivision
is one circumstance which may be considered: "Provided,
That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population." 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973(b).
Section 2 thus makes electoral success or failure by minority
candidates an important factor in assessing whether a challenged electoral mechanism deprives minorities of an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice, without in any way requiring
proportional representation.
The Senate Report places these general requirements
in a more detailed historical perspective, explaining that
amended § 2 is intended to codify the "results" test employed
in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), and White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and to reject the "intent" test
propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55 (1980). S. Rep. 27-28. Consequently, "plaintiffs
may choose to establish discriminatory results without
proving any kind of discriminatory purpose." S. Rep. 28.
Indeed, White's phrasing of the "results" test closely resembles the language of amended § 2:
"[W]e have entertained claims that multimember districts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial groups. To sustain
such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats
in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs'
burden is to produce evidence to support findings that
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the political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group in
question-that its members had less opportunity than
did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice."
412 U. S., at 765-766 (citations omitted).
Although § 2 does not speak in terms of "vote dilution," I
agree with the Court that proof of vote dilution can establish
a denial of equal opportunity to participate and to elect under
the White test codified in § 2 as amended. The phrase "vote
dilution," in the legal sense, simply refers to the impermissible discriminatory effect that a multimember or other districting plan has when it operates "to cancel out or minimize
the voting strength of racial groups." White, supra, at 765.
See also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965). The
legal concept of "vote dilution" is a limited one that is called
into play only on a showing that minority voting strength has
been minimized or cancelled out. A showing that minority
voting strength is not maximized by a districting plan is
insufficient. See Whitcomb, supra, at 156-157. There is an
implicit threshold requirement that a plan substantially
impair minority voting strength before a court may conclude
that vote dilution has resulted in a denial of equal opportunity
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives. See Bolden, supra, at 122 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (lack of proportional representation does not establish
vote dilution, which requires "demonstrating that [the minority group] has been effectively fenced out of the political
process").
This is not to say that the threshold requirement is rigid or
insurmountable. Factors such as the lingering effects of
past discrimination are relevant in part precisely because
they may indicate that a relatively smaller incremental diminution in black voting strength would, in a particular case,
constitute minimization and deny black voters equal opportunity within the meaning of § 2. Alternatively, such factors
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may interact with multimember districts in such a way as to
magnify the impairment of minority voting strength that
such districts inherently tend to produce. Much is necessarily left to the district courts in determining whether this
threshold effect has been shown, but unless it is present, a § 2
violation has not occurred.
In order to assess a claim that a challenged districting plan
results in sufficient vote dilution to establish a violation of§ 2,
a court must also, of necessity, have some alternative plan or
plans in mind so that it can measure the effects of the challenged plan. "[T]he phrase [vote dilution] itself suggests a
norm with respect to which the fact of dilution may be ascertained." Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v.
Brooks, --U.S. - - , - - (1984) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from summary affirmance). If no alternative plan
would result in an improvement in the position of minority
voters, it would be impossible to conclude that the challenged
plan, in conjunction with other relevant circumstances, had
caused a denial of equal opportunity to participate and elect.
Neither the language and legislative history of amended § 2
nor this Court's pre-Bolden cases squarely address the question how courts should go about selecting a norm against
which vote dilution can be measured in cases challenging
multimember districts. It has been suggested that "[i]n the
case of multi-member districts, the norm available for at least
theoretical purposes is the single-member district," Mississippi Republican Executive Committee, supra, at - (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). But this suggestion does not
end the matter, for any multimember district could be divided into single-member districts in a variety of ways.
Consequently, assuming that the vote-diluting effects of a
multimember district are to be measured against a hypothetical single-member plan, the choice as to how those singlemember districts are to be drawn becomes critical.
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In this case, the hypothetical norm employed by the District Court was single-member districts in which black voting
majorities resided:
"At the time of the creation of these multi-member districts, there were concentrations of black citizens within
the boundaries of each that were sufficient in numbers
and contiguity to constitute effective voting majorities in
single-member districts lying wholly within the boundaries of the multi-member districts, which singlemember districts would satisfy all constitutional requirements of population and geographical configuration."
590 F. Supp., at 358.
It is not self-evident that this choice was correct. Appellants, however, have not challenged this aspect of the District Court's decision or offered an alternative standard
against which, in their view, the District Court should have
assessed the evidence of vote dilution that was presented to
it. Accordingly, we have no occasion to decide whether § 2
confers a right to the creation of safe electoral districts or
their equivalent, or, if not, whether the district court is precluded from employing safe electoral districts as a benchmark
for evaluating a claim that multimember districts result in
vote dilution to an extent that violates § 2's equal opportunity
standard.
Once a baseline for evaluating the effects of multimember
districting is selected, a court faces the difficult task of determining whether the challenged districting plan causes a diminution of black voting strength and a concomitant reduction
in the prospects for black electoral success that amounts to a
denial of equal electoral opportunity. I do not suggest that
there is any mechanical formula for peforming this sensitive
task, any more than there appears to be a mechanical formula
for selecting a baseline for comparison. A district court
must, as White indicates, engage in "an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the . . . multimember district," 412 U. S., at 769-770, and that appraisal is necessarily
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one in which the court's familiarity with local history and conditions, "political and otherwise," id., at 770, plays a large
role. The purpose for which that appraisal is undertaken,
however, must be kept in mind. A court cannot condemn a
multimember district simply because, under any districting
scheme, it is convinced that black voters will operate under
one or another handicap. The court must be satisfied that
the "design and impact" of the district, in light of other electoral rules and the totality of the circumstances, results in a
substantial augmentation of those handicaps.
Any other rule would be tantamount to a per se condemnation of multimember districts in every locale in which the social and economic status of blacks is significantly depressed
by reason of past discrimination. Congress repudiated such
results. The Senate Report endorsed for purposes of § 2 the
"'axiom[]'" that "'at large and multi-member districting
schemes are not per se unconstitutional'," S. Rep. 33 (quoting
Zimmerv. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297, 1304 (CA51973), aff'd
sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424
U. S. 636 (1976) (per curiam)), and represented that codification of the results test, as employed in White and in some two
dozen decisions of the Courts of Appeals following that decision, would "not result in wholesale invalidation of electoral
structures." S. Rep. 35. So long as courts examine the totality of the circumstances with due regard for the requirement that a multimember district must be shown to minimize
black voting strength as compared to whatever norm is properly employed, it should be possible to keep this balance true.
II

The District Court assigned great weight to appellees' statistical evidence of "racial vote polarization," which it found
to be severe and persistent in each of the challenged districts.
590 F. Supp., at 367. Without explicitly addressing appellants' principal challenge to the validity of this statistical evidence, the Court holds that the District Court's findings of
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severe racially polarized voting are not clearly erroneous.
In so doing, the Court adopts as its litmus test for evaluating
the significance of racially polarized voting the Senate Report's statement that courts must determine whether "racial
politics play an excessive role in the political process" in a
particular community. Ante, a t - - (quoting S. Rep. 33).
The impression conveyed-that the Court is simply following
congressional intent-is misleading; and the implicationthat the kind of statistical evidence on which the District
Court relied is wholly unproblematic-is quite wrong.
Initially, it should be remembered that because we wisely
employ the secret ballot in this country statistical evidence
may well be incapable of measuring with exactitude how racial groups actually vote. In this case, however, given the
large statistical disparities yielded by appellees' regression
analysis, any error attributable to the impossibility of direct
observation of voting behavior would seem very unlikely to
have altered the general statistical pattern of racially polarized voting results in each of the challenged districts. While
it would be open to defendants to show that statistical evidence was materially flawed in this or other respects, appellants do not argue that the District Court's decision to credit
the statistical evidence in this case was clearly erroneous.
Appellants do contend, however, that appellees' statistical
regression analysis of voting patterns is legally insufficient
because it takes no account of explanatory variables other
than race. Brief for Appellants 41-44. The District Court
relied on data based on nothing more than the correlation between the percentage of votes for black candidates and the
percentage of black residents in particular precincts. Appellants remind us that in many communities blocs of voters may
prefer different candidates simply because their interests diverge on economic, social or other issues as to which the candidates must take a stand. Where factors other than racial
prejudice account for differences in racial voting patterns, appellants argue, voters are not engaging in the "unfortunate
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practice of voting for or against a candidate because of his
race" that constitutes "racial bloc voting" as described in
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 166
(1977) (opinion of JUSTICE WHITE). See also Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982) ("without bloc voting the
minority candidates would not lose elections solely because of
their race").
By endorsing the District Court's acceptance of the inquiry
into racial bloc voting as involving, in the first instance, only
"the existence vel non of difference in the voting patterns of
blacks and whites," ante, at--, the Court apparently rejects this argument without more ado. The Court's conclusion rests on the District Court's finding that the methods of
regression analysis employed by appellees' expert witness to
arrive at his estimates of the extent to which blacks and
whites vote differently from each other are "standard in the
literature for the analysis of racially polarized voting."
Ante, at - - , n. 13. But this is no answer to appellants'
contention that the legal concept of racially polarized voting
under § 2 refers to voting based on considerations of race.
Appellants' argument is not devoid of support in the case
law interpreting § 2 as amended. The Fifth Circuit has
stated that "in the factual development of the existence of
polarized voting" the question is "whether race or ethnicity
was such a determinant of voting preference in the rejection
of black or brown candidates by a white majority that the
at-large district, with its components, denied minority voters
effective voting opportunity." Lee County Branch of
NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F. 2d 1473, 1482 (CA5 1984)
(quoting Jones v. City of Lubbock, 730 F. 2d 233, 234 (CA5
1984) (Higginbotham, J., concurring)). Therefore, the court
cautioned, "[i]t will often be necessary to examine factors
other than race that may also correlate highly with election
outcomes-campaign expenditure, party identification, income, media advertising, religion, name recognition, position
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on key issues, and so forth." City of Opelika, supra, at
1482.
The legislative history of § 2 as amended does not clearly
indicate how courts should determine the existence of racially
polarized voting. The Senate Report states:
"The results test makes no assumptions one way or the
other about the role of racial political considerations in a
particular community. If plaintiffs assert that they are
denied fair access to the political process, in part, because of the racial bloc voting context within which the
challenged election system works, they would have to
prove it." S. Rep. 34 (emphasis in original).

(

This statement need not be read, however, to require
plaintiffs to prove that sharply divergent racial voting patterns result from race-based voting. Unrebutted statistical
evidence that whites consistently refuse to support black candidates will support an inference that racial politics plays a
dominant role in a particular community. See City of Lubbock, supra, at 236 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Moreover, the Senate Report on§ 2 as amended relied on a body of
federal appellate court cases employing the White test in reviewing election districting plans. S. Rep. 32. Although
there was no well-developed analysis of the concept of racial
bloc voting in this body of cases, courts did not suggest that
plaintiffs were required to establish that very wide divergences in racial voting patterns were caused by race-based
preferences or prejudices. See, e. g., Kirksey v. Board of
Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F. 2d 139, 149 (CA5) (en
bane), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 968 (1977); Dove v. Moore, 539
F. 2d 1152, 1155 (CAS 1976); Wallace v. House, 515 F. 2d
619, 624 (CA5), vacated on other grounds, 425 U. S. 947
(1975). In light of this case law, it seems more likely than
not that Congress intended that statistical proof of polarized
~ racial voting patterns over a reasonable period of time could
establish a prima facie case of racial bloc voting for § 2 pur-
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poses, without particular regard for the causes of such
patterns.
The question remains, however, whether defendants may
rebut such a showing by proof that race-based voting is not
widespread, and that divergent social or economic interests
explain the polarized voting patterns. In my view, it may
well be open to a district court examining a claim of racially
polarized voting to examine other explanations offered by defendants for voting statistics in order to determine whether
race was the dominating factor in the relevant political contests. Any contrary rule would seem inconsistent with the
Senate Report's repeated emphasis on "intensive racial politics," on "racial political considerations," and on whether
"racial politics . . . dominate the electoral process" as the
essence of the "racial bloc voting" that Congress deemed relevant to showing a § 2 violation. S. Rep. 33-34.
If evidence of other explanatory variables may be offered
by defendants, then the order and allocation of proof on the
issue of racial bloc voting in § 2 cases would seem broadly
analogous to that required in actions under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. E. g., McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); U. S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983).
Under these cases, where the plaintiff has carried the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case, the burden of going
forward then shifts to the defendant to rebut the inference of
discrimination created by the prima facie case. The burden
of persuasion, however, always remains on the plaintiff.
Burdine, supra, at 253. The Senate Report, as noted earlier, makes clear that § 2 plaintiffs do indeed bear the burden
of persuasion on the issue of racial bloc voting, as on the
other elements that are relevant to establishing a vote dilution claim. It must be emphasized, however, that even an
unrebutted prima facie case of racial bloc voting does not
alone establish a violation of§ 2, for an electoral plan violates
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§ 2 only when it denies minority voters an equal opportunity
"to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b). If the court
concludes that the role of "other explanatory factors" such as
"campaign expenditure, party identification, income, media
use measured by cost, religion, [and] name identification,"
City of Lubbock, 730 F. 2d, at 235 (Higginbotham, J., concurring), was relatively weak, and that "race is the dominating
factor in political outcomes," City of Opelika, 748 F. 2d, at
1482, it must still inquire whether "the racial bloc voting context within which the challenged election system works," S.
Rep. 34, has combined with other relevant factors in a manner that "denie[s] fair access to the political process." Ibid.
Appellants argue that in this case there are other explanations for the divergent racial voting patterns shown by appellees' statistical evidence, but they have offered no proof to
substantiate their claims. I therefore agree with the Court
that on these facts the District Court's finding that appellees
had established the existence of legally significant racially
polarized voting was not clearly erroneous.
I do not agree, however, with the Court's unqualified insistence that "evidence that minority and majority voters
would select different sets of candidates if elections were held
in segregated electorates" can be "highly probative of vote
dilution", regardless of the extent of majority support for
candidates preferred by the racial minority. Ante, at--,
n. 18. Under this approach, it would follow that vote dilution could routinely be established even if a very large minority of white voters consistently supported candidates preferred by black voters. Thus, the Court apparently believes
that the fact that in the "general election in which white support for a black candidate reached the highest level-49%,
black support was 41% higher-90%," ante, at--, is evidence of racially polarized voting for § 2 purposes. Congress
thought otherwise. As the Senate Report shows, Congress
clearly understood that where "minority voters ... receive
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substantial support from white voters," "it would be exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to show that they were effectively
excluded from fair access to the political process under the
results test." S. Rep. 33. It simply cannot be said that an
election in which 49% of the white voters support a black candidate exhibits, on its face, "monolithic" racial bloc voting or
"intensive racial politics," or that this degree of support is not
"substantial." S. Rep. 33, 34.
The Court attempts to justify its position on the basis of an
unsupported claim that "[w]here a substantial white majority
consistently chooses a different set of candidates from that
preferred by the black minority, blacks will find it very difficult to elect representatives of their choice." Ante, at--,
n. 18. This formulation assumes an answer to the critical
question: whether, given a particular norm or baseline
against which to measure vote dilution, blacks will find it sufficiently more difficult to elect representatives of their choice
under a challenged electoral system that the court can conclude that black voting strength has been minimized or cancelled out. Certainly in cases such as this one, where there
is no anti-single shot law or numbered-seat requirement, see
ante, at--, nn. 5-6, it will sometimes be possible for black
voters in multimember districts to enjoy a degree of electoral
success comparable to what they could anticipate under a single-member district plan, particularly if a sizeable minority of
white voters support black candidates. Whatever the degree of white support for black candidates, where black electoral success is not substantially impaired in a multimember
district as compared to what would be expected in the baseline case, it cannot be concluded that the multimember district plan causes minimization of black voting strength by interacting with racially polarized voting. Cf. Mississippi
Republican Executive Committee, - - U. S., at - (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from summary affirmance). The
fact that blacks and whites might elect different candidates in
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segregated elections may therefore be irrelevant in such a
case.
Were we confronted in this case with a pattern of electoral
results in which white voters consistently gave substantial
support to black candidates, I would have great difficulty upholding a finding attaching great weight to statistical evidence of "racially polarized voting." On the facts of this
case, however, I am not prepared to hold that whites consistently gave substantial support to black candidates in any of
the challenged districts. Accordingly, I would leave undisturbed the District Court's decision to give great weight to
racial bloc voting in each of the challenged districts.
Nonetheless, the District Court clearly erred-and the
Court repeats this error-in aggregating data from all of the
challenged districts, and then relying on the fact that "on
average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the primary elections." Ante, at - - . Although
Senate District 22 encompasses House District 36, with that
exception the districts at issue in this case are distributed
throughout the State of North Carolina, and I see no warrant
for evaluating them in the aggregate rather than individually. White calls for "an intensely local appraisal of the
design and impact of the ... multimember district," 412
U. S., at 769-770, and racial voting statistics from one district are ordinarily irrelevant in assessing the totality of the
circumstances in another district. The risk of erroneous adjudications under § 2 is greatly increased when a court draws
no distinction between a district, such as House District 8, in
which fewer than 10% of white voters supported a black candidate in each of the state legislative elections studied, and
one such as House District 21, in which in four of the five
elections studied more than 30% of white voters supported a
black candidate. In view of the specific evidence from each
district that the District Court also considered, however, I
cannot say that its ultimate conclusion that there was severe
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racial bloc voting was clearly erroneous with regard to any of
the challenged districts.
III
The District Court also committed clear legal error with
respect to the only factor Congress expressly mentioned in
§ 2 as amended: "the extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b). As the evidence summarized by the Court in table form shows, ante, at - - , App.
B, the degree of black electoral success differed widely in the
seven originally contested districts. In House District 8 and
Senate District 2, neither of which is contested in this Court,
no black candidate had ever been elected to the offices in
question. In House District 21 and House District 36, the
only instances of black electoral success came in the two most
recent elections, one of which took place during the pendency
of this litigation. By contrast, in House District 39 and Senate District 22, black successes, although intermittent, dated
back to 1974, and a black candidate had been elected in each
of these districts in three of the last five elections. Finally,
in House District 23 a black candidate had been elected in
each of the last six elections.
The District Court, drawing no distinctions among these
districts for purposes of its findings, concluded that "the
overall results achieved to date at all levels of elective office
are minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the total
population." 590 F. Supp., at 367. Although the District
Court clearly erred to the extent that it considered electoral
success in the aggregate, rather than in each of the challenged districts, the Court studiously avoids comment on this
point. Instead, the Court notes that the Senate Report endorsed Zimmer's admonition that the election of a few black
candidates does not "necessarily foreclose the possibility of
dilution of the black vote," 485 F. 2d, at 1307, and asserts
that the District Court was free to regard the results of the
1982 elections with suspicion and to decide "on the basis of all
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the relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to
blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections." Ante, at--.
The Court does not explain, however, how the District
Court could possibly have given any weight to "blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections" in House District 23, where a black candidate has been
elected in six consecutive elections. Nor does the Court explain how this technique would apply in Senate District 22,
where a black candidate was elected in three consecutive
elections from 1974 to 1978, but no black candidate was
elected in 1982, or in House District 39, where black candidates were elected in 1974 and 1976 as well as in 1982.
The Court also relies on the Senate Report's statement
that courts should perform a "searching practical evaluation
of the 'past and present reality'," S. Rep. 30, in order to
ascertain whether the political processes are equally open.
The question, however, is not simply whether the political
processes are equally open, but whether a particular electoral
mechanism, in combination with any other relevant circumstances, causes the minimization or cancellation of black voting strength and thus denies black voters equal electoral
opportunity. The District Court's dismissive treatment of
evidence of black electoral successes loses sight of that question, as is shown by its finding that black electoral success
was too minimal and too recent "to compel or even arguably
to support an ultimate finding that a black candidate's race is
no longer a significant adverse factor in the political processes of the state-either generally or specifically in the
areas of the challenged districts." 590 F. Supp., at 367.
Even if race is "a significant adverse factor," consistent black
electoral success can establish that a multimember district
does not interact with that factor to cause a substantial diminution in black voting strength. Contrary to what the District Court thought, these pre-1982 successes, which were
"proportional or nearly proportional," ante, at--, to black
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population in these three multimember districts, certainly
lend some support for a :finding that black voters in these districts enjoy an equal opportunity to elect representatives of
their choice.
Although the District Court did not expressly so state, we
may infer that the court believed that single-member districts in which blacks constituted an effective majority would
have produced a significantly greater degree of black electoral success than had actually resulted in the elections from
1972 on. I cannot say that this implicit :finding was clearly
erroneous with respect to most of the challenged districts,
but it seems to me simply impossible to draw this conclusion
with respect to House District 23. Blacks comprise 36.3% of
the population in that district, and constitute 28.6% of the
registered voters. In each of the six elections since 1970 one
of the three representatives from this district has been a
black. There is no :finding, or any reason even to suspect,
that the successful black candidates in District 23 did not in
fact represent the interests of black voters. The District
Court did not suggest that racially polarized voting would diminish if single-member districts were employed, it did not
:find that black success in previous elections was aberrant,
and it did not indicate that it would have been possible to
draw up single-member districts in which blacks had a realistic chance of electing two of the three representatives from
District 23.
Zimmer's caveat against necessarily foreclosing a vote dilution claim on the basis of isolated black successes cannot be
pressed this far. Indeed, the 23 Court of Appeals' decisions
on which the Senate Report relied, and which are the best
evidence of the scope of this caveat, contain no example of
black electoral success that even remotely approximates the
consistent, decade-long pattern in District 23. See, e. g.,
Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F. 2d 191, 195 (CA5 1973) (no
black candidates elected); Wallace v. House, 515 F. 2d 619,
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623 vacated on other grounds, 425 U. S. 947 (1975) (one black
candidate elected).
I do not propose that consistent and virtually proportional
black electoral success should always, as a matter of law, bar
finding a § 2 violation. But, as a general rule, such success is
entitled to great weight in evaluating whether a challenged
electoral mechanism has, on the totality of the circumstances,
operated to deny black voters an equal opportunity to participate and to elect. With respect to House District 23, the
District Court's failure to accord black electoral success such
weight was clearly erroneous, and the District Court identified no reason for not giving this degree of success preclusive
effect. Accordingly, I would hold that appellees failed toestablish a violation of § 2 in District 23.
IV
Congress believed that codification of the "results" test in
§ 2 would "clearly establish the standards for proving a violation of that section." S. Rep. 2. Unfortunately, the "results" test as interpreted by the Court today is instead
typified by the "unknown contours and unforeseeable consequences" Congress sought to avoid by relying on the "reliable
and reassuring track record of court decisions using the ["results"] standard." S. Rep. 31, 32. Because I think that the
"results" test is not as standardless as the Court would have
it, I do not join the Court's opinion. Because the District
Court clearly erred in finding a violation of § 2 in House District 23, I dissent from the Court's affirmance of its judgment
in this respect.
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JusTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in part
and ~s~nting in part.
~ .L..V". In tli1s case, we are called upon to construe § 2 of the Vot~ ing Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982. Amended
.5 b C ,
§ 2 is intended to codify the "results" test employed in
1
~ £ArV
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124(1971), and White v.
I
$) +-Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and to reject the "intent" test
17 1 1
propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446
.
_ ··-r.,k
~ l..(/l..A/"U. S. 55 (1980). S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 27-28 (1982) (here~
inafter S. Rep.). Whereas Bolden required members of a
1
·
racial minority who alleged impairment of their voting
~
strength to prove that the challenged electoral system was
created or maintained with a discriminatory purpose and led
)
~
~ to discriminatory results, under the results test, "plaintiffs
I
may choose to establish discriminatory results without prov~
ing any kind of discriminatory purpose." S. Rep. 28. At
f 2..- ?
the same time, however, § 2 unequivocall disclaims the
~creation of a right to ropor 10na re resentation. This
di8claimerwase8sential to the compromise that resulted in
passage of the amendment. SeeS. Rep. 193-194 (Additional
Views of Senator Dole).
In construing this compromise legislation, we must make
every effort to be faithful to the al nee Con es s ruck.
This is not an easy task. We know that Congress intended
to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under § 2, but we

5 /w/--vL
/l

1 .

() ''

"JJE-

Lp
d-o../)

/')1.-(rr

{ {

9

-z . . p ,.,
f---;c;::?-Jr /_
./

~

~
J-o
1

o
t 4

,-.

83-196&--CONCUR/DISSENT
2

THORNBURG v. GINGLES

also know that Congress did not intend to create a right to
proportional representation for minority voters. There is an
inherent tension between what Con~nd
what it wis ed to avoid, because any theory of vote dilution

m~osomeexte~r
ity~tll.at

makes some re erence to the proportion betw~e~he_m1~ g:r,oup an the electora e a large.
In additiOn, severru important aspects of the "results" test
had received little attention in this Court's cases or in the
decisions of the courts of appeals employing that test on
which Congress also relied. See S. Rep. 32. Specifically,
the legal meaning to be given to the conce ts of "racial bloc
voting an mmority voting strength" had been left largely
Uniddressed by~§ 2 was~iilended.
·
~resolve all these difficulties today.
Fi , the Court supplies definitions of racial bloc voting and
minority voting strength that will apparently be applicable in
all cases and that will dictate the structure of vote dilution
fl.::ec;;'ntl\ the Court
adopts a test, based on the
litigation. ~
--...___...___;~
level of minority electoral success, for determining when an
electoral scheme has sufficiently diminished minority voting
strength to constitute vote dilution. ~~ in light of its
definition of racial bloc voting, the Court approves the use of
statistical evidence of divergent rac!al voting patterns and
holaS: that t e reasons fi)lothe !Vergence are irrelevant .
...._ Fourth although the Court does not acknowledge it expressly, the combination of the Court's definition of minority
. voting strength and its test for vote dilution results in the
creation of a ri ht to a form of proportional representatioriin
favor of all eo a hically and poh 1ca ly coHesive minority
group§ that are large enough to constltu e maJOr! 1es 1f
concentrated within one or more single-member districts.
In so doing, the Court has disregarded the balance struck by
Congress in amending § 2 and has failed to apply the results
test as described by this Court in Whitcomb and White.

I
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In order to explain my disagreement with the Court's
interpretation of § 2, it is useful to illustrate the impact that
alternative districting plans or types of districts typically
have on the likelihood that a minority group will be able to
elect candidates it prefers, and then to to set out the critical
elements of a vote dilution claim as they emerge in the
Court's opinion.
Consider a town of 1000 voters that is is governed by a
council of four representatives, in which 30% of the voters
are black, and in which the black voters are concentrated in
one section of the city and tend to vote as a bloc. It would be
possible to draw four single-member districts, in one of which
blacks would constitute an overwhelming majority. The
black voters in this district would be assured of electing a
representative of their choice, while any remaining black
voters in the other districts would be submerged in large
white majorities. This option would give the minority group
roughly proportional representation.
Alternatively, it would usually be possible to draw four
single-member districts in two of which black voters constituted much narrower majorities of about 60%. The black
voters in these districts would often be able to elect the
representative of their choice in each of these two districts ,
but if even 20% of the black voters supported the candidate
favored by the white minority in those districts the candidates preferred by the majority of black voters might lose.
This option would, depending on the circumstances of a
particular election, sometimes give the minority group more
than proportional representation, but would increase the risk
that the group would not achieve even roughly proportional
representation.
It would also usually be possible to draw four singlemember districts in each of which black voters constituted a
minority. In the extreme case, black voters would constitute 30% of the voters in each district. Unless approxi-
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mately 30% of the white voters in this extreme case backed
the minority candidate, black voters in such a district would
be unable to elect the candidate of their choice even if they
unanimously supported him. This option would make it difficult for black voters to elect candidates of their choice even
with significant white support, and all but impossible without
such support.
Finally, it would be possible to elect all four representatives in a single at-large election in which each voter could
vote for four candidates. Under this scheme, white voters
could elect all the representatives even if black voters turned
out in large numbers and voted for one and only one candidate. To illustrate, if only four white candidates ran, and
each received approximately equal support from white voters, each would receive about 700 votes, whereas black voters could cast no more than 300 votes for any one candidate.
If, on the other hand, eight white candidates ran, and white
votes were distributed less evenly, so that the five least
favored white candidates received fewer than 300 votes while
three others received 400 or more, it would be feasible for
blacks to elect one representative with 300 votes even without substantial white support. If even 25% of the white voters backed a particular minority candidate, and black voters
voted only for that candidate, the candidate would receive a
total of 475 votes, which would ensure victory unless white
voters also concentrated their votes on four of the eight
remaining candidates, so that each received the support of
almost 70% of white voters. As thes~w, the
at-large or multimember district as an in eren t
o
su~~rity. The minority group's
prospects for electoral success under such a district heavily
depend on a variety of factors such as voter turnout, how
many candidates run, how evenly white support is spread,
how much white support is given to a candidate or candidates
preferred by the minority group, and the extent to which
minority voters engage in "bullet voting" (which occurs when

I
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voters refrain from casting all their votes to avoid the risk
that by voting for their lower-ranked choices they may give
those candidates enough votes to defeat their higher-ranked
choices, see ante, at--, n. 5).
There is no difference in principle between the varying
effects of the alternatives outlined above and the varying
effects of alternative single-district plans and multimember
districts. The type of districting selected and the way in
which district lines are drawn can have a powerful effect on
the likelihood that members of a geographically and politically cohesive minority group will be able to elect candidates
of their choice.
Although § 2 does not speak in terms of "vote dilution,"__l
agree with the Court that roof of vote dilution can establish
a violation Q.f § ~s ~Ill@ded. The phrase vo e dilutwn, in
theregar-Sen.ge,-simply-refers to the impermissible discriminatory effect that a multimember or other districting plan
has when it operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting
strength of racial groups." White, 412 U. S., at 765. See
also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965). This defi~n, however, conceals some very formidable difficul_ties.
Is the "voting strengtii" of a racial group to be assessed solely
with reference to its prospects for electoral success, or should
courts look at other avenues of political influence open to the
racial group? Insofar as minority voting strength is assessed with reference to electoral success, how should undiluted minority voting strength be measured? How much of
an impairment of minority voting strength is necessary to
prove a violation of § 2? What constitutes racial bloc voting
and how is it proved? What weight is to be given to evidence of actual electoral success by minority candidates in
the face of evidence of racial bloc voting?
The Court resolves the first question summarily: minority
voting strength is to be assessed solely in terms of the minority group's ability to elect candidates it prefers. Ante, at
-----(Circulating Draft 13-14). Under this approach,

r
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the essence of a vote dilution claim is that the State has
created single-member or multimember districts that
unacceptably impair the minority group's ability to elect the
candidates its members prefer.
In order to evaluate a claim that a particular multimember
district or single-member district has diluted the minority
group's voting strength to a degree that violates § 2, however, it is also necessary to construct a measure of "undiluted" minority voting strength. "[T]he phrase [vote dilution] itself suggests a norm with respect to which the fact of
dilution may be ascertained." Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, - - U. S. - - , - - (1984)
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from summary affirmance). Put
simply, in order to decide whether an electoral system has
made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates
they prefer, a court must have an idea in mind of how hard it
"should" be for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an acceptable system.
Several possible measures of "undiluted" minority voting
strength suggest themselves. First, a court could simply
use proportionality as its guide: if the minority group constituted 30% of the voters in a given area, the court would regard the minority group as having the potential to elect 30%
of the representatives in that area. Second, a court could
posit some alternative districting plan as a "normal" or "fair"
electoral scheme and attempt to calculate how many candidates preferred by the minority group would probably be
elected under that scheme. There are, as we have seen, a
variety of ways in which even single-member districts could
be drawn, and each will present the minority group with its
own array of electoral risks and benefits; the court might,
therefore, consider a range of acceptable plans in attempting
to estimate "undiluted" minority voting strength by this
method. Third, the court could attempt to arrive at a plan
that would maximize feasible minority electoral success, and
use this degree of predicted success as its measure of "undi-
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luted" minority voting strength. If a court were to employ
this third alternative, it would often face hard choices about
what would truly "maximize" minority electoral success. An
example is the scenario described above, in which a minority
group could be concentrated in one completely safe district or
divided among two districts in each of which its members
would constitute a somewhat precarious majority.
The Court t a
a a
ted a va · t of the , third ap- \
proach, to wit, ndiluted minority votin st en h means the
maximumfeasible minority voting strength. In explaining
the elemen s o a vo e 1 u wn c a1m, t e Court first states
that "the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it
is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute
a majority in a single-member district." Ante, at - (Circulating Draft 15). If not, apparently the minority
group has no cognizable claim under § 2. Second, "the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive, that is, that a significant proportion of the minority
group supports the same candidates." Ante, a t - - (Circulating Draft 16). Third, the Court requires the minority
group to "demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances ... -usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Ante, at - - (Circulating Draft 16). If these
three requirements are met, "the minority group demonstrates that submergence in a white multimember district impedes its ability to elect its chosen representatives." Ibid.
That is to say, the minority group has proven vote dilution in
violation of §),
The Couft's definition of the elements of a vote dilution
claim is SIJEple and iJ;"va~ble: a court should calculate minority voting strength by assuming that the minority group is
concentrated in a single-member district in which it constitutes a voting majority. Where the minority group is not
large enough, geographically concentrated enough, or politically cohesive enough for this to be possible, the minority
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group's claim fails. Where the minority group meets these
requirements, the representatives that it could elect in the
hypothetical district or districts in which it constitutes a majority will serve as the measure of its undiluted voting
strength. Whatever plan the State actually adopts must be
assessed in terms of the effect it has on this undiluted voting
strength. If this is indeed the single, universal standard for
evaluating undiluted minority voting strength for vote dilution purposes, the standard is applicable whether what is
challenged is a multimember district or a particular singlemember districting scheme.
The Court's statement of the elements of a vote dilution
claim also supplies an answer to another question posed
above: how much of an impairment of undiluted minority voting strength is necessary to prove vote dilution. The Court
requires the minority group that satisfies the threshold requirements of size and cohesiveness to prove that it will usually be unable to elect as many representatives of its choice
under the challenged districting scheme as its undiluted
voting strength would permit. This requirement, then, constitutes the true test of vote dilution. Again, no reason
appears why this test would not be applicable to a vote dilution claim challenging single-member as well as multimember
1 districts.
~~ 1 This measure of vote il ion, taken in conjunction with
~ ~ the ourt's standard for measuring undiluted minority voting
strength, creates what amounts to a ''i ht"to usual, roughly
proportional
resentation on the art of sizeable, compact,
cohes~ity_gr~s. If, under a particular- multimember or singfe-member district plan, qualified minority
groups usually cannot elect the representatives they would
be likely to elect under the most favorable single-member
districting plan, then § 2 is violated. Unless minority
success under the challenged electoral system regularly approximates this rough version of proportional representation,
that system dilutes minority voting strength and violates § 2.

re
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To appreciate the implications of this approach, it is useful
to return to the illustration of a town with four council representatives given above. Under the Court's approach, if the
black voters who comprise 30% of the town's voting population do not usually succeed in electing one representative of
their choice, then regardless of whether the town employs atlarge elections or is divided into four single-member districts,
its electoral system violates § 2. Moreover, if the town had a
black voting population of 40%, on the Court's reasoning the
black minority, so long as it was geographically and politically cohesive, would be entitled usually to elect two of the
four representatives, since it would normally be possible to
create two districts in which black voters constituted safe
majorities of approximately 80%.
To be sure, the Court also re uires that plaintiffs prove
that racial bloc voting by t e
a· ont mterac s w1th
the challen ed 1stnctin 1 n so as usually to defeat the minonty's pre erred candidate. In
___..fact, however, this requirement adds little that is not already contained in the Court's
requir~hat the minority group be politically cohesive
and that its preferred candidates usually lose. As the Court
acknowledges, under its approach, "in general, a white bloc
vote that normally will defeat the c_9mbined stre.ng_th of mino~ plus white 'crossover' votes rises to the level
of legally significant white bloc voting." Ante, at - (Circulating Draft 21). But this is to define legally significant bloc voting by the racial majority in terms of the extent
of the racial minority's electoral success. If the minority can
prove that it could constitute a majority in a single-member
district, that it supported certain candidates and that those
candidates have not usually been elected, then a finding that
there is "legally significant white bloc voting" will necessarily
follow. Otherwise, by definition, those candidates would
usually have won rather than lost.
It might be suggested that there could be explanations
other than race-based white bloc voting for the defeat of

I
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minority candidates. Under the Court's approach, however,
it does not matter fWJiY) wmte vOters refUse to ~te _for the
can~-riY t e mmonty.
nte, at - - (Circulating ra t 27).
a es other than a lack of white sup~ would also apparenti"YOeaeemea-nT!~levant to the -iote
dilution inqu~nder the Court's analysis. For example,
CJ:> poor financing4i'i>oor turnout would often simply reflect the
minority group's lower socio-economic status, and consequently could not reduce the weight given to evidence that
white voters did not support minority candidates in sufficient
numbers to prevent them from usually being defeated.
As ~d by the Court today, then, the basic contours of
e dihlfionciru:rnreliire no reference o mos o the
"Z ·mmer factors that were develope by e 1
1rcuit
to implement White's results test and which were highlighted
in the Senate Report. S. Rep. 28-29; see Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. 8. 636 (1976)
(per curiam). If a minority group is politically and geographically cohesive and large enough to constitute a voting
majority in one or more single-member districts, then unless
white voters usually support the minority's preferred candidates in sufficient numbers to enable the minority group to
elect as many of those candidates as it could elect in such
hypothetical districts, it will routinely follow that a vote dilution claim can be made out, and the multimember district will
be invalidated. There is simply no need for plaintiffs to establish "the history of voting-related discrimination in the
state or political subdivision," ante, at - - (Circulating
Draft 11), or "the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group," ibid., or "the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes," ibid., or "the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of
past discrimination in areas such as education, employment,

•
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and health," ibid., or "the use of overt or subtle racial appeals
in political campaigns," ibid., or that "elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority group." Ante, at-- (Circulating Draft 12). Of
course, these other factors may be supportive of such a claim,
because they may strengthen a court's confidence that minority voters will be unable to overcome the relative disadvantage at which they are placed by a particular districting
plan, or suggest a more general lack of opportunity to participate in the political process. But the fact remains that
electoral success has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and that the elements of a vote dilution claim create an entitlement to
roughly proportional re resentation within the framework of
singe-member 1str1cts.
-----..
II

In my view, the ~t for measuring minority voting
strength and its test for vote dilution, operating in tandem,
come closer to an abso e e i
e t of roportional re resentation than Con ess intended when it codified the results
test in § 2. It is not necessary or appropriate to decide in
this case whether § 2 requires a uniform measure of undiluted
minority voting strength in every case, nor have appellants
challenged the standard employed by the District Court for
assessing undiluted minority voting strength.
In this case, the District Court seems to have taken an approach quite similar to the Court's in making its preliminary
assessment of undiluted minority voting strength:
"At the time of the creation of these multi-member districts, there were concentrations of black citizens within
the boundaries of each that were sufficient in numbers
and contiguity to constitute effective voting majorities
in single-member districts lying wholly within the
boundaries of the multi-member districts, which singlemember districts would satisfy all constitutional require-

I
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ments of population and geographical configuration."
590 F. Supp. 345, 358-359 (ED N. Car. 1984).
The Court goes well

be~ply _sustaining

_the !district

Court~oy this measure of undiluted minority

voti~ strellgth as a reasonable one that is consistent with
§ 2. In my view, we should refrain from deciding in this
case whether a court must invariably posit as its measure of
"undiluted" minority voting strength single-member districts
in which minority group members constitute a majority.
There is substantial doubt that Congress intended "undiluted
minority voting strength" to mean "maximum feasible minority voting strength." Even if that is the appropriate definition in some circumstances, I am unsure that Congress intended to mandate a single, universally applicable standard
for measuring undiluted minority voting strength, regardless
of local conditions and regardless of the extent of past
discrimination against minority voters in a particular State or
political subdivision. Since appellants have not raised the
issue, I would assume that what the District Court did here
was permissible under § 2, and leave open the broader question whether § 2 requires this approach.
What appellants do contest is the propriety of the District
Court's standard for vote dilution. Appellants claim that the
District Court held that "[a]lthough blacks had achieved considerable success in winning state legislative seats in the
challenged districts, their failure to consistently attain the
number of seats that numbers alone would presumptively
give them (i. e., in proportion to their presence in the population)," standing alone, constituted a violation of § 2. Brief
for Appellants 20 (emphasis in original). This holding, appellants argue, clearly contravenes § 2's proviso that "nothing
in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in
the population." 42 U. S. C. § 1973.
I believe appellants' characterization of the District Court's
holding is incorrect.
n my view, the D1stnct Court con---...

I
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eluded that there was a severe diminution in the prospects
for black electoral success in each of the challenged districts,
as compared to single-member districts in which blacks could
constitute a majority, and that this severe diminution was in
large part attributable to the interaction of the multimember
form of the district with persistent racial bloc voting on the
part of the white majorities in those districts. See 590 F.
Supp., at 372. * The District Court attached great weight
to this circumstance as one part of its ultimate finding that
"the creation of each of the multi-member districts challenged
in this action results in the black registered voters of that district being submerged as a voting minority in the district and
thereby having less opportunity than do other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice." !d., at 374. But the
District Court's extensive op~arly relies as well on a
variety of the othqrZtmmer factoxs/as the Court's thorough
summary of the Distriet eourt's findings indicates. See
ante, a t - - - - - (Circulating Draft 5-8).
If the District Court had held that the challenged
multimember districts violated § 2 solely because blacks had
not consistently attained seats in proportion to their presence
in the population, its holding would clearly have been inconsistent with § 2's disclaimer of a right to proportional representation. Surely Congress did not intend to say, on the one (
hand, that members of a protected class have no right to proportional representation, and on the other, that any consistent failure to achieve proportional representation, without
more, violates § 2. A requirement that minority representation usually be proportional to the minority group's propor*At times , the District Court seems to have looked to simple proportionality rather than to hypothetical single-member districts in which black
voters would constitute a majority. See, e. g., 590 F. Supp., at 367. Nowhere in its opinion, however, did the District Court state that§ 2 requires
that minority groups consistently attain the level of electoral success that
would correspond with their proportion of the total or voting population.
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tion in the population is not quite the same as a right to strict
proportional representation, but it comes so close to such a
right as to be inconsistent with § 2's disclaimer and with the
results test that is codified in § 2. In the words of Senator
Dole, the architect of the compromise that resulted in passage of the amendments to § 2:
"[t]he language of the subsection explicitly rejects, as did
White and its progeny, the notion that members of a protected class have a right to be elected in numbers equal
to their proportion of the population. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected
under the challenged practice or structure is just one factor, among the totality of circumstances to be considered, and is not dispositive." S. Rep. 194 (Additional
Views of Sen. Dole).
Jt On the sa~ reasoning, I would r~he Court's test for
vote dilution. The Court measures undiluted minorityv otin~ by reference to the possibility of creating singlemember districts in which the minority group would constitute a majority, rather than by looking to raw proportionality
alone. The Court's standard for vote dilution, when combined with its test for undiluted minority voting strength,
makes actionable every deviation from usual, rough proportionality in representation for any cohesive minority group as
to which this degree of proportionality is feasible within the
framework of single-member districts. This approach is inconsistent with the results test and with § 2's disclaimer of a
right to proportional representation.
In enacting § 2, Congress codified the "results" test this~
Court had employed, as an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in White and Whitcomb. The factors developed by the Fifth~uit and reliedOn by the Senate Report
simply fill in the contours of the "results" test as described in
those decisions, and do not purport to redefine or alter the
ultimate showing of discriminatory effect required by
Whitcomb and White. In my view, therefore, it is to

11
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Whitcomb and White that we should look in the first instance
in ~w great an im airment of minority voting
strength is required to estab 1s vo dilution in vwlatwn of
----=--§2.
This C
cently discussed this very point. In
Davis . Bandemer No. 84-1244, - - U. S. - - , - (1986) ( ·
raft 17), the Court stated:
"In cases involving individual multi-member districts,
we have required a substantially greater showing of adverse effects than a mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution. Only where there is evidence that excluded
groups have 'less opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice' have
we refused to approve the use of multi-member districts.
Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U. S., at 624. See also
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, supra, 430
U. S., at 167; White v. Regester, supra, 412 U. S., at
765-766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, 403 U. S. , at 150.
In these cases, we have also noted the lack of responsiveness by those elected to the concerns of the relevant
groups. See Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U. S. , at
625-629; White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 766-767."
Indeed, "in determining the constitutionality of multimember districts challenged as racial gerrymanders, we have
rejected the view that 'any group with distinctive interests
must be represented in legislative halls if it is numerous
enough to command at least one seat and represents a minority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single
member district.' Whitcomb, supra, 403 U. S., at 156."
Davis v. Bandemer, supra, at - - (Circulating Draft 22).
To the contrary, "[i]n the individual multi-member district
cases, we have found equal protection violations only where a
history of disproportionate results appeared in conjunction
with strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of
fair representation. In those cases, the racial minorities as-
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serting the successful equal protection claims had essentially
been shut out of the political process." I d., at - - (Circulating Draft 25) (internal citation omitted).
When Congress amended § 2 it intended to ru:}opt this
"r~;-wrufe ab~iidoning the additional showing of
discrimi~tory intent required by Bolden. The '~ote dilution
analysis \adopted by the Court today clearly bears little resemblance to the "results" test as described in Whitcomb,
White, and Davis v. Bandemer, and is equally inconsistent
with § 2. Nothing in Whitcomb, White, or the language and
legislative history of § 2 supports the Court's creation of a
right to usual, roughly proportional representation on the
part of every geographically concentrated, politically cohesive minority group that could constitute a majority in one or
more single-member districts.
I would adhere to the ap roach outlined in Whitcomb and
White an o owed, WI some elaboration, in Zimmer and
other cases in the courts of appeals prior to Bolden. Under
that approach, a court should consider all relevant factors
bearing on whether the minority group has "less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."
42 U. S. C. § 1973 (emphasis added). The court should not
focus solely on the minority group's ability to elect representatives of its choice. Whatever measure of undiluted minority voting strength the court employs in connection with evaluating the presence or absence of minority electoral success,
it should also bear in mind that "the power to influence the
political process is not limited to winning elections." Davis
v. Bandemer, supra, at - - (Circulating Draft 18)~
co~e relative lack of minority electoral success under a
challenged plan, when compared with the success that would
be predicted under the measure of undiluted minority voting
strength the court is employing, can constitute powerful evidence of vote dilution. Moreover, the minority group may in
fact lack access to or influence upon representatives it did not

-
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Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, supra, at

., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(Circulati~;:n;aft

9-10).

Nonetheless, a

rev~wi_!!g court

1£"-~g;i~to find more th~n simply tllatfnemrnority
elecgroup does not usuall attain an und1l d
7

toral success. The court must find that even substantia minortty-Success will be highly infrequent under the challenged
plan before it may conclude, on this basis alone, that the plan
operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of
[the] racial grou[p]." White, 412 U. 8., at 765.

Insofar _ statistical e'0l.ence f divergent racial voting
itted to e
· that the minorit
oup is
patfefif81
i and to assess its erospects for elec_ioral
poli · 1 success, a ee withtne Court that defendants cannot rebut
tl1i8Sho ·
y offerin evidence that the divergent racial
part by causes otfier
voting patterns may be explained
than race;ffiiehasanunderlying mVer ence iii the interests
of minority and white voters.
o not
ee, however, that
such evidence can never affect
ote dilutionm~ry, even under the Cou sown analysis. Evidence
at a
caooidate preferred by the minority group in a particular
election was rejected by white voters for reasons other than
those which made that candidate the preferred choice of the
minority group would seem clearly relevant in answering the
question whether bloc voting by white voters will consistently defeat minority candidates. Such evidence would suggest that another candidate, equally preferred by the minority group, might be able to attract greater white support in
future elections. I believe Congress also intended that explanations of the reasons why white voters rejected minority
candidates would be probative of the likelihood that candidates elected without decisive minority support would be
willing to take the minority's interests into account. In a
community that is polarized along racial lines, racial hostility

in
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may bar these indirect avenues of political influence to a
much greater extent than in a community where racial animosity is absent although the interests of racial groups
diverge.
In this case, as the Court grud ·n ly acknowledges, the
Distrietcourt clearl erre 1 aggregatmg dat from all of
the c a e
stricts, and then re ying on the fact that on
w 1 e voters did not vote for any black canrimary elections selected for study. Ante, at
- - , n. 24. Although Senate District 22 encompasses
House District 36, with that exception the districts at issue in
this case are distributed throughout the State of North
Carolina. White calls for "an intensely local appraisal of the
design and impact of the ... multimember district," 412
U. S., at 769-770, and racial voting statistics from one district are ordinarily irrelevant in assessing the totality of the
circumstances in another district. In ~fk evidence fr<m!__each district that the District Court also considered, however, I can'not say thatfu conclusion that thete was
SeVere racial bloc votin WaS clearly erroneOUS Wltfi regard to
any of the c allenged districts. Except in House District 23,
where racial bloc voting did not prevent sustained and virtu- .
ally proportional minority electoral success, I would accord- \
ingly leave u · turbed t
"strict
's decision to give
gre t weight to racial lo vo · in each of the challenged
~
districts.
IV
Having made usual, roughly proportional electoral success
the sole focus of its vote dilution analysis, the Court then
addresses the proper treatment of evidence of minority electoral successes. The Court holds that sustained electoral
success creat
rebuttable resump 10n that t e
or uni y of minority voters to elect representatl es of their choice
is equal to that of the majority." Ante, at-- (Circulating
Draft 42). HQwever, the Cour~ump
tion may b~ if "special circumstances" enabled the

.-
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minority group to elect its chosen candidates. Ibid. The
Court holds that this presumption is applicable to House District 23, in which a black candidate has been elected in each of
the last six elections, but remands to afford appellees an
opportunity to rebut the presumption, while declining to
specify what would suffice for rebuttal. See id., at - - ,
n. 34.

Elsewhere in its opinion, however, the Court states that
"special circumstances, such as the absence of an opponent,
incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may explain
minority electoral success in a polarized contest." Ante, at
- - (Circulating Draft 22) (footnote omitted). Whether or
not these special circumstances can be used to rebut the presumption that arises from consistent minority electoral success, it is clear that the Court believes that such circumstances would justify a court in disregarding or discounting
the election of a minority candidate in a particular election.
Moreover, the court may attach less weight to minority electoral success during the pendency of litigation if there is
evidence that white leaders may have given an unusual degree of organized support to minority candidates in an effort
to forestall court-ordered redistricting. Ante, at-- (Circulating Draft 41).
I agree with the Court that consistent and sustained electoral success by candidates preferred by minority voters jus' tifies a presumption that those voters enjoy an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. I do not agree, however,
that incumbency or an unopposed minority candidacy necessarily constitutes "special circumstances" that justify discounting that candidate's success. Indeed, this suggestio
seems completely inconsistent with the Court's own focus o
electoral success. In many instances the fact that a minorit
candidate runs unopposed may stem from the political power
of the minority group, not from powerlessness, for the white
majority may concede a seat simply because it would have lit-
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tle chance of winning it. Similarly, the fact that a black candidate who is preferred by black voters garners additional
support from white voters because he or she is an incumbent
should not, on the Court's own theory, eliminate the significance of that white support. At least so long as that incumbent continues to run for office, a candidate preferred by minority voters will have a good chance of attracting sufficient
support from them to win elections. Surely this electoral
success is relevant to the vote dilution inquiry even under the
Court's analysis.
Unlike the Court, I believe that the District Court erred in
assessing the extent of black electoral success in House District 39 and Senate District 22, as well as in House District
23, where the Court acknowledges error. As the evidence
summarized by the Court in table form shows, ante, at--,
App. B, the degree of black electoral success differed widely
in the seven originally contested districts. In House District
8 and Senate District 2, neither of which is contested in this
Court, no black candidate had ever been elected to the offices
in question. In House District 21 and House District 36, the
only instances of black electoral success came in the two most
recent elections, one of which took place during the pendency
of this litigation. By contrast, in House District 39 and
Senate District 22, black successes, although intermittent,
dated back to 1974, and a black candidate had been elected in
each of these districts in three of the last five elections. Finally, in House District 23 a black candidate had been elected
in each of the last six elections.
The District Court, drawing no distinctions among these
districts for purposes of its findings, concluded that "the
overall results achieved to date at all levels of elective office
are minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the total
population." 590 F. Supp., at 367. The .Qistrict Co~rt
cl~ to the extent that it considered electoral success
in the aggregate, rather than in each of the challenged districts, since, as the Court states, "[t]he inquiry into the exist-

l
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ence of vote dilution is district-specific." Ante, at - - ,
n. 24 (Circulating Draft 24, n. 24). The Court asserts that
the District Court was free to regard the results of the 1982
elections with suspicion and to decide "on the basis of all the
relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to blacks'
relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections," ante, at - - (Circulating Draft 41), but the Court
does not explain how this technique would apply in Senate
District 22, where a black candidate was elected in three consecutive elections from 1974 to 1978, but no black candidate
was elected in 1982, or in House District 39, where black candidates were elected in 1974 and 1976 as well as in 1982.
Contrary to what the District Court thought, see 590 F.
Supp., at 367, these pre-1982 successes, which were proportional or nearly proportional to black population in these
three multimember districts, certainly lend some support for
a finding that black voters in these districts enjoy an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
Despite this error, I agree with the Court's conclusion
that, exc~t in House District 23, minority electoral"-Success
was notsufficien fre uent to "ustif a resumption ofequal
op ortum to
1c1
nd elect. The District ourt
foun tliat "in each of the challenged districts racial polarization in voting presently exists to a substantial or severe
degree, and ... in each district it presently operates to minimize the voting strength of black voters." 590 F. Supp., at
372. I cannot say that this finding was clearly erroneous
with respect to House District 39 or Senate District 22, particularly when taken together with the District Court's findings concerning the other Zimmer factors, and hence that
court's ultimate conclusion of vote dilution in these districts is
adequately supported.
This finding, however, is clearly erroneous with respect to
House District 23. Blacks comprise 36.3% of the population
in that district, and constitute 28.6% of the registered voters.
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In each of the six electi ns nee 1970 one of the three repre- -~
sentatives from · · 1ct has been a black. There is no
finding, or any reason even to suspect, that the successful
black candidates in District 23 did not in fact represent the
interests of black voters, and the District Court did not find
that black success in previous elections was aberrant.
Zimmer's caveat against necessarily foreclosing a vote
dilution claim on the basis of isolated black successes, 485
F. 2d, at 1307; seeS. Rep. 29, n. 115, cannot be pressed this
far. Indeed, the 23 court of appeals decisions on which the
Senate Report relied, and which are the best evidence of the
scope of this caveat, contain no example of minority electoral
success that even remotely approximates the consistent, decade-long pattern in District 23. See, e. g., Turner v.
McKeithen, 490 F. 2d 191 (CA5 1973) (no black candidates
elected); Wallace v. House, 515 F. 2d 619, vacated on other
grounds, 425 U. S. 947 (1975) (one black candidate elected).
I do not propose that consistent and virtually proportional
minority electoral success should always, as a matter of law,
bar finding a § 2 violation. But, as a general rule, such success is entitled to e
ei htTn evaluatin w her a challenge electoral mechanism has, on the totality Q[ th:_,circums c , opera e t e black voters an e ual opportunity
to participate in the olitical rocess and to e ec representatives o the1r choic .
ith respect to House District 23, the
Dis r1et Court's failure to accord black electoral success such
weight was clearly erroneous, and the District Court identified no reason for not giving this degree of success preclusive
effect. Accordingly, I agree with the Court that appellees
failed to establish a violation of § 2 in District 23.
I do not believe, however, that the fact that this Court is
construing § 2 as amended for the first time entitles appellees
to another chance to establish a violation of § 2. Describing
the weight to be given to evidence of consistent, nearly proportional minority electoral success in terms of a "presumption" does not alter the fact that appellees did not prove their
""t
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vote dilution claim. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, No. 84-1244
(Circulating Draft 28) (reversing and not remanding where
the District Court's findings do not surmount the threshold
requirement of an adverse effect articulated in that decision
with respect to challenges to partisan political gerrymandering). Accordingly, I would reverse as to District 23 without
remanding.
I am also baffled by the Court's willingness to leave open,
for resolution by the District Court on remand, appellees'
theory that "where black voters must depend on bullet voting
they do not enjoy the same opportunity to participate in the
political process or to elect representatives of their choice as
whites do," ante, at--, n. 35 (Circulating Draft 42, n. 35).
A minority group that elects a representative in election
after election in a multimember district, and that could do no
better under the Court's standard for measuring undiluted
minority voting strength, has suffered no diminution in voting strength under the Court's own definition. Where an
electoral system consistently permits a politically cohesive
minority group to exercise its full, undiluted voting strength,
it seems absurd to suggest that the minority group has been
denied an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process. Furthermore, it would indeed be strange if Congress, which reaffirmed that multimember districts are not
per se invalid, see S. Rep. 33, intended not only to treat antibullet voting laws as a suspect electoral practice because they
prevent the effective use of minority voting strength, see S.
Rep. 29, but simultaneously to condemn that very practice of
bullet voting by minority voters as a denial of equal opportunity to participate in the political process.
Compromise is essential to much if not most major federal
legislation, and confidence that the federal courts will enforce
} such compromises is m 1spe sa e o t e1r creation.
believe t a t e our o ay str1 es a ifferent balance than
Congress intended to when it codified the results test and
disclaimed any right to proportional representation under § 2.
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/:..'l For that reason, I do not ·oin t
urt's opinion. While I
c_yjoin the Court's · d
n ·n
, dissent from the its decision to remand for further proceedings on House District 23.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1968

LACY H. THORNBURG, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
RALPH GINGLES ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
[May -

, 1986]

JusTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part.
In this case, we are called upon to construe § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982. Amended
§ 2 is intended to codify the "results" test employed in
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), and White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and to reject the "intent" test
propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55 (1980). S. Rep. No. 97-417, pp. 27-28 (1982) (hereinafter S. Rep.). Whereas Bolden required members of a
racial minority who alleged impairment of their voting
strength to prove that the challenged electoral system was
created or maintained with a discriminatory purpose and led
to discriminatory results, under the results test, "plaintiffs
may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose." S. Rep. 28. At
the same time, however, § 2 unequivocally disclaims the
creation of a right to proportional representation. This
disclaimer was essential to the compromise that resulted in
passage of the amendment. See id., at 193-194 (Additional
Views of Sen. Dole).
In construing this compromise legislation, we must make
every effort to be faithful to the balance Congress struck.
This is not an easy task. We know that Congress intended
to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under § 2, but we
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also know that Congress did not intend to create a right to
proportional representation for minority voters. There is an
inherent tension between what Congress wished to do and
what it wished to avoid, because any theory of vote dilution
must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of minority voting strength that makes some reference to the proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large.
In addition, several important aspects of the "results" test
had received little attention in this Court's cases or in the
decisions of the Courts of Appeals employing that test on
which Congress also relied. See id., at 32. Specifically, the
legal meaning to be given to the concepts of "racial bloc voting" and "minority voting strength" had been left largely
unaddressed by the courts when § 2 was amended.
The Court attempts to resolve all these difficulties today.
First, the Court supplies definitions of racial bloc voting and
minority voting strength that will apparently be applicable in
all cases and that will dictate the structure of vote dilution
litigation. Second, the Court adopts a test, based on the
level of minority electoral success, for determining when an
electoral scheme has sufficiently diminished minority voting
strength to constitute vote dilution. Third, in light of its
definition of racial bloc voting, the Court approves the use of
statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns and
holds that the reasons for the divergence are irrelevant.
Fourth, although the Court does not acknowledge it expressly, the combination of the Court's definition of minority
voting strength and it& test for vote dilution results in the
creation of a right to a form of proportional representation in
favor of all geographically and politically cohesive minority
groups that are large enough to constitute majorities if
concentrated within one or more single-member districts.
In so doing, the Court has disregarded the balance struck by
Congress in amending § 2 and has failed to apply the results
test as described by this Court in Whitcomb and White.
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In order to explain my disagreement with the Court's
interpretation of§ 2, it is useful to illustrate the impact that
alternative districting plans or types of districts typically
have on the likelihood that a minority group will be able to
elect candidates it prefers, and then to set out the critical
elements of a vote dilution claim as they emerge in the
Court's opinion.
Consider a town of 1,000 voters that is governed by a council of four representatives, in which 30% of the voters are
black, and in which the black voters are concentrated in one
section of the city and tend to vote as a bloc. It would be
possible to draw four single-member districts, in one of which
blacks would constitute an overwhelming majority. The
black voters in this district would be assured of electing a
representative of their choice, while any remaining black
voters in the other districts would be submerged in large
white majorities. This option would give the minority group
roughly proportional representation.
Alternatively, it would usually be possible to draw four
single-member districts in two of which black voters constituted much narrower majorities of about 60%. The black
voters in these districts would often be able to elect the
representative of their choice in each of these two districts,
but if even 20% of the black voters supported the candidate
favored by the white minority in those districts the candidates preferred by the majority of black voters might lose.
This option would, depending on the circumstances of a
particular election, sometimes give the minority group more
than proportional representation, but would increase the risk
that the group would not achieve even roughly proportional ·
representation.
It would also usually be possible to draw four singlemember districts in each of which black voters constituted a
minority. In the extreme case, black voters would constitute 30% of the voters. in each district. Unless approxi-
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mately 30% of the white voters in this extreme case backed
the minority candidate, black voters in such a district would
be unable to elect the candidate of their choice in an election
between only two candidates even if they unanimously sup\ ported him. This option would make it difficult for black
voters to elect candidates of their choice even with significant
white support, and all but impossible without such support.
Finally, it would be possible to elect all four representatives in a single at-large election in which each voter could
vote for four candidates. Under this scheme, white voters
could elect all the representatives even if black voters turned
out in large numbers and voted for one and only one candidate. To illustrate, if only four white candidates ran, and
each received approximately equal support from white voters, each would receive about 700 votes, whereas black voters could cast no more than 300 votes for any one candidate.
If, on the other hand, eight white candidates ran, and white
votes were distributed less evenly, so that the five least
favored white candidates received fewer than 300 votes while
three others received 400 or more, it would be feasible for
blacks to elect one representative with 300 votes even without substantial white support. If even 25% of the white voters backed a particular minority candidate, and black voters
voted only for that candidate, the candidate would receive a
total of 475 votes, which would ensure victory unless white
voters also concentrated their votes on four of the eight
remaining candidates, so that each received the support of
almost 70% of white voters. As these variations show, the
at-large or multimember district has an inherent tendency to
submerge the votes of the minority. The minority group's
prospects for electoral success under such a district heavily
depend on a variety of factors such as voter turnout, how
many candidates run, how evenly white support is spread,
how much white support is given to a candidate or candidates
preferred by the minority group, and the extent to which
minority voters engage in "bullet voting" (which occurs when
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voters refrain from casting all their votes to avoid the risk
that by voting for their lower-ranked choices they may give
those candidates enough votes to defeat their higher-ranked
choices, see ante, at--, n. 5).
There is no difference in principle between the varying
effects of the alternatives outlined above and the varying
effects of alternative single-district plans and multimember
districts. The type of districting selected and the way in
which district lines are drawn can have a powerful effect on
the likelihood that members of a geographically and politically cohesive minority group will be able to elect candidates
of their choice.
Although § 2 does not speak in terms of "vote dilution," I
agree with the Court that proof of vote dilution can establish
a violation of§ 2 as amended. The phrase "vote dilution," in
the legal sense, simply refers to the impermissible discriminatory effect that a multimember or other districting plan
has when it operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting
strength of racial groups." White, 412 U. S., at 765. See
also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965). This definition, however, conceals some very formidable difficulties.
Is the "voting strength" of a racial group to be assessed solely
with reference to its prospects for electoral success, or should
courts look at other avenues of political influence open to the
racial group? Insofar as minority voting strength is assessed with reference to electoral success, how should undiluted minority voting strength be measured? How much of
an impairment of minority voting strength is necessary to
prove a violation of § 2? What constitutes racial bloc voting
and how is it proved? What weight is to be given to evidence of actual electoral success by minority candidates in
the face of evidence of racial bloc voting?
The Court resolves the first question summarily: minority
voting strength is to be assessed solely in terms of the minority group's ability to elect candidates it prefers. Ante, at
- - - - - (Circulating.Draft 13-14). Under this approach,
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the essence of a vote dilution claim is that the State has
created single-member or multimember districts that
unacceptably impair the minority group's ability to elect the
candidates its members prefer.
In order to evaluate a claim that a particular multimember
district or single-member district has diluted the minority
group's voting strength to a degree that violates § 2, however, it is also necessary to construct a measure of "undiluted" minority voting strength. "[T]he phrase [vote dilution] itself suggests a norm with respect to which the fact of
dilution may be ascertained." Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 469 U. S. 1002, 1012 (1984)
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from summary affirmance). Put
simply, in order to decide whether an electoral system has
made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates
they prefer, a court must have an idea in mind of how hard it
"should" be for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an acceptable system.
Several possible measures of "undiluted" minority voting
strength suggest themselves. First, a court could simply
use proportionality as its guide: if the minority group constituted 30% of the voters in a given area, the court would regard the minority group as having the potential to elect 30%
of the representatives in that area. Second, a court could
posit some alternative districting plan as a "normal" or "fair"
electoral scheme and attempt to calculate how many candidates preferred by the minority group would probably be
elected under that scheme. There are, as we have seen, a
variety of ways in which even single-member districts could
be drawn, and each will present the minority group with its
own array of electoral risks and benefits; the court might,
therefore, consider a range of acceptable plans in attempting
to estimate "undiluted" minority voting strength by this
method. Third, the court could attempt to arrive at a plan
that would maximize feasible minority electoral success, and
use this degree of predi~ted success as its measure of "undi-
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luted" minority voting strength. If a court were to employ
this third alternative, it would often face hard choices about
what would truly "maximize" minority electoral success. An
example is the scenario described above, in which a minority
group could be concentrated in one completely safe district or
divided among two districts in each of which its members
would constitute a somewhat precarious majority.
The Court today has adopted a variant of the third approach, to wit, undiluted minority voting strength means the
maximum feasible minority voting strength. In explaining
the elements of a vote dilution claim, the Court first states
that "the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it
is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute
a majority in a single-member district." Ante, at - (Circulating Draft 15). If not, apparently the minority
group has no cognizable claim that its ability to elect the representatives of its choice has been impaired. 1 Second, "the
The Court's claim that I suggest "that the ability of a minority group to
constitute a majority in a single-member district is not a threshold
requirment for a claim that the use of multimember districts impairs the
ability of minority voters who live within those districts to elect representatives," ante, at - - (Circulating Draft 51), is misplaced. Because the
plaintiffs in this case would meet that requirement, if indeed it exists, I
need not decide whether it is imposed by § 2. I note, however, the artificiality of the Court's distinction between claims that a minority group's
"ability to elect the representatives of [its] choice" has been impaired and
claims that "its ability to influence elections" has been impaired. Ante, at
- - , n. 12 (Circulating Draft 13, n. 12). It is true that a minority group
that could constitute a majority in a single-member district ordinarily has
the potential ability to elect representatives without white support, and
that a minority that could not constitute such a majority ordinarily does
not. But the Court recognizes that when the candidates preferred by a
minority group are elected in a multimember district, the minority group
has elected those candidates, even if white support was indispensable to
these victories. On the same reasoning, if a minority group that is not
large enough to constitute a voting majority in a single-member district can
show that white support would probably be forthcoming in some such district to an extent that would enable the election of the candidates its members prefer, that minority group would appear to have demonstrated that,
1
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minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive, that is, that a significant proportion of the minority
group supports the same candidates." Ante, at - - (Circulating Draft 16). Third, the Court requires the minority
group to "demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances ... -usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Ibid. (Circulating Draft 16). If these three
requirements are met, "the minority group demonstrates
that submergence in a white multimember district impedes
its ability to elect its chosen representatives." Ibid. That
is to say, the minority group has proved vote dilution in violation of§ 2.
The Court's definition of the elements of a vote dilution
claim is simple and invariable: a court should calculate minority voting strength by assuming that the minority group is
concentrated in a single-member district in which it constitutes a voting majority. Where the minority group is not
large enough, geographically concentrated enough, or politically cohesive enough for this to be possible, the minority
group's claim fails. Where the minority group meets these
requirements, the representatives that it could elect in the
hypothetical district or districts in which it constitutes a majority will serve as the measure of its undiluted voting
strength. Whatever plan the State actually adopts must be
assessed in terms of the effect it has on this undiluted voting
strength. If this is indeed the single, universal standard for
evaluating undiluted minority voting strength for vote dilution purposes, the standard is applicable whether what is
challenged is a multimember district or a particular singlemember districting scheme.
The Court's statement of the elements of a vote dilution
claim also supplies an answer to another question posed
above: how much of an impairment of undiluted minority votat least under this measure of its voting strength, it would be able to elect
some candidates of its choice.
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ing strength is necessary to prove vote dilution. The Court
requires the minority group that satisfies the threshold requirements of size and cohesiveness to prove that it will usually be unable to elect as many representatives of its choice
under the challenged districting scheme as its undiluted
voting strength would permit. This requirement, then, constitutes the true test of vote dilution. Again, no reason
appears why this test would not be applicable to a vote dilution claim challenging single-member as well as multimember
districts.
This measure of vote dilution, taken in conjunction with
the Court's standard for measuring undiluted minority voting
strength, creates what amounts to a right to usual, roughly
proportional representation on the part of sizeable, compact,
cohesive minority groups. If, under a particular multimember or single-member district plan, qualified minority
groups usually cannot elect the representatives they would
be likely to elect under the most favorable single-member
districting plan, then § 2 is violated. Unless minority
success under the challenged electoral system regularly approximates this rough version of proportional representation,
that system dilutes minority voting strength and violates § 2.
To appreciate the implications of this approach, it is useful
to return to the illustration of a town with four council representatives given above. Under the Court's approach, if the
black voters who comprise 30% of the town's voting population do not usually succeed in electing one representative of
their choice, then regardless of whether the town employs atlarge elections or is divided into four single-member districts,
its electoral system violates § 2. Moreover, if the town had a
black voting population of 40%, on the Court's reasoning the
black minority, so long as it was geographically and politically cohesive, would be entitled usually to elect two of the
four representatives, since it would normally be possible to
create two districts in which black voters constituted safe
majorities of approximately 80%.
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To be sure, the Court also requires that plaintiffs prove
that racial bloc voting by the white majority interacts with
the challenged districting plan so as usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. In fact, however, this requirement adds little that is not already contained in the Court's
requirements that the minority group be politically cohesive
and that its preferred candidates usually lose. As the Court
acknowledges, under its approach, "in general, a white bloc
vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white 'crossover' votes rises to the level
of legally significant white bloc voting." Ante, at - (Circulating Draft 21). But this is to define legally significant bloc voting by the racial majority in terms of the extent
of the racial minority's electoral success. If the minority can
prove that it could constitute a majority in a single-member
district, that it supported certain candidates and that those
candidates have not usually been elected, then a finding that
there is "legally significant white bloc voting" will necessarily
follow. Otherwise, by definition, those candidates would
usually have won rather than lost.
It might be suggested that there could be explanations
other than race-based white bloc voting for the defeat of
minority candidates. Under the Court's approach, however,
it does not matter why white voters refuse to vote for the
candidates preferred by the minority. Ante, a t - - (Circulating Draft 27). Causes other than a lack of white support would also apparently be deemed irrelevant to the vote
dilution inquiry under the Court's analysis. For example,
poor financing or poor turnout would often simply reflect the
minority group's lower socioeconomic status, and consequently could not reduce the weight given to evidence that
white voters did not support minority candidates in sufficient
numbers to prevent them from usually being defeated.
As shaped by the Court today, then, the basic contours of
a vote dilution claim require no reference to most of the
"Zimmer factors" that were developed by the Fifth Circuit
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to implement White's results test and which were highlighted
in the Senate Report. S. Rep. 28-29; see Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976)
(per curiam). If a minority group is politically and geographically cohesive and large enough to constitute a voting
majority in one or more single-member districts, then unless
white voters usually support the minority's preferred candidates in sufficient numbers to enable the minority group to
elect as many of those candidates as it could elect in such
hypothetical districts, it will routinely follow that a vote dilution claim can be made out, and the multimember district will
be invalidated. There is simply no need for plaintiffs to establish "the history of voting-related discrimination in the
State or political subdivision," ante, at - - (Circulating
Draft 11), or "the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group," ibid., or "the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes," ibid., or "the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of
past discrimination in areas such as education, employment,
and health," ibid., or "the use of overt or subtle racial appeals
in political campaigns," ibid., or that "elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority group." Ante, at-- (Circulating Draft 12). Of
course, these other factors may be supportive of such a claim,
because they may strengthen a court's confidence that minority voters will be unable to overcome the relative disadvantage at which they are placed by a particular districting
plan, or suggest a more general lack of opportunity to participate in the political process. But the fact remains that
electoral success has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and that the elements of a vote diluti.on claim create an entitlement to
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roughly proportional representation within the framework of
single-member districts.
II
In my view, the Court's test for measuring minority voting
strength and its test for vote dilution, operating in tandem,
come closer to an absolute requirement of proportional representation than Congress intended when it codified the results
test in § 2. It is not necessary or appropriate to decide in
this case whether § 2 requires a uniform measure of undiluted
minority voting strength in every case, nor have appellants
challenged the standard employed by the District Court for
assessing undiluted minority voting strength.
In this case, the District Court seems to have taken an approach quite similar to the Court's in making its preliminary
assessment of undiluted minority voting strength:
"At the time of the creation of these multi-member districts, there were concentrations of black citizens within
the boundaries of each that were sufficient in numbers
and contiguity to constitute effective voting majorities
in single-member districts lying wholly within the
boundaries of the multi-member districts, whi~h singlemember districts would satisfy all constitutional requirements of population and geographical configuration."
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 358-359 (ED
N. C. 1984).

The Court goes well beyond simply sustaining the District
Court's decision to employ this measure of undiluted minority
voting strength as a reasonable one that is consistent with
§ 2. In my view, we should refrain from deciding in this
case whether a court must invariably posit as its measure of
"undiluted" minority voting strength single-member districts
in which minority group members constitute a majority.
There is substantial doubt that Congress intended "undiluted
minority voting strength" to mean "maximum feasible minority voting strength." Even if that is the appropriate defini-
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/ tion in some circumstances, there is no indication that Congress intended to mandate a single, universally applicable
standard for measuring undiluted minority voting strength,
regardless of local conditions and regardless of the extent of
past discrimination against minority voters in a particular
State or political subdivision. Since appellants have not
raised the issue, I would assume that what the District Court
did here was permissible under § 2, and leave open the
broader question whether § 2 requires this approach.
What appellants do contest is the propriety of the District
Court's standard for vote dilution. Appellants claim that the
District Court held that "[a]lthough blacks had achieved considerable success in winning state legislative seats in the
challenged districts, their failure to consistently attain the
number of seats that numbers alone would presumptively
give them (i. e., in proportion to their presence in the population)," standing alone, constituted a violation of § 2. Brief
for Appellants 20 (emphasis in original). This holding, appellants argue, clearly contravenes § 2's proviso that "nothing
in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in
the population." 42 U. S. C. § 1973.
I believe appellants' characterization of the District Court's
holding is incorrect. In my view, the District Court concluded that there was a severe diminution in the prospects
for black electoral success in each of the challenged districts,
as compared to single-member districts in which blacks could
constitute a majority, and that this severe diminution was in
large part attributable to the interaction of the multimember
form of the district with persistent racial bloc voting on the
part of the white majorities in those districts. See 590 F.
Supp., at 372. 2 The District Court attached great weight to
2
At times , the District Court seems to have looked to simple proportionality rather than to hypothetical single-member districts in which black
voters would constitute a majority. See, e. g., 590 F. Supp., at 367. Nowhere in its opinion, however, did the District Court state that§ 2 requires
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this circumstance as one part of its ultimate finding that "the
creation of each of the multi-member districts challenged in
this action results in the black registered voters of that district being submerged as a voting minority in the district and
thereby having less opportunity than do other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice." /d., at 374. But the
District Court's extensive opinion clearly relies as well on a
variety of the other Zimmer factors, as the Court's thorough
summary of the District Court's findings indicates. See
ante, a t - - - - - (Circulating Draft 5-8).
If the District Court had held that the challenged
multimember districts violated § 2 solely because blacks had
not consistently attained seats in proportion to their presence
in the population, its holding would clearly have been inconsistent with § 2's disclaimer of a right to proportional representation. Surely Congress did not intend to say, on the one
hand, that members of a protected class have no right to proportional representation, and on the other, that any consistent failure to achieve proportional representation, without
more, violates § 2. A requirement that minority representation usually be proportional to the minority group's proportion in the population is not quite the same as a right to strict
proportional representation, but it comes so close to such a
right as to be inconsistent with § 2's disclaimer and with the
results test that is codified in § 2. In the words of Senator
Dole, the architect of the compromise that resulted in passage of the amendments to § 2:
"The language of the subsection explicitly rejects, as did
White and its progeny, the notion that members of a protected class have a right to be elected in numbers equal
to their proportion of the population. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected
that minority groups consistently attain the level of electoral success that
would correspond with their proportion of the total or voting population.
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under the challenged practice or structure is just one factor, among the totality of circumstances to be considered, and is not dispositive." S. Rep. 194 (Additional
Views of Sen. Dole).

I

On the same reasoning, I would reject the Court's test for
vote dilution. The Court measures undiluted minority voting strength by reference to the possibility of creating singlemember districts in which the minority group would constitute a majority, rather than by looking to raw proportionality
alone. The Court's standard for vote dilution, when combined with its test for undiluted minority voting strength,
makes actionable every deviation from usual, rough proportionality in representation for any cohesive minority group as
to which this degree of proportionality is feasible within the
framework of single-member districts. 3 This approach is inconsistent with the results test and with § 2's disclaimer of a
right to proportional representation.
3
The Court asserts that this fonnulation is an erroneous description of
its standard for vote dilution, ante, at-- (Circulating Draft 47), but the
Court never identifies the alleged error. The Court reiterates that "plaintiffs must demonstrate that despite the fact that they possess the potential
ability to elect representatives, due to the interaction of the multimember
structure and white bloc voting they have suffered substantial difficulty
over a course of time in electing candidates." Ante, at-- (Circulating
Draft 50). Reduced to its essentials, this means that if it would be feasible
to place the minority group in one or more single-member districts in which
it would constitute a majority, then the selection of a multimember district
violates § 2 if the minority group experiences "substantial difficulty over a
course of time" in electing as many candidates as it could elect under such
single-member districts. Requiring that every minority group that could
possibly constitute a majority in a single-member district be assigned to
such a district would approach a requirement of proportional representation as nearly as is possible within the framework of single-member districts. Since the Court's analysis entitles every such minority group usually to elect as many representatives under a multimember district as it
could elect under the most favorable single-member district scheme, it follows that the Court is requiring a form of proportional representation.
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In enacting § 2, Congress codified the "results" test this
Court had employed, as an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in White and Whitcomb. The factors developed by the Fifth Circuit and relied on by the Senate Report
simply fill in the contours of the "results" test as described in
those decisions, and do not purport to redefine or alter the
ultimate showing of discriminatory effect required by
Whitcomb and White. In my view, therefore, it is to
Whitcomb and White that we should look in the first instance
in determining how great an impairment of minority voting
strength is required to establish vote dilution in violation of
§2.
This Court has recently discussed this very point. In
Davis v. Bandemer, No. 84-1244, - - U.S. - - , - (1986) (Circulating Draft 17), the Court stated:
"In cases involving individual multi-member districts,
we have required a substantially greater showing of adverse effects than a mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution. Only where there is evidence that excluded
groups have 'less opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice' have
we refused to approve the use of multi-member districts.
Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U. S., at 624. See also
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, supra, 430
U. S., at 167; White v. Regester, supra, 412 U. S., at
765..,.766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, 403 U. S., at 150.
In these cases, we have also noted the lack of responsiveness by those elected to the concerns of the relevant
groups. See Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U. S., at
625-629; White v. Regester, 41? U. S., at 766-767."
Thus, the "results" test requires an inquiry not only into electoral success, but also into the extent of the minority group's
other opportunities to participate in the political processes.
See White, supra, at 766 ("(t]he plaintiffs' burden is to
produce evidence to support findings that the political proc-
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esses leading to nomination and election were not equally
open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legisFurthermore, while electoral
lators of their choice").
success is a central part of the vote dilution inquiry, White
held that to prove vote dilution "it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential," 412 U. S., at
765-766, and Whitcomb flatly rejected the proposition that
"any group with distinctive interests must be represented in
legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command at least
one seat and represents a minority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single member district." 403
U. S., at 156. To the contrary, the plaintiffs succeeded
under the "results" test in White only because ."a history of
disproportionate results appeared in conjunction with strong
indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation." Davis v. Bandemer, supra, at-- (Circulating
Draft 22); see White,V412 U. S., at 767, 769.
When Congress amended § 2 it intended to adopt this "results" test, while abandoning the additional showing of discriminatory intent required by Bolden. The vote dilution
analysis adopted by the Court today clearly bears little
resemblence to the "results" test that emerged in Whitcomb
and White. 4 The Court's test for vote dilution, combined
with· its standard for evaluating "voting potential," White,
supra, at 766, means that any racial minority with distinctive
interests must usually "be represented in legislative halls if
it is numerous enough to command at least one seat and represents a minority living in an area sufficiently compact to
constitute" a voting majority in "a single member district."
Whitcomb, 403 U. S., at 156. Nothing in Whitcomb, White,
or the language and legislative history of § 2 supports the
Court's creation of this right to usual, roughly proportional
representation on the part of every geographically compact,
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politically cohesive minority group that is large enough to
form a majority in one or more single-member districts.
I would adhere to the approach outlined in Whitcomb and
White and followed, with some elaboration, in Zimmer and
other cases in the Courts of Appeals prior to Bolden. Under
that approach, a court should consider all relevant ..factors
bearing on whether the minorit~ouR_ as "less opportunity
than other members of the el~ctorate to participate in the political prOCE;SS and to elect representatives of their choice."
42 U. S. C. § 1973 (emphasis added). The court should not
focus solely on the minority group's ability to elect representatives of its choice. Whatever measure of undiluted minority voting strength the court employs in connection with evaluating the presence or absence of minority electoral success,
it should also bear in mind that "the power to influence the
political process is not limited to winning elections." Davis
v. Bandemer, supra, at - - (Circulating Draft 18). Of
c~e, the relative lack of minority electoral success under a
cf1affimged plan, when compared with the success that would
be predicted under the measure of undiluted minority voting
strength the court is employing, c::gL_constitute 2owerful evidence of vote dilution. Moreover, the minority group may in
fact lack access to or influence upon repr~sentatives it did not
support as candidates. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, supra, at
--(POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(Circulating Draft 9-10). Nonetheless, a reviewing court
shQllld be required to find more than simply that the mino~ity
group does not usually attain an undiluted measure ~f elec-.
toral succe-l's. The court must find that even substantial minority success will be highly infrequent under the challenged
plan before it may conclude, on this basis alone, that the plan
operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of
[the] racial grou[p]." White, 412 U. S., at 765.

I

III
Insofar as statistical .evidence of divergent racial voting
patterns is admitted to establish that the minority group is
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politically cohesive and to assess its prospects for electoral
success, I agree with the Court that defendants cannot rebut
this showing by offering evidence that the divergent racial
voting patterns may be explained in part by causes other
than race, such as an underlying divergence in the interests
of minority and white voters. I do not agree, however, that
such evidence can never affect the overall vote dilution inquiry, even under the Court's own analysis. Evidence that a
candidate preferred by the minority group in a particular
election was rejected by white voters for reasons other than
those which made that candidate the preferred choice of the
minority group would seem clearly relevant in answering the
question whether bloc voting by white voters will consistently defeat minority candidates. Such evidence would suggest that another candidate, equally preferred by the minority group, might be able to attract greater white support in
future elections. I believe Congress also intended that explanations of the reasons why white voters rejected minority
candidates would be probative of the likelihood that candidates elected without decisive minority support would be
willing to take the minority's interests into account. In a
community that is polarized along racial lines, racial hostility
may bar these and other indirect avenues of political influence to a much greater extent than in a community where racial animosity is absent although the interests of racial
groups diverge. Indeed, the Senate Report clearly stated
that one factor that could have probative value in § 2 cases
was "whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on
the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group." S. Rep. 29. The overall
vote dilution inquiry neither requires nor permits an arbitrary rule against consideration of all evidence concerning
voting preferences other than statistical evidence of racial
voting patterns. Such a rule would give no effect whatever
to the Senate Report's repeated emphasis on "intensive racial
politics," on "racial political considerations," and on whether
"racial politics . . . dominate the electoral process" as one as-
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pect of the "racial bloc voting" that Congress deemed rele( vant to showing a § 2 violation. S. Rep. 33-34.
In this case, as the Court grudgingly acknowledges, the
District Court clearly erred in aggregating data from all of
the challenged districts, and then relying on the fact that on
average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the primary elections selected for study. Ante, at
- - , n. 24. Although Senate District 22 encompasses
House District 36, with that exception the districts at issue in
this case are distributed throughout the State of North
Carolina. White calls for "an intensely local appraisal of the
design and impact of the . . . multimember district," 412
U. S., at 769-770, and racial voting statistics from one district are ordinarily irrelevant in assessing the totality of the
circumstances in another district. In view of the specific evidence from each district that the District Court also considered, however, I cannot say that its conclusion that there was
severe racial bloc voting was clearly erroneous with regard to
any of the challenged districts. Except in House District 23,
where racial bloc voting did not prevent sustained and virtually proportional minority electoral success, I would accordingly leave undisturbed the District Court's decision to give
great weight to racial bloc voting in each of the challenged
districts.
IV
Having made usual, roughly proportional electoral success
the sole focus of its vote dilution analysis, the Court then
addresses the proper treatment of evidence of minority electoral successes. The Court holds that sustained electoral
success creates a rebuttable "presumption that the opportunity of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice
is equal to that of the majority." Ante, at-- (Circulating
Draft 42). However, the Court indicates that this presumption may be rebutted if "special circumstances" enabled the
minority group to elect its chosen candidates. Ibid. The
Court holds that this pr~sumption is applicable to House Dis-
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trict 23, in which a black candidate has been elected in each of
the last six elections, but remands to afford appellees an
opportunity to rebut the presumption, while declining to
specify what would suffice for rebuttal. See ante, at--,
n. 34.
Elsewhere in its opinion, however, the Court states that
"special circumstances, such as the absence of an opponent,
incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may explain
minority electoral success in a polarized contest." Ante, at
- - (Circulating Draft 22) (footnote omitted). Whether or
not these special circumstances can be used to rebut the presumption that arises from consistent minority electoral success, it is clear that the Court believes that such circumstances would justify a court in disregarding or discounting
the election of a minority candidate in a particular election.
Moreover, the court may attach less weight to minority electoral success during the pendency of litigation if there is
evidence that white leaders may have given an unusual degree of organized support to minority candidates in an effort
to forestall court-ordered redistricting. Ante, at-- (Circulating Draft 41).
I agree with the Court that consistent and sustained electoral success by candidates preferred by minority voters justifies a presumption that those voters enjoy an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. I do not agree, however,
that incumbency or an unopposed minority candidacy necessarily constitutes "special circumstances" that justify discounting that candidate's success. Indeed, this suggestion
seems completely inconsistent with the Court's own focus on
electoral success. In many instances the fact that a minority
candidate runs unopposed may stem from the political power
of the minority group, not from powerlessness, for the white
majority may concede a seat simply because it would have little chance of winning it. Similarly, the fact that a black candidate who is preferred. by black voters garners additional
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support from white voters because he or she is an incumbent
should not, on the Court's own theory, eliminate the significance of that white support. At least so long as that incumbent continues to run for office, a candidate preferred by minority voters will have a good chance of attracting sufficient
support from them to win elections. Surely this electoral
success is relevant to the vote dilution inquiry even under the
Court's analysis.
Unlike the Court, I believe that the District Court erred in
assessing the extent of black electoral success in House District 39 and Senate District 22, as well as in House District
23, where the Court acknowledges error. As the evidence
summarized by the Court in table form shows, ante, at--,
App. B, the degree of black electoral success differed widely
in the seven originally contested districts. In House District
8 and Senate District 2, neither of which is contested in this
Court, no black candidate had ever been elected to the offices
in question. In House District 21 and House District 36, the
only instances of black electoral success came in the two most
recent elections, one of which took place during the pendency
of this litigation. By contrast, in House District 39 and
Senate District 22, black successes, although intermittent,
dated back to 1974, and a black candidate had been elected in
each of these districts in three of the last five elections. Finally, in House District 23 a black candidate had been elected
in each of the last six elections.
The District Court, drawing no distinctions among these
districts for purposes of its findings, concluded that "[t]he
overall results achieved to date at all levels of elective office
are minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the total
population." 590 F. Supp., at 367. The District Court
clearly erred to the extent that it considered electoral success
in the aggregate, rather than in each of the challenged districts, since, as the Court states, "[t]he inquiry into the existence of vote dilution is district-specific." Ante, at - - ,
n. 24 (Circulating Draft. 24, n. 24). The Court asserts that
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the District Court was free to regard the results of the 1982
elections with suspicion and to decide "on the basis of all the
relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to blacks'
relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections," ante, at - - (Circulating Draft 41), but the Court
does not explain how this technique would apply in Senate
District 22, where a black candidate was elected in three consecutive elections from 1974 to 1978, but no black candidate
was elected in 1982, or in House District 39, where black candidates were elected in 1974 and 1976 as well as in 1982.
Contrary to what the District Court thought, see 590 F.
Supp., at 367, these pre-1982 successes, which were proportional or nearly proportional to black population in these
three multimember districts, certainly lend some support for
a finding that black voters in these districts enjoy an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
Despite this error, I agree with the Court's conclusion
that, except in House District 23, minority electoral success
was not sufficiently frequent to justify a presumption of equal
opportunity to participate and elect. The District Court
found that "in each of the challenged districts racial polarization in voting presently exists to a substantial or severe
degree, and ... in each district it presently operates to minimize the voting strength of black voters." I d., at 372. I
cannot say that this finding was clearly erroneous with respect to House District 39 or Senate District 22, particularly
when taken together with the District Court's findings concerning the other Zimmer factors, and hence that court's ultimate conclusion of vote dilution in these districts is adequately supported.
This finding, however, is clearly erroneous with respect to
House District 23. Blacks comprise 36.3% of the population
in that district, and constitute 28.6% of the registered voters.
In each of the six elections since 1970 one of the three representatives from this district has been a black. There is no
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finding, or any reason even to suspect, that the successful
black candidates in District 23 did not in fact represent the
interests of black voters, and the District Court did not find
that black success in previous elections was aberrant.
Zimmer's caveat against necessarily foreclosing a vote
dilution claim on the basis of isolated black successes, 485
F. 2d, at 1307; seeS. Rep. 29, n. 115, cannot be pressed this
far. Indeed, the 23 Court of Appeals decisions on which the
Senate Report relied, and which are the best evidence of the
scope of this caveat, contain no example of minority electoral
success that even remotely approximates the consistent, decade-long pattern in District 23. See, e. g., Turner v.
McKeithen, 490 F. 2d 191 (CA5 1973) (no black candidates
elected); Wallace v. House, 515 F. 2d 619 (CA5 1975), vacated on other grounds, 425 U. S. 947 (1976) (one black candidate elected).
I do not propose that consistent and virtually proportional
minority electoral success should always, as a matter of law,
bar finding a § 2 violation. But, as a general rule, such success is entitled to great weight in evaluating whether a challenged electoral mechanism has, on the totality of the circumstances, operated to deny black voters an equal opportunity
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. With respect to House District 23, the
District Court's failure to accord black electoral success such
weight was clearly erroneous, and the District Court identified no reason for not giving this degree of success preclusive
effect. Accordingly, I agree with the Court that appellees
failed to establish a violation of § 2 in District 23.
I do not believe, however, that the fact that this Court is
construing § 2 as amended for the first time entitles appellees
to another chance to establish a violation of § 2. Describing
the weight to be given to evidence of consistent, nearly proportional minority electoral success in terms of a "presumption" does not alter the fact that appellees did not prove their
vote dilution claim. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, No. 84-1244
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(Circulating Draft 28) (reversing and not remanding where
the District Court's findings do not surmount the threshold
requirement of an adverse effect articulated in that decision
with respect to challenges to partisan political gerrymandering). Accordingly, I would reverse as to District 23 without
remanding.
I am also baffled by the Court's willingness to leave open,
for resolution by the District Court on remand, appellees'
theory that "where black voters must depend on bullet voting
they do not enjoy the same opportunity to participate in the
political process or to elect representatives of their choice as
whites do," ante, at--, n. 35 (Circulating Draft 42, n. 35).
A minority group that elects a representative in election
after election in a multimember district, and that could do no
better under the Court's standard for measuring undiluted
minority voting strength, has suffered no diminution in voting strength under the Court's own definition. Where an
electoral system consistently permits a politically cohesive
minority group to exercise its full, undiluted voting strength,
it seems absurd to suggest that the minority group has been
denied an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process. Furthermore,. it would indeed be strange if Congress, which reaffirmed that multimember districts are not
per se invalid, see S. Rep. 33, intended not only to treat antibullet voting laws as a suspect electoral practice because they
prevent the effective use of minority voting strength, see id.,
at 29, but simultaneously to condemn that very practice of
bullet voting by minority voters as a denial of equal opportunity to participate in the political process.

v
When members of a racial minority challenge a
multimember district on the grounds that it dilutes their voting strength, I agree with the Court that they must show
that they possess such strength and that the multimember
district impairs it. A court must therefore appraise the mi-
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nority group's undiluted voting strength in order to assess
the effects of the multimember district. I would reserve the
question of the proper method or methods for making this assessmentl ~nce such an assessment is made, in my view the
evaluation of an alleged impairment of voting strength requires consideration of the minority group's access to the political processes generally, not solely consideration of the
chances that its preferred candidates will actually be elected.
Proof that white voters withhold their support from minority-preferred candidates to an extent that consistently ensures their defeat is entitled to significant weight in plaintiffs'
favor. However, if plaintiffs direct their proof solely towards the minority group's prospects for electoral success,
they must show that substantial minority success will be
highly infrequent under the challenged plan in order to establish that the plan operates to "cancel out or minimize" their
voting strength. White, 412 U. S., at 765.
Compromise is essential to much if not most major federal
legislation, and confidence that the federal courts will enforce
such compromises is indispensable to their creation. I believe that the Court today strikes a different balance than
Congress intended to when it codified the results test and
disclaimed any right to proportional representation under § 2.
For that reason, I do not join the Court's opinion. While I
join the Court's judgment in part, I dissent from the its decision to remand for further proceedings on House District 23.
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JusTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE, JusTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in
the judgment.
In this case, we are called upon to construe § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982. Amended
§ 2 is intended to codify the "results" test employed in
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), and White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and to reject the "intent" test
propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55 (1980). S. Rep. No. 97-417, pp. 27-28 (1982) (hereinafter S. Rep.). Whereas Bolden required members of a
racial minority who alleged impairment of their voting
strength to prove that the challenged electoral system was
created or maintained with a discriminatory purpose and led
to discriminatory results, under the results test, "plaintiffs
may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose." S. Rep. 28. At
the same time, however, § 2 unequivocally disclaims the
creation of a right to proportional representation. This
disclaimer was essential to the compromise that resulted in
passage of the amendment. See id., at 193-194 (Additional
Views of Sen. Dole).
In construing this compromise legislation, we must make
every effort to be faithful to the balance Congress struck.
This is not an easy task. We know that Congress intended

\

83- 196&-CONCUR

2

THORNBURG v. GINGLES

to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under § 2, but we
also know that Congress did not intend to create a right to
proportional representation for minority voters. There is an
inherent tension between what Congress wished to do and
what it wished to avoid, because any theory of vote dilution
must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of minority voting strength that makes some reference to the proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large.
In addition, several important aspects of the "results" test
had received little attention in this Court's cases or in the decisions of the Courts of Appeals employing that test on which
Congress also relied. See id., at 32. Specifically, the legal
meaning to be given to the concepts of "racial bloc voting"
and "minority voting strength" had been left largely unaddressed by the courts when § 2 was amended.
The Court attempts to resolve all these difficulties today.
First, the Court supplies definitions of racial bloc voting and
minority voting strength that will apparently be applicable in
all cases and that will dictate the structure of vote dilution
litigation. Second , the Court adopts a test, based on the
level of minority electoral success, for determining when an
electoral scheme has sufficiently diminished minority voting
strength to constitute vote dilution. Third, although the
Court does not acknowledge it expressly, the combination of
the Court's definition of minority voting strength and its test
for vote dilution results in the creation of a right to a form of
proportional representation in favor of all geographically and
politically cohesive minority groups that are large enough to
constitute majorities if concentrated within one or more single-member districts. In so doing, the Court has disregarded the balance struck by Congress in amending § 2 and
has failed to apply the results test as described by this Court
in Whitcomb and White.
I
In order to explain my disagreement with the Court's interpretation of§ 2, it is useful to illustrate the impact that al-
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ternative districting plans or types of districts typically have
on the likelihood that a minority group will be able to elect
candidates it prefers, and then to set out the critical elements
of a vote dilution claim as they emerge in the Court's opinion.
Consider a town of 1,000 voters that is governed by a council of four representatives, in which 30% of the voters are
black, and in which the black voters are concentrated in one
section of the city and tend to vote as a bloc. It would be
possible to draw four single-member districts, in one of which
blacks would constitute an overwhelming majority. The
black voters in this district would be assured of electing a
representative of their choice, while any remaining black voters in the other districts would be submerged in large white
majorities. This option would give the minority group
roughly proportional representation.
Alternatively, it would usually be possible to draw four
single-member districts in two of which black voters constituted much narrower majorities of about 60%. The black
voters in these districts would often be able to elect the
representative of their choice in each of these two districts,
but if even 20% of the black voters supported the candidate
favored by the white minority in those districts the candidates preferred by the majority of black voters might lose.
This option would, depending on the circumstances of a particular election, sometimes give the minority group more
than proportional representation, but would increase the risk
that the group would not achieve even roughly proportional
representation.
It would also usually be possible to draw four single-member districts in each of which black voters constituted a minority. In the extreme case, black voters would constitute
30% of the voters in each district. Unless approximately
30% of the white voters in this extreme case backed the minority candidate, black voters in such a district would be
unable to elect the candidate of their choice in an election
between only two candidates even if they unanimously sup-
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ported him. This option would make it difficult for black
voters to elect candidates of their choice even with significant
white support, and all but impossible without such support.
Finally, it would be possible to elect all four representatives in a single at-large election in which each voter could
vote for four candidates. Under this scheme, white voters
could elect all the representatives even if black voters turned
out in large numbers and voted for one and only one candidate. To illustrate, if only four white candidates ran, and
each received approximately equal support from white voters, each would receive about 700 votes, whereas black voters could cast no more than 300 votes for any one candidate.
If, on the other hand, eight white candidates ran, and white
votes were distributed less evenly, so that the five least favored white candidates received fewer than 300 votes while
three others received 400 or more, it would be feasible for
blacks to elect one representative with 300 votes even without substantial white support. If even 25% of the white voters backed a particular minority candidate, and black voters
voted only for that candidate, the candidate would receive a
total of 475 votes, which would ensure victory unless white
voters also concentrated their votes on four of the eight
remaining candidates, so that each received the support of
almost 70% of white voters. As these variations show, the
at-large or multimember district has an inherent tendency to
submerge the votes of the minority. The minority group's
prospects for electoral success under such a district heavily
depend on a variety of factors such as voter turnout, how
many candidates run, how evenly white support is spread,
how much white support is given to a candidate or candidates
preferred by the minority group, and the extent to which minority voters engage in "bullet voting" (which occurs when
voters refrain from casting all their votes to avoid the risk
that by voting for their lower-ranked choices they may give
those candidates enough votes to defeat their higher-ranked
choices, see ante, at - - , n. 5).
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There is no difference in principle between the varying
effects of the alternatives outlined above and the varying
effects of alternative single-district plans and multimember
districts. The type of districting selected and the way in
which district lines are drawn can have a powerful effect on
the likelihood that members of a geographically and politically cohesive minority group will be able to elect candidates
of their choice.
Although § 2 does not speak in terms of "vote dilution," I
agree with the Court that proof of vote dilution can establish
a violation of§ 2 as amended. The phrase "vote dilution," in
the legal sense, simply refers to the impermissible discriminatory effect that a multimember or other districting plan
has when it operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting
strength of racial groups." White, 412 U. S., at 765. See
also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965). This definition, however, conceals some very formidable difficulties.
Is the "voting strength" of a racial group to be assessed solely
with reference to its prospects for electoral success, or should
courts look at other avenues of political influence open to the
racial group? Insofar as minority voting strength is assessed with reference to electoral success, how should undiluted minority voting strength be measured? How much of
an impairment of minority voting strength is necessary to
prove a violation of § 2? What constitutes racial bloc voting
and how is it proved? What weight is to be given to evidence of actual electoral success by minority candidates in
the face of evidence of racial bloc voting?
The Court resolves the first question summarily: minority
voting strength is to be assessed solely in terms of the minority group's ability to elect candidates it prefers. Ante, at
- - - - - . Under this approach, the essence of a vote dilution claim is that the State has created single-member or
multimember districts that unacceptably impair the minority
group's ability to elect the candidates its members prefer.
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In order to evaluate a claim that a particular multimember
district or single-member district has diluted the minority
group's voting strength to a degree that violates § 2, however, it is also necessary to construct a measure of "undiluted" minority voting strength. "[T]he phrase [vote dilution] itself suggests a norm with respect to which the fact of
dilution may be ascertained." Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 469 U. S. 1002, 1012 (1984)
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from summary affirmance). Put
simply, in order to decide whether an electoral system has
made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates
they prefer, a court must have an idea in mind of how hard it
"should" be for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an acceptable system.
Several possible measures of "undiluted" minority voting
strength suggest themselves. First, a court could simply
use proportionality as its guide: if the minority group constituted 30% of the voters in a given area, the court would regard the minority group as having the potential to elect 30%
of the representatives in that area. Second, a court could
posit some alternative districting plan as a "normal" or "fair"
electoral scheme and attempt to calculate how many candidates preferred by the minority group would probably be
elected under that scheme. There are, as we have seen, a
variety of ways in which even single-member districts could
be drawn, and each will present the minority group with its
own array of electoral risks and benefits; the court might,
therefore, consider a range of acceptable plans in attempting
to estimate "undiluted" minority voting strength by this
method. Third, the court could attempt to arrive at a plan
that would maximize feasible minority electoral success, and
use this degree of predicted success as its measure of "undiluted" minority voting strength. If a court were to employ
this third alternative, it would often face hard choices about
what would truly "maximize" minority electoral success. An
example is the scenario described above, in which a minority
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group could be concentrated in one completely safe district or
divided among two districts in each of which its members
would constitute a somewhat precarious majority.
The Court today has adopted a variant of the third approach, to wit, undiluted minority voting strength means the
maximum feasible minority voting strength. In explaining
the elements of a vote dilution claim, the Court first states
that "the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it
is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute
a majority in a single-member district." Ante, at--. If
not, apparently the minority group has no cognizable claim
that its ability to elect the representatives of its choice has
been impaired. 1 Second, "the minority group must be able
to show that it is politically cohesive, that is, that a significant proportion of the minority group supports the same candidates." Ante, at--. Third, the Court requires the mi' I express no view as to whether the ability of a minority group to constitute a majority in a single-member district should constitute a threshold
requirment for a claim that the use of multimember districts impairs the
ability of minority voters to participate in the political processes and to
elect representatives of their choice. Because the plaintiffs in this case
would meet that requirement, if indeed it exists, I need not decide whether
it is imposed by § 2. I note, however, the artificiality of the Court's distinction between claims that a minority group's "ability to elect the representatives of [its] choice" has been impaired and claims that "its ability to
influence elections" has been impaired. Ante, at--, n. 12. It is true
that a minority group that could constitute a majority in a single-member
district ordinarily has the potential ability to elect representatives without
white support, and that a minority that could not constitute such a majority
ordinarily does not. But the Court recognizes that when the candidates
preferred by a minority group are elected in a multimember district, the
minority group has elected those candidates, even if white support was indispensable to these victories. On the same reasoning, if a minority group
that is not large enough to constitute a voting majority in a single-member
district can show that white support would probably be forthcoming in
some such district to an extent that would enable the election of the candidates its members prefer, that minority group would appear to have demonstrated that, at least under this measure of its voting strength, it would
be able to elect some candidates of its choice.
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nority group to "demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special
circumstances . . . -usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Ibid. If these three requirements are
met, "the minority group demonstrates that submergence in
a white multimember district impedes its ability to elect its
chosen representatives." Ibid. That is to say, the minority
group has proved vote dilution in violation of § 2.
The Court's definition of the elements of a vote dilution
claim is simple and invariable: a court should calculate minority voting strength by assuming that the minority group is
concentrated in a single-member district in which it constitutes a voting majority. Where the minority group is not
large enough, geographically concentrated enough, or politically cohesive enough for this to be possible, the minority
group's claim fails. Where the minority group meets these
requirements, the representatives that it could elect in the
hypothetical district or districts in which it constitutes a
majority will serve as the measure of its undiluted voting
strength. Whatever plan the State actually adopts must be
assessed in terms of the effect it has on this undiluted voting
strength. If this is indeed the single, universal standard for
evaluating undiluted minority voting strength for vote dilution purposes, the standard is applicable whether what is
challenged is a multimember district or a particular singlemember districting scheme.
The Court's statement of the elements of a vote dilution
claim also supplies an answer to another question posed
above: how much of an impairment of undiluted minority voting strength is necessary to prove vote dilution. The Court
requires the minority group that satisfies the threshold requirements of size and cohesiveness to prove that it will
usually be unable to elect as many representatives of its
choice under the challenged districting scheme as its undiluted voting strength would permit. This requirement,
then, constitutes the true test of vote dilution. · Again, no
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reason appears why this test would not be applicable to a
vote dilution claim challenging single-member as well as
multimember districts.
This measure of vote dilution, taken in conjunction with
the Court's standard for measuring undiluted minority voting
strength, creates what amounts to a right to usual, roughly
proportional representation on the part of sizeable, compact,
cohesive minority groups. If, under a particular multimember or single-member district plan, qualified minority
groups usually cannot elect the representatives they would
be likely to elect under the most favorable single-member
districting plan, then § 2 is violated. Unless minority
success under the challenged electoral system regularly approximates this rough version of proportional representation,
that system dilutes minority voting strength and violates § 2.
To appreciate the implications of this approach, it is useful
to return to the illustration of a town with four council representatives given above. Under the Court's approach, if the
black voters who comprise 30% of the town's voting population do not usually succeed in electing one representative of
their choice, then regardless of whether the town employs atlarge elections or is divided into four single-member districts,
its electoral system violates § 2. Moreover, if the town had a
black voting population of 40%, on the Court's reasoning the
black minority, so long as it was geographically and politically cohesive, would be entitled usually to elect two of the
four representatives, since it would normally be possible to
create two districts in which black voters constituted safe
majorities of approximately 80%.
To be sure, the Court also requires that plaintiffs prove
that racial bloc voting by the white majority interacts with
the challenged districting plan so as usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. In fact, however, this requirement adds little that is not already contained in the Court's
requirements that the minority group be politically cohesive
and that its preferred candidates usually lose. As the Court
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acknowledges, under its approach, "in general, a white bloc
vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white 'crossover' votes rises to the level
oflegally significant white bloc voting." Ante, at--. But
this is to define legally significant bloc voting by the racial
majority in terms of the extent of the racial minority's electoral success. If the minority can prove that it could constitute a majority in a single-member district, that it supported
certain candidates and that those candidates have not usually
been elected, then a finding that there is "legally significant
white bloc voting" will necessarily follow. Otherwise, by
definition, those candidates would usually have won rather
than lost.
As shaped by the Court today, then, the basic contours of a
vote dilution claim require no reference to most of the "Z immer factors" that were developed by the Fifth Circuit to
implement White's results test and which were highlighted
in the Senate Report. S. Rep. 28-29; see Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (1973), aff'd sub nom. East
Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636
(1976) (per curiam). If a minority group is politically and
geographically cohesive and large enough to constitute a voting majority in one or more single-member districts, then unless white voters usually support the minority's preferred
candidates in sufficient numbers to enable the minority group
to elect as many of those candidates as it could elect in such
hypothetical districts, it will routinely follow that a vote dilution claim can be made out, and the multimember district will
be invalidated. There is simply no need for plaintiffs to establish "the history of voting-related discrimination in the
State or political subdivision," ante, at--, or "the extent to
which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group," ibid., or "the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes," ibid., or "the extent to which minority group
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members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such
as education, employment, and health," ibid., or "the use of
overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns," ibid., or
that "elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized
needs ofthe members ofthe minority group." Ante, at--.
Of course, these other factors may be supportive of such a
claim, because they may strengthen a court's confidence that
minority voters will be unable to overcome the relative disadvantage at which they are placed by a particular districting
plan, or suggest a more general lack of opportunity to participate in the political process. But the fact remains that electoral success has now emerged, under the Court's standard,
as the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and that the elements
of a vote dilution claim create an entitlement to roughly proportional representation within the framework of singlemember districts.
II
In my view, the Court's test for measuring minority voting
strength and its test for vote dilution, operating in tandem,
come closer to an absolute requirement of proportional representation than Congress intended when it codified the results
test in § 2. It is not necessary or appropriate to decide in
this case whether § 2 requires a uniform measure of undiluted
minority voting strength in every case, nor have appellants
challenged the standard employed by the District Court for
assessing undiluted minority voting strength.
In this case, the District Court seems to have taken an approach quite similar to the Court's in making its preliminary
assessment of undiluted minority voting strength:
"At the time of the creation of these multi-member districts, there were concentrations of black citizens within
the boundaries of each that were sufficient in numbers
and contiguity to constitute effective voting majorities in
single-member districts lying wholly within the boundaries of the multi-member districts, which single-member districts would satisfy all constitutional require-
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ments of population and geographical configuration."
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 358-359 (ED
N. C. 1984).
The Court goes well beyond simply sustaining the District
Court's decision to employ this measure of undiluted minority
voting strength as a reasonable one that is consistent with
§ 2. In my view, we should refrain from deciding in this case
whether a court must invariably posit as its measure of "undiluted" minority voting strength single-member districts in
which minority group members constitute a majority.
There is substantial doubt that Congress intended "undiluted
minority voting strength" to mean "maximum feasible minority voting strength." Even if that is the appropriate definition in some circumstances, there is no indication that Congress intended to mandate a single, universally applicable
standard for measuring undiluted minority voting strength,
regardless of local conditions and regardless of the extent of
past discrimination against minority voters in a particular
State or political subdivision. Since appellants have not
raised the issue, I would assume that what the District Court
did here was permissible under § 2, and leave open the
broader question whether § 2 requires this approach.
What appellants do contest is the propriety of the District
Court's standard for vote dilution. Appellants claim that the
District Court held that "(a]lthough blacks had achieved considerable success in winning state legislative seats in the
challenged districts, their failure to consistently attain the
number of seats that numbers alone would presumptively
give them (i. e., in proportion to their presence in the population)," standing alone, constituted a violation of § 2. Brief
for Appellants 20 (emphasis in original). This holding, appellants argue, clearly contravenes § 2's proviso that "nothing
in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in
the population." 42 U. S. C. § 1973.
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I believe appellants' characterization of the District Court's
holding is incorrect. In my view, the District Court concluded that there was a severe diminution in the prospects
for black electoral success in each of the challenged districts,
as compared to single-member districts in which blacks could
constitute a majority, and that this severe diminution was in
large part attributable to the interaction of the multimember
form of the district with persistent racial bloc voting on the
part of the white majorities in those districts. See 590 F.
Supp. , at 372. 2 The District Court attached great weight to
this circumstance as one part of its ultimate finding that "the
creation of each of the multi-member districts challenged in
this action results in the black registered voters of that district being submerged as a voting minority in the district and
thereby having less opportunity than do other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice." I d., at 374. But the
District Court's extensive opinion clearly relies as well on a
variety of the other Zimmer factors, as the Court's thorough
summary of the District Court's findings indicates. See
ante, at - - - - - .
If the District Court had held that the challenged multimember districts violated § 2 solely because blacks had not
consistently attained seats in proportion to their presence in
the population, its holding would clearly have been inconsistent with § 2's disclaimer of a right to proportional representation. Surely Congress did not intend to say, on the one
hand, that members of a protected class have no right to proportional representation, and on the other, that any consistent failure to achieve proportional representation, without
2
At times , the District Court seems to have looked to simple proportionality rather than to hypothetical single-member districts in which black
voters would constitute a majority. See, e. g., 590 F. Supp., at 367. Nowhere in its opinion, however, did the District Court state that§ 2 requires
that minority groups consistently attain the level of electoral success that
would correspond with their proportion of the total or voting population.
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more, violates § 2. A requirement that minority representation usually be proportional to the minority group's proportion in the population is not quite the same as a right to strict
proportional representation, but it comes so close to such a
right as to be inconsistent with § 2's disclaimer and with the
results test that is codified in § 2. In the words of Senator
Dole, the architect of the compromise that resulted in passage of the amendments to § 2:
"The language of the subsection explicitly rejects, as did
White and its progeny, the notion that members of a protected class have a right to be elected in numbers equal
to their proportion of the population. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected
under the challenged practice or structure is just one factor, among the totality of circumstances to be considered, and is not dispositive." S. Rep. 194 (Additional
Views of Sen. Dole).
On the same reasoning, I would reject the Court's test for
vote dilution. The Court measures undiluted minority voting strength by reference to the possibility of creating singlemember districts in which the minority group would constitute a majority, rather than by looking to raw proportionality
alone. The Court's standard for vote dilution, when combined with its test for undiluted minority voting strength,
makes actionable every deviation from usual, rough proportionality in representation for any cohesive minority group as
to which this degree of proportionality is feasible within the
framework of single-member districts. Requiring that
every minority group that could possibly constitute a majority in a single-member district be assigned to such a district
would approach a requirement of proportional representation
as nearly as is possible within the framework of single-member districts. Since the Court's analysis entitles every such
minority group usually to elect as many representatives
under a multimember district as it could elect under the most
favorable single-member district scheme, it follows that the
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Court is requiring a form of proportional representation.
This approach is inconsistent with the results test and with
§ 2's disclaimer of a right to proportional representation.
In enacting § 2, Congress codified the "results" test this
Court had employed, as an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in White and Whitcomb. The factors developed by the Fifth Circuit and relied on by the Senate Report
simply fill in the contours of the "results" test as described in
those decisions, and do not purport to redefine or alter the
ultimate showing of discriminatory effect required by Whitcomb and White. In my view, therefore, it is to Whitcomb
and White that we should look in the first instance in determining how great an impairment of minority voting strength
is required to establish vote dilution in violation of § 2.
The "results" test as reflected in Whitcomb and White requires an inquiry into the extent of the minority group's
opportunities to participate in the political processes. See
White, supra, at 766. While electoral success is a central
part of the vote dilution inquiry, White held that to prove
vote dilution, "it is not enough that the racial group allegedly
discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential," 412 U. S., at 765-766, and
Whitcomb flatly rejected the proposition that "any group
with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative
halls if it is numerous enough to command at least one seat
and represents a minority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single member district." 403 U. S., at
156. To the contrary, the results test as described in White
requires plaintiffs to establish "that the political processes
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group in question-that its members had
less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice." 412 U. S., at 766. By showing both "a history of disproportionate results" and "strong indicia of lack of
political power and the denial of fair representation," the
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jplaintiffs in White met this standard, which, as emphasized
just this Term, requires "a substantially greater showing of
adverse effects than a mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution."
Davis v. Bandemer, - - U. S. - - , - - , - - (1986) (pluI rality opinion).
When Congress amended § 2 it intended to adopt this "results" test, while abandoning the additional showing of discriminatory intent required by Bolden. The vote dilution
analysis adopted by the Court today clearly bears little
resemblence to the "results" test that emerged in Whitcomb
and White. The Court's test for vote dilution, combined
with its standard for evaluating "voting potential," White,
supra, at 766, means that any racial minority with distinctive
interests must usually "be represented in legislative halls if
it is numerous enough to command at least one seat and represents a minority living in an area sufficiently compact to
constitute" a voting majority in "a single member district."
Whitcomb, 403 U.S., at 156. Nothing in Whitcomb, White,
or the language and legislative history of § 2 supports the
Court's creation of this right to usual, roughly proportional
representation on the part of every geographically compact,
politically cohesive minority group . that is large enough to
form a majority in one or more single-member districts.
I would adhere to the approach outlined in Whitcomb and
White and followed, with some elaboration, in Zimmer and
other cases in the Courts of Appeals prior to Bolden. Under
that approach, a court should consider all relevant factors
bearing on whether the minority group has "less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."
42 U. S. C. § 1973 (emphasis added). The court should not
focus solely on the minority group's ability to elect representatives of its choice. Whatever measure of undiluted minority voting strength the court employs in connection with evaluating the presence or absence of minority electoral success,
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it should also bear in mind that "the power to influence the
political process is not limited to winning elections." Davis
v. Bandemer, supra, at--. Of course, the relative lack of
minority electoral success under a challenged plan, when
compared with the success that would be predicted under the
measure of undiluted minority voting strength the court is
employing, can constitute powerful evidence of vote dilution.
Moreover, the minority group may in fact lack access to or
influence upon representatives it did not support as candidates. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, supra, at - - (POWELL, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, a
reviewing court should be required to find more than simply
that the minority group does not usually attain an undiluted
measure of electoral success. The court must find that even
substantial minority success will be highly infrequent under
the challenged plan before it may conclude, on this basis
alone, that the plan operates "to cancel out or minimize the
voting strength of [the] racial grou[p]." White, 412 U. S.,
at 765.
III
Only a plurality of the Court joins Part III-C of JusTICE
BRENNAN's opinion, which addresses the validity of the statistical evidence on which the District Court relied in finding
racially polarized voting in each of the challenged districts.
Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is admitted solely to establish that the minority group
is politically cohesive and to assess its prospects for electoral
success, I agree with the plurality that defendants cannot rebut this showing by offering evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns may be explained in part by causes other
than race, such as an underlying divergence in the interests
of minority and white voters. I do not agree, however, that
such evidence can never affect the overall vote dilution inquiry. Evidence that a candidate preferred by the minority
group in a particular election was rejected by white voters
for reasons other than those which made that candidate the
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preferred choice of the minority group would seem clearly
relevant in answering the question whether bloc voting by
white voters will consistently defeat minority candidates.
Such evidence would suggest that another candidate, equally
preferred by the minority group, might be able to attract
greater white support in future elections.
I believe Congress also intended that explanations of the
reasons why white voters rejected minority candidates would
be probative of the likelihood that candidates elected without
decisive minority support would be willing to take the minority's interests into account. In a community that is polarized
along racial lines, racial hostility may bar these and other indirect avenues of political influence to a much greater extent
than in a community where racial animosity is absent although the interests of racial groups diverge. Indeed, the
Senate Report clearly stated that one factor that could have
probative value in § 2 cases was "whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to
the particularized needs of the members of the minority
group." S. Rep. 29. The overall vote dilution inquiry neither requires nor permits an arbitrary rule against consideration of all evidence concerning voting preferences other than
statistical evidence of racial voting patterns. Such a rule
would give no effect whatever to the Senate Report's repeated emphasis on "intensive racial politics," on "racial
political considerations," and on whether "racial politics ...
dominate the electoral process" as one aspect of the "racial
bloc voting" that Congress deemed relevant to showing a § 2
violation. S. Rep. 33-34. Similarly, I agree with JUSTICE
WHITE that the plurality's conclusion that the race of the candidate is always irrelevant in identifying racially polarized
voting conflicts with Whitcomb and is not necessary to the
disposition of this case. Ante, at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in part and in the judgment and dissenting in part).
In this case, as the Court grudgingly acknowledges, the
District Court clearly erred in aggregating data from all of

83-1968-CONCUR
THORNBURG v. GINGLES

19

the challenged districts, and then relying on the fact that on
average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black
candidate in the primary elections selected for study. Ante,
at - - , n. 28. Although Senate District 22 encompasses
House District 36, with that exception the districts at issue in
this case are distributed throughout the State of North Carolina. White calls for "an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the ... multimember district," 412 U. S.,
at 769-770, and racial voting statistics from one district are
ordinarily irrelevant in assessing the totality of the circumstances in another district. In view of the specific evidence
from each district that the District Court also considered,
however, I cannot say that its conclusion that there was severe racial bloc voting was clearly erroneous with regard to
any of the challenged districts. Except in House District 23,
where racial bloc voting did not prevent sustained and virtually proportional minority electoral success, I would accordingly leave undisturbed the District Court's decision to give
great weight to racial bloc voting in each of the challenged
districts.
IV
Having made usual, roughly proportional success the sole
focus of its vote dilution analysis, the Court goes on to hold
that proof that an occasional minority candidate has been
elected does not foreclose a § 2 claim. But JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE WHITE, concludes that "persistent
proportional representation" will foreclose a § 2 claim unless
the plaintiffs prove that this "sustained success does not accurately reflect the minority group's ability to elect its preferred representatives." Ante, at--. I agree with JusTICE BRENNAN that consistent and sustained success by
candidates preferred by minority voters is presumptively inconsistent with the existence of a § 2 violation. Moreover, I
agree that this case presents no occasion for determining
what would constitute proof that such success did not accu-
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rately reflect the minority group's actual voting strength in a
challenged district or districts.
In my view, the District Court erred in assessing the extent of black electoral success in House District 39 and Senate District 22, as well as in House District 23, where the
Court acknowledges error. As the evidence summarized by
the Court in table form shows, ante, at--, App. B, the degree of black electoral success differed widely in the seven
originally contested districts. In House District 8 and Senate District 2, neither of which is contested in this Court, no
black candidate had ever been elected to the offices in question. In House District 21 and House District 36, the only
instances of black electoral success came in the two most recent elections, one of which took place during the pendency of
this litigation. By contrast, in House District 39 and Senate
District 22, black successes, although intermittent, dated
back to 1974, and a black candidate had been elected in each
of these districts in three of the last five elections. Finally,
in House District 23 a black candidate had been elected in
each of the last six elections.
The District Court, drawing no distinctions among these
districts for purposes of its findings, concluded that "[t]he
overall results achieved to date at all levels of elective office
are minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the total
population." 590 F. Supp., at 367. The District Court
clearly erred to the extent that it considered electoral success
in the aggregate, rather than in each of the challenged districts, since, as the Court states, "[t]he inquiry into the existence of vote dilution is district-specific." Ante, at - - ,
n. 28. The Court asserts that the District Court was free to
regard the results of the 1982 elections with suspicion and to
decide "on the basis of all the relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to blacks' relative lack of success over
the course of several recent elections," ante, at--, but the
Court does not explain how this technique would apply in
Senate District 22, where a black candidate was elected in
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three consecutive elections from 1974 to 1978, but no black
candidate was elected in 1982, or in House District 39, where
black candidates were elected in 1974 and 1976 as well as in
1982. Contrary to what the District Court thought, see 590
F. Supp., at 367, these pre-1982 successes, which were proportional or nearly proportional to black population in these
three multimember districts, certainly lend some support for
a finding that black voters in these districts enjoy an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
Despite this error, I agree with the Court's conclusion
that, except in House District 23, minority electoral success
was not sufficiently frequent to compel a finding of equal
opportunity to participate and elect. The District Court
found that "in each of the challenged districts racial polarization in voting presently exists to a substantial or severe degree, and ... in each district it presently operates to minimize the voting strength of black voters." I d., at 372. I
cannot say that this finding was clearly erroneous with respect to House District 39 or Senate District 22, particularly
when taken together with the District Court's findings concerning the other Zimmer factors, and hence that court's ultimate conclusion of vote dilution in these districts is adequately supported.
This finding, however, is clearly erroneous with respect to
House District 23. Blacks comprise 36.3% of the population
in that district, and constitute 28.6% of the registered voters.
In each of the six elections since 1970 one of the three representatives from this district has been a black. There is no
finding, or any reason even to suspect, that the successful
black candidates in District 23 did not in fact represent the
interests of black voters, and the District Court did not find
that black success in previous elections was aberrant.
Zimmer's caveat against necessarily foreclosing a vote dilution claim on the basis of isolated black successes, 485
F. 2d, at 1307; seeS. Rep. 29, n. 115, cannot be pressed this
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far. Indeed, the 23 Court of Appeals decisions on which the
Senate Report relied, and which are the best evidence of the
scope of this caveat, contain no example of minority electoral
success that even remotely approximates the consistent, decade-long pattern in District 23. See, e. g., Turner v.
McKeithen, 490 F. 2d 191 (CA5 1973) (no black candidates
elected); Wallace v. House, 515 F. 2d 619 (CA5 1975), vacated on other grounds, 425 U. S. 947 (1976) (one black candidate elected).
I do not propose that consistent and virtually proportional
minority electoral success should always, as a matter of law,
bar finding a § 2 violation. But, as a general rule, such success is entitled to great weight in evaluating whether a challenged electoral mechanism has, on the totality of the circumstances, operated to deny black voters an equal opportunity
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. With respect to House District 23, the
District Court's failure to accord black electoral success such
weight was clearly erroneous, and the District Court identified no reason for not giving this degree of success preclusive
effect. Accordingly, I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that
appellees failed to establish a violation of § 2 in District 23.

v
When members of a racial minority challenge a multimember district on the grounds that it dilutes their voting
strength, I agree with the Court that they must show that
they possess such strength and that the multimember district
impairs it. A court must therefore appraise the minority
group's undiluted voting strength in order to assess the
effects of the multimember district. I would reserve the
question of the proper method or methods for making this assessment. But once such an assessment is made, in my view
the evaluation of an alleged impairment of voting strength
requires consideration of the minority group's access to the
political processes generally, not solely consideration of the
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chances that its preferred candidates will actually be elected.
Proof that white voters withhold their support from minority-preferred candidates to an extent that consistently en.sures their defeat is entitled to significant weight in plaintiffs'
favor. However, if plaintiffs direct their proof solely towards the minority group's prospects for electoral success,
they must show that substantial minority success will be
highly infrequent under the challenged plan in order to establish that the plan operates to "cancel out or minimize" their
voting strength. White, 412 U. S., at 765.
Compromise is essential to much if not most major federal
legislation, and confidence that the federal courts will enforce
such compromises is indispensable to their creation. I believe that the Court today strikes a different balance than
Congress intended to when it codified the results test and
disclaimed any right to proportional representation under § 2.
For that reason, I join the Court's judgment but not its
opinion.

